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RESUMEN 
 
La investigación sobre la simbiosis es un campo en crecimiento en la biología 
contemporánea. Los avances actuales en el modelado y las técnicas experimentales han 
permitido desarrollar nuevas maneras de estudiar algunos sistemas simbióticos de 
múltiples especies cuyo estudio había sido ignorado en el pasado. Algunas de estas nuevas 
técnicas experimentales y de modelado se basan en el uso de herramientas matemáticas 
sofisticadas (como el análisis de redes) que solo se pueden emplear si el sistema se 
concibe de manera holística. Una de las principales consecuencias de este enfoque es que 
la descomposición del sistema en partes se vuelve una tarea imposible: si los biólogos 
quieren comprender cómo funcionan algunos sistemas simbióticos de múltiples especies, 
cómo se comportan o cómo evolucionan, deben estudiar el sistema de manera holística, 
en lugar de estudiar cómo cada una de las partes del sistema se relaciona entre sí. Este 
tipo de investigación parece cuestionar la tradición dominante en la filosofía 
contemporánea de la ciencia y la biología, a saber: el nuevo mecanismo. De acuerdo con 
los principios de la filosofía del nuevo mecanicismo, los sistemas biológicos deben 
descomponerse en sus elementos componentes para comprender adecuadamente cómo 
funcionan y para descubrir las conexiones causales entre los mismos. El propósito de esta 
tesis doctoral es comprender cómo la investigación contemporánea sobre simbiosis 
cuestiona algunas de las tesis filosóficas centrales que subyacen a la filosofía del nuevo 
mecanismo. Para hacerlo, la tesis se basará en dos métodos filosóficos: (1) análisis de la 
práctica científica; (2) análisis conceptual. Al aplicar estos dos métodos a la investigación 
contemporánea sobre simbiosis, la tesis da lugar a tres artículos en revistas especializadas, 
que se agregan como anexos. La contribución original clave de la disertación doctoral es 
que la investigación contemporánea sobre la simbiosis se basa en el uso de ciertos 
métodos matemáticos que solo son aplicables si el sistema se estudia de manera holística 
y, por lo tanto, conlleva una forma de explicación no mecanicista y no causal. Al final, se 
presentan varias preguntas abiertas para futuras investigaciones. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Symbiosis research is a growing field in contemporary biology. Current advances in 
modelling and experimental techniques have made possible to develop new ways of 
studying some multispecies symbiotic systems whose study had been mostly ignored in 
the past. Some of these new modelling and experimental techniques rely on the use of 
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sophisticated mathematical tools (such as network analysis) that can only be used if the 
system is conceived holistically. One of the main consequences of this approach is that 
de-composition becomes an impossible task: if biologists want to understand how some 
multispecies symbiotic systems work, how they behave, or how they evolve, they need to 
study the system holistically, rather than study how each of the parts of the system relates 
to each other. This type of research seems to question the dominant tradition in 
contemporary philosophy of science and biology, namely: new-mechanism. According to 
the principles of new-mechanistic philosophy, biological systems need to be de-
composed in their component elements to properly understand how they work, and in 
order to unveil the causal connections among the components. The purpose of this 
doctoral thesis is to understand how contemporary symbiosis research questions some of 
the core philosophical thesis that underlie new-mechanistic philosophy. To do so, the 
thesis will rely on two philosophical methods: (1) analysis of scientific practise; (2) 
conceptual analysis. By applying these two methods to contemporary symbiosis research, 
the thesis gives rise to three papers in specialized journals, added as annexes. The key 
original contribution of the doctoral dissertation is that contemporary symbiosis research 
relies on the use of certain mathematical methods that are only applicable if the system is 
studied holistically, and thus entail a form of non-causal-mechanistic explanation. In the 
end, several open questions for future research are presented.  
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Science · Philosophy of Biology · New-mechanism · Philosophy in Science 
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE DOCTORAL PROJECT 
The aim of this OVERVIEW is to contextualize the doctoral project, carefully reviewing 
the scientific problem that the project studies and motivating it in the context of 
contemporary philosophy of science. At the same time, this overview will provide an 
introduction to the research goals of the dissertation, the degree of success in reaching 
them, and the type of open questions that have emerged after it. Finally, it will also explain 
the scientific methodology that has been employed and justify its use for investigating the 
research questions that gave rise to the project. 
 The structure will be as follows. In section 1, I will introduce the scientific 
problem to be studied (section 1.1), the philosophical problem that will be investigated 
(section 1.2), I will indicate how the scientific problem and the philosophical problem are 
related (section 1.3), and I will highlight the fields that the current project will affect 
(section 1.4). In section 2, I will explain the research goals of the doctoral project, and the 
guiding hypothesis that have been used to frame the investigation. In section 3, I will 
explain –and justify– the research methodology that has been applied. In section 4, I will 
present the papers, summarize their main discoveries, and explain how they fulfil the 
research goals and conform to the guiding assumptions of the project. Finally, in section 
5, I present the open questions that the project has given raise to, and that motivate future 
research. 
 
1. Introduction to the research problem investigated in the doctoral thesis 
 
1.1. Description of the scientific problem: How symbiosis research has led to the 
development of holistic methodologies in the study of biological systems 
In the last decades, due to the substantial advances in the study of microorganismal life 
on Earth, the study of its influence on animal and plant biology, and the pervasiveness of 
symbiosis, scientists have developed new methodological strategies to study the biology 
of these multispecies biological systems, including aspects such as their behaviour and 
evolutionary dynamics (Gilbert et al. 2012, 2017; Stencel & Proszewska 2017; Bapteste 
& Huneman 2018). These symbiotic systems have been referred to as ‘holobionts’, when 
they consist in an animal/plant host plus its symbiotic microbiome, and ‘microbiomes’, 
when they consist in a collection of microorganisms living in a concrete ecological niche. 
They constitute a genuine biological reality that challenges us to revisit some of the most 
well-established work in genetics –prompting e.g. the appearance of community genetics–
, as well as some important philosophical concepts such as the notion of ‘unit of 
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selection’, ‘biological lineage’, or the concept of ‘biological individuality’ (Dupré & 
O’Malley 2009; Clarke 2010; Pradeu 2012; DiFrisco 2017; Lidgart & Nyhart 2018; Gissis 
et al. 2018).  
The contemporary increase in our knowledge of the microorganismal world, and 
especially of its importance for sustaining plant and animal life on Earth as we know it –
including several aspects of human health– has led a world-leading group of researchers 
to coin the ‘hologenome concept of evolution’ (Zilber-Rosenberg & Rosenberg 2008; 
Rosenberg & Zilber-Rosenberg 2014; Theis et al. 2016). The hologenome concept of 
evolution postulates that the holobiont, the biological symbiotic entity composed of the 
animal or plant host, plus the set of microbes that compose its microbiome, is a biological 
individual and a unit of selection in evolution (Lloyd 2017; Roughgarden et al. 2018; 
Lloyd & Wade 2019; Suárez & Triviño 2019). Grounded on this hypothesis, defenders of 
the hologenome concept are committed to the claim that the evolution of animals and 
plants is directly connected to the evolution of their microbiomes, such that many of the 
traits that allow animal/plant specializations to specific ecological niches are encoded in 
their microbiomes, rather than in the animal/plant genome –for interesting examples see 
Mendoza et al. (2018), and Gilbert (2019), Chiu & Gilbert (2019).  
The hologenome hypothesis has led biologists to develop new research 
techniques, new modelling methods, and new experimental frameworks to test the validity 
of the hologenome concept, oriented to discover whether (and, if so, how) the microbiome 
has affected animal and plant evolution (Sharon et al. 2010; Brucker & Bordenstein 2013; 
Mendoza et al. 2018; Bapteste & Huneman 2018). In addition to the evolutionary research 
undertaken in agreement with the hologenome framework, as holobionts and 
microbiomes are multispecies communities, some current research on the microbiome has 
been oriented ecologically (rather than evolutionarily), with the aim of studying the 
ecological properties of the microbiome (e.g. how bacterial species interact, how they 
affect each other, what’s their degree of stability and it is maintained, etc.) (Coyte et al. 
2015; Foster et al. 2017). 
Irrespectively of whether these systems are studied evolutionarily or ecologically, 
it is clear that empirical advances in hologenome and microbiome research have led 
biologists to recognize the importance of holistic perspectives in biology. That is, these 
discoveries have prompted biologists to realize that the properties of certain biological 
systems need to be studied holistically –or systemically– rather than part-by-part through 
a process of decomposition. Holistic methodologies have become pervasive in the study 
of biological systems, especially in the study of the well-known phenomenon of 
symbiosis. This contemporary development in scientific practice is far from trivial for the 
development of contemporary philosophy of science, for it questions some of the basic 
assumptions of the well-established tradition of new-mechanism, which has been the 
dominant tradition in some branches of philosophy of science since early 2000, when 
“Thinking about mechanisms” was first published (Machamer et al. 2000).  
Giving this context, this doctoral dissertation aims to provide an answer to the 
following question, which guided the research activities: How will the development of 
contemporary symbiosis research –with special emphasis on the methods that are 
employed to investigate symbiosis– affect philosophy of science?  
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1.2. Description of the philosophical problem: Why holistic methodologies matter 
for the development of contemporary philosophy of science. A contrast with the 
new-mechanistic tradition 
Since 2000, when Machamer, Darden and Craver published their famous paper “Thinking 
about mechanisms” (Machamer et al. 2000), the so-called new-mechanistic philosophy 
has been the standard research tradition in the study of scientific explanation within 
philosophy of science and biology.1 According to the latter, scientific research must be 
guided by a mechanistic paradigm, and to explain a phenomenon consists in uncovering 
the mechanisms that causally produce it. New-mechanism has evolved a lot since the first 
new-mechanistic hypothesis was formulated, and different ideas about the notion of 
“mechanism”, its relevance in contemporary philosophy of science, the limits of its 
applicability, etc. have been formulated (Glennan 2002; Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005; 
Craver 2007; Craver & Darden 2013; Glennan & Illari 2017; Krickel 2018). Despite the 
differences between distinct new-mechanistic accounts, it can be argued that all new-
mechanists share three key principles that define their general philosophical commitments 
(see Nicholson 2012, 2013; Militello & Moreno 2018; Huneman 2018): 
(C1) A commitment to a causal view of the world 
(C2) A global rejection of the Hempelian idea that scientific explanations 
take the form of logical arguments that can proceed either inductively or 
deductively 
(C3) The assumption that mechanisms provide the causal ingredient that is 
required to make every scientific explanation/hypothesis philosophically 
acceptable. 
The combination of these three commitments, together with a specific concept of 
“mechanism”, provide the basic resources to understand new-mechanistic philosophy, as 
well as its relevance in contemporary science, philosophy of science and general 
philosophy. For new-mechanism is not only a theory about how scientific explanations 
must proceed, or how scientific research must be carried out. It is also a global theory 
about some of the key philosophical concepts, such as “causality” [(C1) & (C3)].  
 Let us start from the beginning. New-mechanist philosophers believe that proper 
scientific explanations must proceed by discovering the mechanism (or set of 
mechanisms, if more than one) that causally produce the phenomenon of investigation 
[(C1)]. Now, an important question arises: what is a mechanism? According to new-
mechanism, a mechanism is a structure that consists in a series of entities (or parts) and 
activities (or operation) organised in a way such that the interactions between the entities 
causally produce a set of regular changes that bring the structure from a set of initial 
conditions to a termination condition (Machamer et al. 2000; Glennan 2002; Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2007; Craver & Darden 2013; Glennan & Illari 2017; Krickel 
                                                          
1 There are at least two clear earlier hypotheses about the importance of mechanisms in the biological 
sciences: Bechtel & Abrahamsen (1993), and Glennan (1996). Nonetheless, as these works acquired special 
relevance after the publication of “Thinking about mechanisms”, I will assume that the new-mechanist 
tradition starts then. 
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2018; Deulofeu & Suárez 2018).2 This definition includes three elements: a) entities, or 
parts, that interact in the mechanism and that must be singled out in the scientific 
explanation; b) activities, or operations, which refer to the way in which the entities 
interact with each other; c) organization, which refers to the particular manner how the 
entities and the activities are spatiotemporally distributed in the mechanism. In addition 
to these three elements, a mechanism must consist in a structure such that the causal 
interactions between the parts result in in the system moving from a set of initial or set-
up conditions, to a set of finish or termination conditions (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Canonical example of a mechanism –the neural synapsis. The parts (or entities) 
and their operations (or activities) are particularly salient in the picture. At the same time, 
the organisation of the system in three distinguishable elements (the axon terminal, the 
synaptic cleft, and the dendrite) is salient, and serves to clearly explain how the 
mechanism works (i.e. how the electric signal has to travel from the axon terminal to the 
dendrite, and this needs to be chemically mediated through the synaptic cleft).  Based on 
the example in Machamer et al. (2000: Figure 1). Image taken from Wikipedia Commons, 
open license. 
 
This view of mechanisms is far from philosophically and scientifically irrelevant, for it 
relies on a very specific view of the scientific process (with a very important normative 
dimension too, see e.g. Kaplan & Craver 2011). Concretely, new mechanist philosophers 
share the following methodological commitment: 
                                                          
2 There is currently a controversy between new-mechanistic philosophers about how different philosophers 
conceive the concept of mechanism, the type of commitments of new-mechanistic philosophy, etc. Even 
though this may be important for certain aspects of the development of the doctoral project (see especially 
“Paper 2”), it is irrelevant at this point, for I only aim at introducing a general view of the commitments of 
new-mechanistic philosophy, and the type of research they (all) build upon. For contemporary research on 
how different mechanistic philosophers define the concept see Nicholson (2012, 2013, 2018), Glennan & 
Illari (2018) 
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(C4) The belief that the analytic decomposition of a complex system into 
their simpler components permits that relatively few parts could be 
methodologically isolated from the rest such that causal mappings 
between specific functional operations and their distinguishable structural 
components could be drawn. 
Let me explain carefully what (C4) means (and what it does not mean), for it is essential 
to understand the philosophical core of new-mechanistic philosophy, and thus the type of 
beliefs about causality, explanation, methodology, etc. that follow. For new-mechanistic 
philosophers, a key element in scientific research is the capacity to un-pack, or de-
compose the system that they are studying in different parts (or entities) whose specific 
behaviour can be studied in isolation. In other words, according to new-mechanistic 
philosophy, the mechanism is a structure that performs a function –i.e. it systematically 
leads to a termination condition– because each of its parts engage in a set of activities in 
virtue of the way that these parts are organised. Thus, de-composition, or the capacity of 
breaking up a mechanism into its component parts is an essential element of new-
mechanistic philosophy (such that it has led some authors to argue that this should be the 
main aim of science, see Craver 2007). 
 This observation about the key commitments of new-mechanistic philosophy have 
led Issad & Malaterre (2015: 270) to argue that a mechanistic explanation (or 
methodology) would work if and only if two conditions are met: (1) a model of the 
mechanism (entities, activities, organisation) needs to be provided; (2) a causal story of 
how the parts interact to produce the termination conditions needs to told. These 
conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a proper mechanistic 
explanation of the phenomena. New-mechanists believe that most scientific activity will 
be guided by searching mechanisms, and thus the aim of science would be to find de-
composable systems, to understand how each of the parts of the system causally relates 
to the rest of the parts, and to explain how these interactions produce the final or 
termination conditions that require explanation. 
 New-mechanism, through its insistence on de-composition and the ability to 
understand how each part of the mechanism interacts with each other, conceives science 
as an activity that requires finding bottom-up causes that allow the mapping between the 
functional operations and the components that bring these operations about. This view, 
however, does not necessarily entail a form of physical reductionism à la Salmon (Salmon 
1984) or an ontic interpretation of mechanistic philosophy à la Craver (Craver 2014). On 
the contrary, most new-mechanists accept that the world has a hierarchical structure, and 
that different mechanisms can be found at different levels, realized by different entities, 
activities, and their organisation (Krieckel 2018). This point is important, for otherwise 
new-mechanism could be easily discredited by arguing that the special sciences generate 
explanations that either are not ontic, or do not de-compose the system into molecular 
components (Deulofeu & Suárez 2018). But since the hierarchical view of the world that 
most new-mechanists accept does not make them fall prey of that criticism, then a solid 
criticism to their postulates would require finding examples of explanations at some 
hierarchical level that simply do not satisfy at least one of the requirements imposed by 
the new-mechanistic philosophy. 
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 To summarize, new-mechanism is a view of philosophy, and of the scientific 
activity that is structured around four basic commitments (C1)-(C4), and that takes the 
search of mechanisms –understood as a set of entities, activities, and their organisation 
that interact in a way that be causally specified– as the basic task of scientific research. 
Now the question I need to ask is how and why the specific scientific problem I aim to 
address in this doctoral project (symbiosis research) relates to the new-mechanistic 
philosophy. In other words, to what extend do I believe that symbiosis research questions 
the new-mechanistic paradigm, and why should this be relevant in contemporary 
philosophy of science? 
 
1.3. From symbiosis research to philosophy research: How contemporary symbiosis 
research affects the development of philosophy of science 
The new-mechanistic paradigm in philosophy of science has been mainly inspired by 
contemporary developments in molecular biology and neuroscience. Indeed, it is not 
uncommon to read that the main task of molecular biology is to uncover the mechanisms 
that underlie a particular process. For instance, biologists have repeatedly reported to have 
discovered the (molecular) mechanisms of tumorigenesis (Batlle & Wilkinson 2012), or 
the (molecular) mechanisms of antibiotic resistance (Blair et al. 2014). And 
neuroscientists often talk about the mechanisms of neuronal cell death (Yuan et al. 2003), 
or the mechanisms of neurodegeneration in Alzheimer’s disease (Crews & Masliah 2010). 
New-mechanists have been especially impressed by this kind of developments, which 
made them realise that mechanisms must play a central role in contemporary science. The 
whole project of new-mechanistic philosophy has thus become to invigorate the concept 
of “mechanism” and use it as a guiding notion in contemporary philosophy of science 
that substituted the “obsolete” concepts inherited from neo-positivism.3 
My doctoral thesis takes symbiosis research as a fundamental field to prove the 
universal validity of new-mechanistic philosophy. Contemporary symbiosis research still 
relies on many assumptions deriving from molecular biology, and thus it seems that the 
new-mechanistic principles would still apply there. However, at the same time, symbiosis 
research expands substantially the field, and it seems that some of the key postulates of 
new-mechanistic philosophy will be put under question if we take seriously some of the 
new modelling practises that this type of research has developed (and is still developing). 
Contemporary symbiosis research can be basically divided according to the type 
of systems that is studies: two-species systems (e.g. host-parasite interactions), and 
multispecies systems. The former, whose study seems methodologically closer to the 
new-mechanistic paradigm, consists in studying how two species can interact closely 
during their lifetimes. The latter, however, consists in studying how living communities 
composed by thousands of species (e.g. the microbiome) interact, what are their biological 
properties, how do they evolve, etc.  
Two-species systems are sometimes studied by decomposing the system and 
unveiling the type of systematic connections between the interacting organisms (Bourrat 
                                                          
3 New-mechanism appears in a moment in which most philosophers of science had questioned the 
usefulness of the concept of “scientific law” for contemporary science, and for philosophy of science 
(Cartwright 1983; Giere 1999; cf. Mitchell 2003). 
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2018; Lynch et al. 2019). However, as I will analyse in my thesis, some contemporary 
symbiosis research carried out on two-species systems also relies on some global 
properties of these systems whose study seems to be radically different to the type of 
methodology that new-mechanism requires. Concretely, some of these systems are 
studied mathematically, by relying on game theory and the concept of evolutionary stable 
strategy (Blaser & Kirchner 2007). No mechanistic methodologies seem to be applied to 
the study of these systems, and it becomes necessary to understand why and how this can 
be so.   
Multispecies symbiosis systems, on the other hand, seem not to be ever studied 
mechanistically, or relying on a mechanistic methodology (Green & Jones 2016; 
Huneman 2018; O’Malley & Skillings 2018). Multispecies symbiosis systems, given their 
internal complexity, require different types of methodologies to be studied. Concretely, 
recent research on these systems is based on the use of graph theory (topological 
reasoning) in the form of network analysis (Figure 2). A key feature of the use of these 
techniques is that they can only be applied if the system is studied holistically, for the 
type of properties that these techniques allow to study only appear at the systemic level. 
In other words, the nature of symbiotic multispecies systems makes impossible to de-
compose them for their study, which runs contrary to the principles of new-mechanistic 
philosophy.  
a.       b.    
Figure 2. Comparison of a mechanistic model from molecular biology (a) with a network 
model from multispecies symbiotic research (b). In mechanistic models, the parts are well 
defined (molecules, cells, etc), and the system is de-composable (each entity plays a 
specific causal role that can be studied independently of the system). In a network model, 
however, the parts are abstract objects and the interactions realize a web-like structure 
that generates collective global properties that are not de-composable, i.e. the causal role 
of each part cannot be studied separately from the system, for each part only behaves the 
way it does when it is embedded within the system. Specific details about the biological 
nature of the systems are irrelevant. The images have been taken from 
https://www.slideshare.net/larsjuhljensen/network-visualization-a-crash-course-on-
using-cytoscape.  
 
A second, and very important point of multispecies symbiosis research is that it does not 
rely exclusively on the construction of bottom-up methodologies. On the contrary, 
multispecies symbiosis research relies many times on top-down methodological 
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approaches. The difference between the two types of approaches is as follows. Bottom-
up approaches consist in de-composing the system into its basic molecular constituents 
to understand how these can cause/produce the type of macroscopic behaviour that we 
observe. For instance, investigating how a genetic make up may cause a disposition to 
develop a disease is a bottom-up approach, in which the molecular components are 
attributed causal efficiency in producing the macroscopic effect. Multispecies symbiosis 
research, however, relies in many cases in top-down approaches to argue that these 
macroscopic effects are indeed causally responsible of the molecular patterns that we 
observed. For instance, it is usually argued that a concrete macroscopic pattern (like 
inflammatory bowel disease) is responsible of the strange distribution of species in the 
microbiome, and not the other way around. Of course, top-down strategies seem to be in 
many cases just “provisional”, i.e. scientist only use them until bottom-up approaches 
become feasible. However, it is not completely certain that this happens/should happen 
in symbiosis research, for many times both strategies are combined (Figure 3). To 
understand the exact significance of bottom-up approaches in symbiosis research 
becomes a fundamental task for contemporary research in philosophy of science. 
 
Figure 3. Combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches in contemporary 
microbiome research. In top-down approaches, it is studied how global properties of the 
system (e.g. degree of inflammation of the gut barrier) determine/affect its micro-
components (e.g. genetic and microbial composition). In bottom-up approaches, on the 
contrary, it is studied how micro-components (e.g. microbial composition) affect global 
properties (e.g. the thickness of the mucus layer). These approaches are frequently 
combined in multispecies research, since both global properties affect micro-components, 
and vice-versa. The image has been taken from https://phys.org/news/2016-03-gut-
microbiome-remarkably-stable.html.  
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Given the previous context, the purpose of this doctoral thesis is to study how new-
mechanistic philosophy is being affected by symbiosis research, and how it may 
illuminate some aspects of contemporary science that have not being studied deeply 
enough yet. 4 
 
1.4. Justification for tackling this specific scientific and philosophical problem: 
What would we miss if we fail to investigate the philosophical principles that 
underlie contemporary symbiosis research? 
The necessity of studying the philosophical assumptions –and their implications– that 
underlie contemporary research about multispecies symbiotic systems transcends the 
realm of philosophy of science. It derives from the deep implications that an 
underestimation –or an overestimation– of the philosophical grounding of these 
techniques may have for other applied disciplines such as contemporary evolutionary 
biology, or contemporary medicine. Disregarding or inadequately appreciating these 
implications may have consequences for: 
- Contemporary medicine – Human health. The microbiome (a genuine 
symbiotic multispecies system) plays a fundamental role in human health 
and has been systematically related to diseases such as asthma, chronic 
diabetes, hypertension and inflammatory bowel disease, among others –
probably including degenerative brain disorders, such as Parkinson (Ding et 
al. 2019). Contemporary medicine has designed treatments based on the 
principles of microbiome arrangement (including the fact that it is modelled 
by using network models), like the famous faecal transplantation, used to 
cope with chronic diarrhoea caused by Clostridium difficile infections. 
Despite the effectiveness of these treatments, we still lack a clear 
understanding of the principles that regulate microbiome arrangement, and 
most of these treatments are based on an inferred “inversed causality”: if 
this treatment works, then it must be because it rearranges the microbiome 
(Hooks & O’Malley 2017). This type of inferences about the microbiome 
are potentially very promising, as they may lead to the development of new 
and necessary therapies against infectious diseases, particularly important 
in the days of antibiotic-resistance. However, they are also potentially 
dangerous, for the principles that regulate their functioning are still 
unknown, and they may cause a “health disaster” in the long term. 
Given that my doctoral project investigates the deep epistemological and 
ontological assumptions and implications that underlie microbiome 
                                                          
4 It is important to note, although in passing, that there are other lines of criticism to the new-mechanistic 
tradition that concentrate more on the way of defining the new-mechanistic commitments. For instance, 
some people have argued that new-mechanists have failed to provide a coherent notion of “mechanism”, 
and that the term is used to define a heterogeneous class of phenomena across the sciences (Nicholson 
2012; see also Woodward 2013). Yet other have contested the necessity of new-mechanistic philosophy on 
the basis that the tradition that new-mechanism criticises (Hempel’s model of scientific explanation) can 
indeed be updated and made coherent with contemporary developments in philosophy of science (Díez 
2014; Alleva et al. 2017). Even though these are solid criticisms against new-mechanism in philosophy of 
science, I will not consider them here, for the aim of the thesis is rather to investigate a set of biological 
phenomena that seem not to fit well with the type of phenomena that inspired new-mechanism.  
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research, its implications may be potentially useful for medicine, solving 
some of the contemporary questions about the universality of microbiome-
based treatments, their scope, and their limits. 
- Contemporary evolutionary biology – Biodiversity preservation and 
agriculture. Under the hologenome framework of evolution, the 
microbiome has been speculated to play a fundamental role in the evolution 
of animals and plants. Concretely, recent ground-breaking research in 
evolutionary biology has suggested that the adaptation to some specific 
dietary sources –e.g. strict herbivory in ruminants (see Gilbert 2019), or 
strict hematophagy in bats (see Mendoza et al. 2018)–, or to specific niches 
(e.g. Caribbean waters) may have been the result of a process of coevolution 
between the animal/plant genome, and the genetic composition of its 
microbiome. Multispecies symbiosis research has studied this type of co-
evolutionary dynamics between hosts and their microbiome, with the aim of 
unveiling some of the specific details of animal-microbiome evolution. If 
this type of results can be generalised to other species, and to every adaption 
to rapid changing environmental and/or dietary conditions, it may 
potentially have a substantial use in programmes of biodiversity 
preservation (Royal Society 2018; Sergaki et al. 2018; Toju et al. 2018). 
Could the microbiome be selectively modified so that some endangered 
species can cope with the challenges of a rapidly changing climate? Could 
biodiversity be preserved by investing in programmes that, in addition to 
directly combating climate change, allow for more plastic and resistant 
animal and plant species on the basis of a modification of their microbiome? 
And, given the potential effects of the microbiome on agriculture, could 
some of these techniques be applied in that field? Is it possible to design 
resistant crops by selectively modifying their microbiome, rather than their 
genetic composition? 
One of the most serious limitations of this type of evolutionary research is 
though that the scope of these results is limited, for we still have a proper 
and complete understanding of the kind of causal implications that can be 
derived from them. And, importantly, we currently ignore whether they can 
be studied under the principles of the new-mechanistic philosophy. My 
doctoral project aims at covering this gap by precisely providing a solid 
understanding of the epistemological assumptions that underlie this type of 
research –particularly, how they fit with the new-mechanistic philosophy–, 
thus uncovering its potential limits.    
- Contemporary philosophy – Epistemology. As explained above, taking 
contemporary multispecies research seriously may radically change our 
view of some epistemological and ontological categories. Concretely, it may 
help understand better the nature of scientific modelling, insofar as my 
doctoral project will incorporate a whole new body of models that have been 
mostly disregarded in contemporary philosophy (Knuttila 2011; Frigg 2012; 
Green 2013; Serban & Green, forthcoming). This may prompt a new, wider 
view of the nature of biological knowledge, widening or radically changing 
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the scope of classical debates such as the debate about the nature of scientific 
explanation, the nature of causation, and the notion of emergence, whose 
study constitutes the main body of the project. Since all the new modelling 
techniques that are applied in the realm of contemporary biology are 
arguably explanatory, can lead to the discovery of a certain type of causal 
connections within multispecies systems, and are arguably the result of 
emergent properties (Osmanovic et al. 2018; Suárez & Triviño 2019, 2020; 
Green, forthcoming), studying each of these new techniques is highly 
promising for contemporary philosophy of science.  
My doctoral project advances the field by posing new philosophical 
questions and provide answers to questions that are mostly neglected in 
contemporary philosophy of science. Are there forms of explanation that 
transcend the new-mechanistic paradigm? How do they work? Is it possible 
to see forms of causation that act top-down, rather than bottom up? How 
does symbiosis research illuminate these alternative forms of causation, and 
what does this tells us about causation?  
Because of these issues, this doctoral project will have clear implications not only for 
contemporary philosophy of science, but also for contemporary science, in a way that can 
strongly advance our knowledge of the biological world. 
 
2. Research goals of the thesis and guiding hypotheses 
This doctoral thesis has four key research goals (RGs): 
* RG1. To analyse the type of methodologies that underlie contemporary 
symbiosis research, with special emphasis on the type of mathematical 
tools that are used to articulate scientific explanations. 
* RG2. To track the historical origins of the ideas that ground contemporary 
symbiosis research and relate them systematically to the type of 
philosophical assumptions that underlie contemporary research. 
* RG3. To study the methodological differences between different types of 
symbiosis research, with focus on the differences between two-species 
models (e.g. host-parasite interactions), and multispecies models (e.g. the 
microbiome). 
* RG4. To evaluate the epistemological consequences of the use of these 
tools in the context of the philosophical debate about scientific 
explanation, with special emphasis on how contemporary symbiosis 
research may limit some of the assumptions of new-mechanistic 
philosophy.  
 
The project is grounded on two key guiding hypotheses (GHs), whose investigation 
constituted the core of the doctoral project:  
17 
 
* GH1. The pervasive use of holistic methodologies in contemporary 
symbiosis research challenges some of the most important philosophical 
assumptions that ground the new-mechanistic tradition in philosophy of 
science. 
* GH2. The use of these new methodologies is rooted in a set of distinctive 
philosophical ideas about the concept of ‘biological individuality’ that 
contrast sharply with the ideas that support the application of mechanistic 
methodologies. 
 
3. Research methodology applied in the thesis 
During the doctoral project, the GHs have been tested in connection with historical and 
contemporary symbiosis research. The project has been grounded on two different 
research methodologies that have guided all the research activities.  
(1) Analysis of scientific practise. The method of analysis of the scientific 
practice is quite common in contemporary philosophy of science 
(Nicholson & Dupré 2018). It basically consists in the careful examination 
of the ways in which scientists conduct their research, by placing special 
emphasis in the knowledge of the methodologies they apply and the 
reason(s) why they have chosen them. It has mostly been carried out by 
reading papers, although it is usually combined with direct talk to the 
scientists (e.g. by email exchange to ask them specific questions, meetings 
in conferences, personal discussion, etc). 
(2) Conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis is one of the oldest methods 
in the tradition of analytic philosophy (Soames 2003; Margolis & 
Laurence 2014). I have used it to study the implicit meaning of the 
concepts that biologists use in their research, how they are systematically 
related to each other, and which are their philosophically hidden 
implications. This method has enabled the doctoral candidate to better 
grasp the general implications (for epistemology and ontology) of the 
concepts that biologists use. 
Each of these methodologies has been carried out in separate chronological moments, 
although both methodologies have been combined to a certain extent in the moment of 
writing the papers. 
RESEARCH PERIOD 1. OCTOBER 2017 TO APRIL 2018 
(Including a 3-months research stay at Egenis: The Centre for the Study of Life 
Sciences, University of Exeter, from January to April 2018) 
During this period my research mostly consisted in the analysis of the scientific practise, 
with special emphasis on the study of the ontological implications of the methodological 
commitments that can be found in contemporary symbiosis research. I investigated the 
scientific literature, with emphasis on the research undertaken under the framework of 
the ‘hologenome concept of evolution’. I read both papers that supported the hologenome 
hypothesis theoretically (Zilber-Rosenberg & Rosenberg 2008; Gilbert et al. 2012; Theis 
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et al. 2016) and empirically (Sharon et al. 2010; Brucker & Bordenstein 2013), with 
special interest in understanding the type of methodologies that were used in this type of 
research. At the same time, I also read papers that were critical with the hologenome 
hypothesis, both at the theoretical (Moran & Sloan 2015; Douglas & Werren 2016) and 
experimental levels (Chandler & Turelli 2014; Hester et al. 2016). Finally, I also read 
some classical works in history of biology that introduced the key concepts that my thesis 
was going to investigate (de Bary 1879; Pound 1893; Schneider 1897; Merezhkowsky 
1905). 
 This research period was oriented towards understanding the type of ontological 
commitments at the core of multispecies research. Particularly, it aimed to disentangle 
the ontological basis of the scientific disagreement. In that vein, the type of methodology 
adopted was close to the type of methodology that Peter Godfrey-Smith has suggested for 
what he calls philosophy of nature (Godfrey-Smith 2009), and what Thomas Pradeu has 
characterised as philosophy in science. 
 At the end of this research period, the first paper of the doctoral dissertation had 
been published in Symbiosis, appearing in the number of October 2018. 
RESEARCH PERIOD 2. MAY 2018 TO DECEMBER 2019 
(Including a 3-months research stay at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and 
Cognition Research, from March to June 2019) 
In the last period of my research I applied conceptual analysis to the type of 
methodological commitments that I discovered in contemporary symbiosis research. 
Concretely, I studied two specific models that have been applied in contemporary 
symbiosis research, as I took them to be the most important for the overall goals of my 
doctoral research. The analysis was not aimed at understanding the models and their 
significance in the context of contemporary biology –this activity corresponded in any 
case to research period 2–, but at conceptually understanding their implications for 
contemporary philosophy. The goal was to understand to what extent the two models I 
had chosen (Blaser & Kirchner’s equilibrium model, and Coyte et al.’s model of the 
microbiome) questioned some of the philosophical premises that grounded contemporary 
research in the new-mechanistic tradition. 
 The work in the research period was framed in the context of philosophy of 
science, as this discipline has been developed since it was first defended as an independent 
philosophical discipline due to the work of the Vienna Circle (Godfrey-Smith 2003; Díez 
& Moulines 2008; Rosenberg 2011). 
At the end of this research period, I had published the two other papers that 
compose the doctoral dissertation, one appeared in Synthese in May 2019, and the other 
appeared in Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía, in December 2019. 
 
4. Research outcomes of the doctoral thesis: Description of the three papers 
The doctoral research has given rise to three papers, each of which studies one of the 
dimensions that the doctoral project aimed to cover. The content of each of the papers, 
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how it relates to the RGs of the doctoral project, and how the three papers conform to 
each of the GHs is explained below.  
 
4.1. The importance of symbiosis in philosophy of biology 
The first paper, ‘The importance of symbiosis in philosophy of biology: An analysis of 
the debate on biological individuality and its historical roots’, appeared in the journal 
Symbiosis, volume 76, issue 2, pages 77-96, in October 2018 (first online: 28th April 
2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13199-018-0556-1. It mainly contributes towards *RG2, 
as it studies the historical origins of some of the ideas that underlie contemporary 
symbiosis research, putting emphasis in the notion that contemporary disputes about the 
legitimacy of some types of symbiosis research –investigation of the ‘hologenome 
hypothesis’– are in the end “old wine in new barrels”.  
The first part of the paper discusses the work of four biologists in late 19th and 
early 20th century (A. de Bary, R. Pound, A. Schneider, C. Merezhkowsky), to argue that 
their disagreements about the type of methodological practices they were using in their 
research were grounded on different views of ‘biological individuality’: while researchers 
such as de Bary, Schneider and Merezhkowsky had a “permissive” view, according to 
which some symbiotic assemblages could be considered biological individuals and 
studied as such, others (R. Pound) maintained a more limited view of the concept that 
discarded certain type of research strategies. Importantly, the paper strongly suggests that 
their disagreement was mainly ontological, i.e. it was based on different conceptions of 
what makes a “bunch of living stuff” a biological individual, versus what makes it a 
community of independent but interacting individuals.  
The second part of the paper systematically reviews contemporary symbiosis 
research, when this is guided under the so-called ‘hologenome framework of evolution’. 
It reviews the contemporary origins of this type of research (in the work of Lynn 
Margulis), as well as early criticisms (the work of John Maynard-Smith), to later show 
how the hypothesis has developed since it was explicitly formulated by biologists Ilana 
Zilber-Rosenberg and Eugene Rosenberg. This part of the review concentrates not only 
on how hologenome research has developed, but also on the type of criticism that it has 
given rise to. The paper systematically relates the disagreement about the 
usefulness/validity of the hologenome concept to disagreements about the nature of 
biological individuality, to quote: 
current biological disputes are partially grounded in different 
philosophical assumptions, but concretely grounded in different 
conceptions about biological individuality (2018: 93) 
It goes further to argue that these disagreements are not different from the type of 
disagreements found in early symbiosis research, in late 19th/early 20th century, insofar as 
they are rooted in the same type of diverging philosophical assumptions, which are in the 
end ontological disagreements about “how the world should be sliced into pieces”.  
 In this vein, the paper serves to pave the way for the rest of the doctoral project, 
which will concern investigating the type of philosophical assumptions that underlie 
contemporary symbiosis research. 
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 The paper appeared in a biology journal, rather than in a philosophy journal, 
because while its main contribution was philosophical –to the literature in philosophy of 
biology (as the title and keywords suggest)– its intended target audience was mainly 
biological. On the one hand, the fact that the paper appeared in a biology journal proves 
the competence of the doctoral candidate to carry out the research he aims to carry out, 
as well as to discuss the type of philosophical implications that the thesis aims to 
investigate, for it proves his biological expertise. On the other hand, it also contributes to 
an ongoing scientific discussion, which despite not being the main goal of my doctoral 
research, is also an important goal in it. 
 
4.2. Equilibrium explanation as structural non-mechanistic explanation 
The second paper, ‘Equilibrium explanation as structural non-mechanistic explanation: 
The case long-term bacterial persistence in human hosts’, appeared in the journal 
Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía, volume 38, issue 3, pages 95-120, in 
December 2019. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16434. It mainly contributes 
towards *RG3 and, partially, towards *RG1, as it investigates the study of two species 
symbiotic associations. The paper argues that even some studies of two-species symbiotic 
associations are non-mechanistic, thus contradicting the belief that the methodologies 
applied to study two-species systems need to be mechanistic. 
 The paper concentrates on the study of Blaser & Kirschner’s equilibrium model. 
Their model was developed to explain why (and how) some symbiotic associations could 
persist long-term. Conventional population genetic knowledge suggests that symbiotic 
associations are inherently instable, for they would give rise to the evolution of cheaters 
that will disrupt the association. As this is so, the evolution of evolutionarily resilient 
symbiotic associations becomes almost impossible, and their existence would require 
explanation. Blaser & Kirschner’s model covers that gap and provides a general 
framework to conceive long-term host-bacterial symbiotic associations. Importantly, it 
does so by relying on a mathematical development of the concept of evolutionary stable 
strategy specifically applied to cases of symbiosis –the concept of evolutionary stable 
strategy is conventionally applied to individuals of the same population. And, second, 
Blaser & Kirschner do not rely on any mechanism to develop their model, which only 
concentrates on potential structural features of any host-symbiont association. Their key 
contribution is thus to explore the space of possible biological states that may lead to the 
appearance of a long-term host-bacterial association. 
 Grounded on this research, our paper argues that Blaser & Kirschner’s model is 
non-causal, if causality is conceived in mechanistic terms. Our key argument is their 
model relies on the concept of evolutionary stable strategy, and thus it only explores the 
possible equilibrium states that would make host-bacterial symbiotic associations 
persistent in the long-term, and in three different levels (molecularly, ontogenetically, 
evolutionarily). Instead of relying on the possible mechanistic structure of host-bacterial 
symbiotic associations, Blaser & Kirschner’s model relies exclusively on their 
mathematical properties, and thus the model has enough generality for being applies to 
every possible symbiotic system (rather than to a concrete pair of species). The key lesson 
that our paper provides in that even pair host-bacterial symbiotic associations are 
21 
 
sometimes studied mathematically, which strongly questions the applicability of new-
mechanism in contemporary symbiosis research. 
 
4.3. Explaining the behaviour of random ecological networks 
The third paper, ‘Equilibrium explanation as structural non-mechanistic explanation: The 
case long-term bacterial persistence in human hosts’, appeared in the journal Synthese, in 
May 2019 (no volume or issue assigned yet). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02187-
9. It mainly contributes towards *RG4 and, partially, towards *RG1. The paper 
investigates the type of modelling techniques that are used for the study of the behaviour 
of multispecies symbiotic systems. Concretely, it focuses on the microbiome (a 
multispecies symbiotic system) and studies the type of modelling techniques that 
contemporary biologists are using to study some of its more salient ecological properties 
(stability behaviour). 
 The paper studies the philosophical assumptions that underlie Coyte et al.’s model 
of the microbiome. Their model relies on network analysis to study the ecology of the 
microbiome, concretely, its stability behaviour. Coyte et al.’s model serves to prove that 
what makes the microbiome stable is the high degree of competition among the different 
bacterial species that compose it, rather than the high degree of interspecies cooperation 
(as other ecological models had previously suggested). To prove this, Coyte et al. build a 
mathematical (network) model of the microbiome and study how it will respond to 
different perturbations given certain initial conditions. Their model, importantly, is purely 
mathematical, and takes the microbiome holistically, rather than de-composing it in its 
component parts.  
Grounded on that, in our paper, we make a philosophical analysis of Coyte et al.’s 
methodology to better understand its implications for contemporary philosophy of 
science. Our paper holds an important promise for future research, for it proves three 
theses: (1) in the line of the second paper, and in agreement with GH1, it contradicts the 
universality of the new-mechanistic philosophy by denying that every biological 
explanation must be causal, where causality is understood in the very strict mechanistic 
terms (bottom-up, studied by de-composing the system in its component parts); (2) it 
suggests a view of scientific explanation as a pluralist, integrative activity, where the 
model of the mechanism is combined with a mathematical structure that limits the range 
of possible states of the system. This point, far from being trivial, holds a promise for 
developing future, original research on the type of elements that make this type of 
explanations genuinely explanatory. 
 
4.4. How the papers confirm/reject the guiding hypothesis 
The three papers that constitute the body of the doctoral dissertation confirm well GH1, 
namely:  
* GH1. The pervasive use of holistic methodologies in contemporary 
symbiosis research challenges some of the most important philosophical 
assumptions that ground the new-mechanistic tradition in philosophy of 
science. 
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My research has particularly proven that the demand that biological systems must be de-
composed to provide genuine explanations has been completely challenged. Contrary to 
that, contemporary symbiosis research proves that the features of some biological system 
are explained only holistically and, more importantly, they can only be explained 
holistically. In addition to that, my research has proven that the properties of some 
biological system need to be studied top-down, rather than bottom-up (as new-mechanists 
demand), which opens an important question about causality (see next section). 
 My research, though, has been made coherent with GH2, although it has not 
completely proven it. To repeat, GH2 asserted: 
* GH2. The use of these new methodologies is rooted in a set of distinctive 
philosophical ideas about the concept of ‘biological individuality’ that 
contrast sharply with the ideas that support the application of mechanistic 
methodologies. 
It cannot be denied that my doctoral dissertation has proven that part of the divergence 
between contemporary symbiosis research and other forms of research in contemporary 
biology rest on different ideas about how to set the boundaries of biological individuals 
(see especially paper 1). However, there is still some room left to confirm the truth of 
GH2. Particularly, the specific ontology that justifies the application of different 
methodologies requires further investigation. A recent draft, jointly written with Álvaro 
Moreno, provides stronger support to GH2. However, since it has not been accepted yet, 
it is not included in the dissertation, and thus the dissertation provides support for GH2 
without completely confirming its truth. 
 
5. Open questions that arise from the doctoral research 
Although the doctoral project provided answers to the questions it aimed to tackle, it also 
left several open questions whose investigation is left for future research.  
 Firstly, the dissertation served to prove that some contemporary biological 
research (symbiosis research) is at odds with the new-mechanistic paradigm in 
philosophy of science. It showed that this paradigm could be questioned not only in 
multispecies research, but also, and more importantly, in single host-parasite research. 
Now, this clearly opens an important question: if biologists are currently designing 
research strategies that are at odds with the new-mechanistic paradigm and that, I argued, 
are perfectly explanatory, what makes these activities explanatory activities? New-
mechanism provides a sold framework to justify why certain types of scientific activities 
are explanatory. This thesis only proves that new-mechanistic philosophers have 
systematically ignored a part of scientific research that relies on different principles to 
build its explanations. However, it has not developed a systematic account of why these 
contemporary methods of biological research are also explanatory (although see Díez 
2014, for a proposal). Providing an answer to that question is an open task for future 
research, one that requires fundamental attention. 
 Secondly, in section 1.2. I explained how the new-mechanist philosophy provides 
a useful account of how some scientific methodologies are able to track causal 
relationships in the world. Importantly, these methodologies are often used as a basis to 
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define a philosophically enriching conception of “causality”. The research that I present 
in this doctoral dissertation severely questions that every scientific methodology 
traces/investigates the type of causal relationships that new-mechanist philosophers 
define. Despite this, it is undeniable that contemporary symbiosis research has discovered 
systematic relationships of some sort. A key question that has been answered in my 
doctoral research concerns the later point: what type of systematic relationship are being 
studied in contemporary symbiosis research? This question is crucial, for it can guide a 
completely new research into the concept of causality. Is the category of “causality” wider 
than new-mechanistic philosophers believe? Is it possible to argue that there are different 
degrees of causality? Can causality be a systemic property that, as such, is responsible of 
the behaviour of the parts that compose the system, rather than the other way around? If 
this is so, can we restate the concept of “downward causation”? On which grounds? These 
questions require an answer, and my doctoral project has only opened them. 
 Finally, the project results raise a very important ontological question. I said that 
the doctoral project had proven that some biological systems can only be known 
holistically, for their systemic properties disappear as soon as the system is de-composed 
to study the behaviour of each of its parts. In other words, how two parts interact with 
each other is irrelevant to know how the multispecies symbiotic system will act, as its 
behaviour becomes unpredictable. This fact, of course, raises a substantial question about 
emergence. Do symbiotic systems manifest emergent properties? Does their existence 
suppose an emergent jump in nature? How can their properties be characterised? Why is 
the behaviour of these systems non-predictable? 
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Abstract
Symbiosis plays a fundamental role in contemporary biology, as well as in recent thinking in philosophy of biology. The
discovery of the importance and universality of symbiotic associations has brought new light to old debates in the field,
including issues about the concept of biological individuality. An important aspect of these debates has been the formulation
of the hologenome concept of evolution, the notion that holobionts are units of natural selection in evolution. This review
examines the philosophical assumptions that underlie recent proposal of the hologenome concept of evolution, and traces
those debates back in time to their historical origins, to the moment when the connection between the topics of symbiosis
and biological individuality first caught the attention of biologists. The review is divided in two parts. The first part explores
the historical origins of the connection between the notion of symbiosis and the concept of biological individuality, and
emphasizes the role of A. de Bary, R. Pound, A. Schneider and C. Merezhkowsky in framing the debate. The second part
examines the hologenome concept of evolution and explores four parallelisms between contemporary debates and the
debates presented in the first part of the essay, arguing that the different debates raised by the hologenome concept were
already present in the literature. I suggest that the novelty of the hologenome concept of evolution lies in the wider
appreciation of the importance of symbiosis for maintaining life on Earth as we know it. Finally, I conclude by suggesting
the importance of exploring the connections among contemporary biology, philosophy of biology and history of biology in
order to gain a better understanding of contemporary biology.
Keywords Symbiosis . History of biology . Philosophy of biology . Biological individuality . Hologenome . Holobiont . Units of
selection
That symbiosis is a universal phenomenon in our planet is
something that does not escape the attention of biologists.
Organisms of different species constantly engage with each
other in various types of associations, amongst which symbi-
osis–the persistent relationship among individuals of different
species (Paracer and Ahmadjian 2000)– stands out as an es-
sential phenomenon for the maintenance of life on Earth as we
know it. For instance, it is widely acknowledged that the bod-
ies of most animals contain an important number of bacterial
partners, which sometimes even leads to the duplication of the
number of their own cells (Huttenhower et al. 2012; Relman
2012; McFall-Ngai et al. 2013; McFall-Ngai 2015).
Furthermore, the important role of symbionts for the physiol-
ogy and normal development of their hosts is generally rec-
ognized and widely supported by current biological evidence
(Gilbert and Epel 2009; Brucker and Bordenstein 2012, 2013;
Sommer and Bäckhed 2013; Rosenberg and Zilber-Rosenberg
2014; McFall-Ngai 2015). Finally, the importance of symbio-
sis in some events of speciation has been recently explored
and it is currently gaining empirical support (Jaenike et al.
2010; Brucker and Bordenstein 2012, 2013; Gontier 2015;
Lipnicki 2015).
The acknowledgment of the importance of symbiosis for
the maintenance of life on Earth, as well as the universality
of the phenomenon, has recently led philosophers of biol-
ogy to question the definition of some of the most important
concepts in the field. Particularly important, the
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monogenetic uniqueness of organisms as well as the bound-
aries between organisms and their environment have been
questioned, challenging some of the traditional definitions
of biological individuality. Should the symbiotic microor-
ganisms that reside within the bodies of animals and plants
be considered parts of a holistic unit that encompasses the
host and its symbionts or, on the contrary, should those
microorganisms be considered independently from the
host? If they should be considered parts of the host, forming
a higher level entity, what is the metaphysical status of this
higher level entity? Is it itself a biological individual, or an
ecological community of different independent individ-
uals? Can symbiotic assemblages be considered units of
selection, i.e. objects that form populations that evolve fol-
lowing Darwinian dynamics? If so, how does this affect the
concept of heredity? And how do symbiotic associations
evolve through time? As McFall-Ngai et al. have summa-
rized: B[t]hese new data are demanding a re-examination of
the very concepts of what constitutes a genome, a popula-
tion, an environment, and an organism^ (McFall-Ngai et al.
2013: 3234).
Those basic philosophical questions are not completely
new, and their origin can be traced back in time to the first
moments in which symbiosis thinking began to flourish,
and the definition of the concept was not clear.1 For in-
stance, at the end of the nineteenth century a popular trend
in biology started identifying symbiosis with Bmutualism^
(Martin and Schwab 2012). This attitude led those authors
to emphasize the existence of a Bshared dependency^
among partners (physiological, morphological), in which
the biological individuality of these partners might be
sacrificed in benefit of the Bbigger entity .^ This, for exam-
ple, was the position of Albert B. Frank in his early research
on mycorrhizas in 1885 (Frank 1885 [Frank 2005]; Trappe
2005). However, if on the contrary most symbionts are
interpreted as parasites, this would led to emphasize the
individuality of the symbionts that engage in the relation-
ship, suggesting that they will engage in the relationship for
their own benefit, not losing their autonomy. This position
was vigorously defended by Roscoe Pound (1893). Their
disagreement suggests that the conception of symbiosis that
one holds has consequences for how to conceive biological
individuality.
This review has two purposes: first, it aims to analyse
the influence of symbiosis thinking in recent philosophy
of biology, particularly reflecting how it has influenced
the debates about the boundaries and constitution of the
biological individual, as well as the debates about the
units of selection; second, it aims to uncover the historical
roots of the relation between the concept of symbiosis and
the philosophical controversy about what constitutes a bi-
ological individual.2
The review will be divided into two parts. The first part,
historically oriented, will introduce the concept of symbiosis
and analyse its conceptual evolution since it was first pro-
posed by Anton de Bary in 1879. The emphasis of this section
will be put in how the concept of symbiosis did already ques-
tion, since its original formulation, the boundaries and the
constitution of biological individuals. The second part of the
paper will be centred on recent developments in microbiology,
paying special attention to the hologenome concept of evolu-
tion, and how those developments have affected current de-
bates on the notion of what constitutes a biological individual,
as well as its connection with the debate about the units of
selection. I argue that most of the philosophical issues raised
by the hologenome concept of evolution were already present
in the original debates about symbiosis, and I try to uncover
their historical roots, drawing four parallelisms between past
research on symbiosis and the research done in the light of the
hologenome concept. Finally, I suggest that the recent aware-
ness of the philosophical significance of symbiosis originates
from three facts: first, the appreciation on the universality of
the phenomenon, which derives from the development of new
techniques to identify the presence of microorganisms in the
body of multicellular organisms (microbiomics); second, its
importance for sustaining life as we know it, including the role
that symbionts play in the physiology and development of
multicellular organisms; third, the consideration of some sym-
biotic assemblages –holobionts– as units of selection, which
caught the attention of philosophers who were previously not
so interested in the phenomenon of symbiosis.
1 Part I. The historical roots of the concept
of symbiosis – philosophical implications
This part of the review explores four main ideas relating to the
concepts of symbiosis and biological individuality. The gene-
sis of these ideas will be traced back to the authors that
first proposed them. I will begin by considering the work of
Anton de Bary, who first considers symbiosis as a separate
biological phenomenon, naming it, and characterizing
1 Many authors still argue that the definition of symbiosis are not clear at
present, e.g.Wilkinson (2001), Douglas (2010: 4), Martin and Schwab (2013).
2 The review is not about the problem of biological individuality and how
different biologists and philosophers have conceived the topic; rather, this
review is about the relation between symbiosis and certain dimensions of the
problem of biological individuality –the boundaries and composition of the
biological individual and the units of selection. However, the reader must at
least take into account that three different notions of biological individual will
be considered, especially in part 2: biological individuals as functionally inte-
grated units, biological individuals as units of selection and biological individ-
uals as bounded units (with clear physical boundaries, such as a membrane).
Readers interested in the philosophical problem of biological individuality
might refer to Wilson and Barker (2013), Bouchard and Huneman (2013),
Pradeu (2016a), DiFrisco (2017) and Lidgard & Nyhart (2017: 17-63).
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its specific properties. At this time, I will argue, symbiosis was
already understood to challenge received ideas on the physi-
ological boundaries of the individual; and yet, symbiosis was
not then clearly distinguished from other phenomena, e.g.
biological Bsociality^ (section 1). Second, I will consider
Roscoe Pound’s criticism of a symbiosis understood as mutu-
alism, and I will introduce the arguments he presents to justify
his opposition, paying special attention to his reliance on the
concept of Bstruggle for life^ (section 2). Third, I will analyse
Albert Schneider’s BThe Phenomena of Symbiosis^, as the
first systematization of the concept and, more importantly
for the purposes of this paper, the first moment in which sym-
biosis was understood as a phenomenon that might evolve
over time, and which could be analysed independently of the
organisms that interact symbiotically. I argue that Schneider
supposes the first important step in considering symbiotic as-
semblages as units of selection (section 3). Finally, I argue that
the last step for considering symbiotic assemblages as evolu-
tionary individuals (i.e. as questioning the conventional fron-
tiers of the evolutionary individual, of the entity that
Bstruggles for life^) was accomplished by Constantin
Merezhkowsky,3 when he hypothesized about the symbiotic
origin or chloroplasts, thus creating the conceptual possibility
of imagining a hereditary symbiosis (section 4).4
1.1 Anton de Bary (1831–1888)
The introduction of the term Bsymbiosis^ in biology is usually
credited to Anton de Bary, who originally used it for the first
time in the history of biology in his speech to the Association of
German Naturalists and Physicians, BDie Erscheinung der
Symbiose^, the Bphenomenon of symbiosis^ (de Bary 1878
[2016]; Oulhen et al. 2016).5 Nonetheless, one year before de
Bary’s lecture, Albert B. Frank had introduced the term
BSymbiotismus^, to designate those Bcases where two different
species live on or in one another^ (Frank 1877, quoted in Sapp
1994: 6).When they first used the term, both Frank and de Bary
were interested in the study of lichens, whose dual nature had
been hypothesized ten years before by Simon Schwendener
(Honegger 2000; Egerton 2015; Gontier 2016a). For
Schwendener, the dual nature of lichens was understood as a
relationship where the fungus is in control of the algae, that it
uses to obtain its nutrients, but also, and most importantly, as a
new biological individual: Bthe organisms are so intrinsically
and reciprocally connected that through their penetration and
merging, they constitute new plants with a clear individual
character^ (1868, quoted in Gontier 2016a; emphasis added).
De Bary, drawing upon those observations plus the experimen-
tal results that demonstrated that the dual nature of lichens was
not merely a fiction of Schwendener –the two elements that
constitute the lichen were separated for the first time in 1876,
and by 1877 it was already possible to synthetize lichens in the
lab bymerging algae with fungal spores (Stahl 1877, referred in
de Bary 1878 [2016]; Sapp 1994; Egerton 2015: 104, 106;
Gontier 2016a: 276)–decided to refer to Bthe living together
of differently named organisms^ by the term Bsymbiosis^
(1878 [Oulhen et al. 2016: 133]).
In his original lecture, de Bary emphasizes two aspects of
symbiotic relationships: first, the different degrees of depen-
dency that the partners in a symbiotic relationship sometimes
generate with respect to each other; second, the different kind
of effects that can be generated as a consequence of the sym-
biotic association. With respect to the latter point, by the time
when de Bary coined the concept of Bsymbiosis^, Pierre-
Joseph van Beneden’s classification of the different types of
associations between organisms in mutualism, commensalism
and parasitism, had become very popular (van Beneden
1876), and de Bary would precisely use that classification to
better capture the nature of symbiotic phenomenon, a phe-
nomenon of which, in his words: B[p]arasitism, mutualism
and lichenism are special cases^ (1878 [Oulhen et al. 2016:
136]; emphasis added).6 With respect to the former, de Bary’s
speech is predominantly dedicated, in almost its totality, in
explaining the types of dependencies among partners, includ-
ing, especially, the morphological and physiological effects
that symbiosis can cause the individuals that are interacting
symbiotically. Interestingly, he decided to include lichenism as
a distinct type of symbiotic relationship together. Why, then, is
lichenism different to mutualism and commensalism?
Most of de Bary’s paper is dedicated in explaining the
association between Azolla and Anabaena, Nostoc and
Cycas, and the fungi and algae that constitute lichens. In fact,
3 There are alternative ways to spell his name (e.g. Merezhkovski,
Mérejkovski, Mereschkovsky). I use the spelling that appears in Sapp et al.
(2002).
4 My historical focus is selective and not exhaustive, since I aim to compare
four parallelisms between the historical development of the concept of symbi-
osis and the recent developments of the concept of holobiosis. The reconstruct-
ed history I will present will reflect this interest. For the readers who are
interested in seeing different historical reconstructions see Sapp (1994),
Paracer & Ahmadjian (2000: 231-238), Wilkinson (2001), Peacock (2011),
Martin and Schwab (2012), Egerton (2015), Carrapiço (2015), Gontier (2015,
2016a), Zook (2015).
5 Frank N. Egerton, however, in his review paper on the history of symbiosis
studies dedicates the first section to studies of symbiotic phenomena that
appeared before the concept of Bsymbiosis^ was introduced (2015: 81–90).
He goes as far as to Herodotus, Aristotle and Theophrastus. Despite the interest
of their research, as far as this review is about the philosophical implications of
the concept and its relation to other philosophical concepts, I have chosen to
begin with de Bary’s account.
6 Parasitism was known while before van Beneden, but parasites (including
those that we might call nowadays microorganisms, Pasteur’s germs) were
basically considered as pursuing their own interests, thus necessarily damaging
the other in a context of struggle for life (e.g. Spencer 1899; cf. Sapp 1994: 25–
28). Precisely, what is innovative about van Beneden’s work was that he was
the first in: (1) identifying the existence of an important number of associations
among organisms that are not parasitic, a discovery that of course had histor-
ical precedents; (2) classifying the different types of biological associations in
virtue of their effects in a systematic way, which is also conceptually different
from previous views on the economy of nature (Egerton 2015: 84).
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de Bary seemed to perceive something particular in those
associations, which is the reason why he asserted:
BWhen we observe more closely the phenomena de-
scribed above, we find in the azollas and the cycads as
well as in lichens, intimate associations of different spe-
cies but never an organization that fits one of the cate-
gories described at the beginning of this study. For the
reasons that I have already explained [see below], we
cannot strictly speak of commensalism or parasitism^
(1878 [Oulhen et al. 2016: 135])
Furthermore, he also discards the hypothesis that those as-
sociations might be considered simply as cases of mutualism:
B[i]t is however doubtful that there are mutual advantages to
the partners. We can definitely say that they do not harm each
other significantly (…). But presently, we have no evidence of
the mutual benefits that they could afford each other^ (1878
[Oulhen et al. 2016: 136]). What de Bary finds particularly
noticeable about the cases of lichenism are precisely the mor-
phological and non-pathological effects of these types of as-
sociations, as well as the sorts of physiological dependencies
that emerge from the partners. Drawing directly upon the ex-
periments carried out by Stahl (1877), he highlights the im-
portant morphological changes that accompany the synthesis
of lichens: Bright after their association with the fungus of the
lichen, the cells of the algae become much larger, contain
more chlorophyll, [and] are stronger in every way. Beyond
doubt, according to data, that have been known for a long time
regarding the structure of the lichen, all of these characteristics
are retained for the entire life cycle of the lichen, sometimes
for several dozen years^ (1878 [Oulhen et al. 2016: 138]). It is
precisely at this place of his discussion, when de Bary
applies Darwin’s theory, explaining that symbiosis might
work as an inducer of the morphological changes that are
required for natural selection to generate adaptation (see also
Sapp 1994: 9; Sapp 2003: 234–251).
What it is at stake in de Bary’s discussion of lichenism is
also a debate about the nature of biological individuality. If the
elements that conform the lichen are dissociated, the lichen
does not exist anymore, and we would only have a fungus –
that will eventually die– and an alga. However, if we put them
together to generate new lichen, they become somehow de-
naturalized, they lose their main morphological characteris-
tics, adopting a new configuration that makes them different
from their free-living counterparts. De Bary’s insistence in the
non-parasitic, non-mutualistic nature of lichens is also note-
worthy. On the one hand, he seems to have identified a new
dimension of the Bliving together^, which was not reducible to
van Beneden’s categories. On the other hand, he still wanted
to keep the concept of Bsymbiosis^ to name the associations
that, in his words Bwe can group under the term sociability^
(1878 [Oulhen et al. 2016: 136]), including some associations
that do not question the individuality of the partners involved
(e.g. pollination). Jan Sapp argues that B[t]his was a strategic
argument that was designed to ensure that lichens were not
discarded as exceptions^ (1994: 9). I agree with him, and I
think de Bary actually believed he was identifying a very
distinct phenomenon, which questioned the conventionally
accepted boundaries of biological individuals.7
1.2 Roscoe Pound (1870–1964)
After de Bary delivered his lecture, research on symbiosis
started growing and new cases were discovered: Karl Bradt
discovered the presence of the symbiotic alga Zooxanthella in
the bodies ofHydra and sponges (1881, in Sapp 1994: 11) and
Patrick Geddes discovered the presence of non-pathogenic
alga in sea anemones (1882); some time later, Albert B.
Frank discovered the presence of fungi in the root of legumes,
which, he hypothesized, was a symbiont with important phys-
iological functions, naming it Bmycorrhiza^ (1885 [Frank
2005]). In this period, symbiosis practically became identified
with mutualism to a point where the two terms became inter-
changeable, while the general meaning of which de Bary had
suggested became lost (Sapp 1994: 18–34; cf. Martin and
Schwab 2012, who argue that the association between symbi-
osis and mutualism lasted until 1970).8
It is precisely in this context that Roscoe Pound lectured
his: BSymbiosis and mutualism,^ with the aim of
disentangling the two concepts (Pound 1893). Pound started
his paper by distinguishing three types of relationships be-
tween hosts and parasites: those where the host kills the par-
asite; those where the parasite kills the host; and those where
Bthe host lives on side by side with the parasite indefinitely^
and continues B[a] further development is attained in cases
where the parasite and host not only live together, but are
mutually beneficial, and, perhaps, even, in extreme cases, in-
ter-dependent^ (1893: 509; emphasis added). For him, fol-
lowing de Bary, symbiosis just meant Bliving together for a
long time,^ and mutualism is just one of the forms that this
7 It is important to note that lichenologists originally rejected Schwendener’s
dual hypothesis (e.g. Crombie 1886), denying in some cases the evidence,
among other reasons because its acknowledgment would threaten Bthe hard-
won autonomy of lichenists themselves^ (Sapp 1994: 4), in so far as lichens
would stop being an independent biological individual. Interestingly, lichen-
ologists did not lose their autonomy and it was precisely the study of lichens as
dual individuals that began challenging traditional ways of understanding bi-
ological individuals more generally. This is the first moment, to my knowl-
edge, that the problem of symbiosis and the philosophical problem of biolog-
ical individuality get engaged in a way that questions the traditional conception
of what counts as a biological individual.
8 One of the reasons why symbiosis became identified with mutualism during
this period is related to the influence of the political ideas of the time, espe-
cially the anarchist ideas of Kropoptkin (1902). Readers interested in the
influence of political ideas on symbiosis thinking can refer to Sapp (1994:
18-25) and Gontier (2016a).
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Bliving together^ might take. Yet, in most circumstances, he
claims, this Bliving together^ does not take the form of mutu-
alism. Furthermore, he provides some clarification that is es-
pecially important for the debate about biological individual-
ity: acknowledging that mutualism can take forms other than
Bliving together,^ he says Bit should be noted that the mutual-
ism of which we are here speaking is mutualism of parasite
and host –not mutualism of independent organisms^ (1893:
509; emphasis added).Why that distinction between cases of
inter-dependent organisms versus cases of independent organ-
isms?What makes the former cases so special?Wemust recall
that de Bary had explicitly said that he had no objection to
using Bsymbiosis^ to refer to those associations that can be
grouped Bunder the term sociability.^ My impression is that
Pound had already perceived the qualitative difference be-
tween those two types of association: whereas the latter do
not compromise the concept of biological individuality, as
the organisms that interact can be clearly recognized as inde-
pendent, the former do, in so far as the organisms (1) live in
close association during all their life cycle and (2) might be-
come inter-dependent to such a agree as to form a new entity.
Granted, there is a qualitative difference between the
two types of associations (i.e. sociability vs. symbiosis)
in so far as the latter, but not the former, compromise cur-
rently accepted ideas about biological individuality.
In particular, it challenges the idea that one individual
can belong to only one species classified according to the
criteria of systematists. The rest of Pound’s paper is dedi-
cated in arguing that the biologists of his time had tended
to overemphasize the presence of mutualism, claiming to
have identified it in many symbiotic associations, where it
was not at all clear that the partners were acting mutually.
First, he argues, mutualism does not occur in every lichen:
it does not exist in homoeomerous lichens, or in what he
calls Bpseudo-heteromerous lichens,^ although evidence
suggests that it might exist in heteromerous lichens, as they
exhibit a complex interdependence among the fungus and
the algae that form the lichen (Pound 1893: 511–513).
Second, he analyses Frank’s studies on mycorrhizas and,
while recognizing part of Frank’s discoveries, he refers to
some evidence by R. Hartig, Ba more sober and trustworthy
writer than Frank^ (1893: 516). He argued that:
BOrganisms are not given to gratuitously assisting one
another. Mychorhiza [sic] undoubtedly exists (…). But
that there is, in any of these cases, more than the ordi-
nary symbiosis of parasite and host, has not been shown
and is improbable. That every tree has its root system
covered with mycelia, proves nothing. Every tree has its
bark covered with lichens, its twigs with black fungi,
and its leaves with parasitic fungi of every description.^
(1893: 516)
Finally, he considers the presence of Rhizobium in the root
of Leguminosae.9 He says that the evidence is uncertain, and
although it might sometimes seem as if the Rhizobium were
mutualists, B[t]he bacteria (…) are parasites. They are there for
their own purposes, and are incidentally beneficial to the
plant^ (1893: 518). Moreover, while admitting that in some
cases the symbiosis might lead to a mutualism –as the plants
infected do better than those uninfected–he continues
diminishing the evolutionary importance of these symbioses
by criticizing some of Frank’s observations:
BTo these probabilities, Frank adds certain characteristic
improbabilities. (…) [T]hat the plant develops tubes or
hyphae for the purpose of self-infection which it sends
through its tissues. (…) [T]hat the roots of the
Leguminosae possess the power of attracting Rhizobia,
due, as he considers, to some secretion. This is too much
for his followers, and I think all will agree that it is the
last straw of an unsupportable load with which he has
already burdened our credibility.^ (1893: 519)10
And he concludes his paper saying:
BEthically, there is nothing in the phenomena of symbi-
osis to justify the sentimentalism they have excited in
certain writers. Practically, in some instances, symbiosis
seems to result in mutual advantage. In all cases it results
advantageously to one of the parties, and we can never
be sure that the other would not have been nearly as well
off, if left to itself.^ (1893: 520)
Even despite Pound’s dismissal of the importance of
mutualistic symbiosis, as well as its general importance,
his example helpfully illustrates the general awareness of
the phenomenon among biologists in the late nineteenth
century. Especially remarkable is his insistence of
distinguishing between those cases where interdependence
is generated versus those where two (or more) individuals
can be recognized as different. Second, and also remark-
able, is his way of neglecting the individuality of the sym-
biotic aggregate. As he expresses here and there, even if in
some rare cases the individuality of the symbiotic aggre-
gate might occur, the organisms are there for their own
9 Although he did not call them Rhizobium, but Btubercles,^ stating BFor all
that I have read and seen, I am satisfied that the parasites [in Leguminosae] are
bacteria, and I see no reason for separating them from the rest of Schizomycetes
as Schneider does. I even doubt the necessity of creating a separate genus for
them, as Frank did in 1890, under the name of ‘Rhizobium’^ (Pound 1893:
517).
10 See Oldroyd (2013) to realize that some of Frank’s observations were in-
deed true and Pound, while having a fair point about the lack of proper evi-
dence for some of Frank’s statements, could have not been more mistaken.
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benefit, and many of them would probably be better out-
side the symbiosis.11 These claims have two important
consequences. First, it suggests that the general rejection
of symbiosis research by biologists writing at this time was
for the reason that it seemed to negatively affect the tradi-
tional conception of biological individuality and Bstruggle
for life^ (see also Sapp 2003, 2004). Second, it paves the
way for a new and important conceptual change in symbi-
osis, the important division between symbiosis and other
forms of sociality, forms that de Bary had considered as
manifestations of the same phenomenon.
1.3 Albert Schneider (1863–1928)
The next important step in the development of the concept
was because of Albert Schneider, who in BThe phenomena
of symbiosis^ proposed a new understanding of the sym-
biosis as Ba continuous association of two or more mor-
phologically distinct organisms, not of the same kind,
resulting in a loss or acquisition of assimilated food-
substances^ (1897: 925). There were three purposes to
his paper: first, to distinguish clearly between cases of as-
sociations of living thing and cases of real symbiosis; sec-
ond, to suggest the possible evolutionary origin of symbi-
osis, accounting for the default behaviour of organisms,
which he understood as a Bstruggle for life^; and third, to
classify different types of symbiotic associations. Of
course, the three questions are closely connected to one
another: once symbiosis is distinguished from mere
Bassociation,^ the classification of different types of sym-
biotic phenomena will be partially based on evolutionary
criteria. Therefore, the different types of symbiotic rela-
tionships will be distinguished by degrees, from the forms
that entail independent individuality of the organisms that
interact, to those where the associated organisms lose their
individuality and merge to form a higher level entity.12
To start with, Schneider begins by pointing out the fact
that symbiosis is something Babnormal,^ as organisms
will usually tend to compete with each other. Symbiosis,
thus, requires long periods of time, phylogenetically, in
which the organisms live in close proximity or real con-
tact, and this makes it almost impossible to determine
when the starting point of the symbiotic relationship oc-
curred. After the relationship has begun, the organisms
will start experiencing some Bmorpho-physiological^
changes that will reinforce their connection, increasing
their degree of mutual dependency. At some point, the
two organisms will merge and their relationship will be
one of holistic dependency with respect to each other; this
is a phenomenon that Schneider calls Bcomplete
individualism.^ With this basic scheme of the evolution
of symbiotic relationships in mind, Schneider classifies
the different types of symbiosis as follows:
I. BIncipient Symbiosis (Indifferent Symbiosis)
1. Accidental Symbiosis
2. Contingent Symbiosis (Raumparasitismus)
II. Antagonistic Symbiosis
1. Mutual Antagonistic Symbiosis (Mutual Parasitism)
2. Antagonistic Symbiosis (Parasitism)
a. Obligative Antagonistic Symbiosis
b. Facultative Anatagonistic Symbiosis
3. Saprophytism
a. Facultative Saprophytism
b. Obligative Saprophytism
III. Mutualistic Symbiosis
1. Nutricism (Semi-Mutualistic Symbiosis)
2. Mutualism
3. Individualism
a. Semi-individualism
b. Complete individualism^ (1897: 930–931)
Commenting on this classification Schneider makes two
important remarks: first, the development of the different
types of symbiotic associations and their particular charac-
ter will depend largely on environmental opportunity; sec-
ond, he puts the emphasis in studying Bthe phylogenetic
relationship of the symbioses without any reference to the
phylogeny of the organisms comprising them^ (1897:
931). In this vein, as he indicates, it means that one does
not need to study the phylogenetic evolution of the specific
organisms that engage in the symbiotic relationship, but
only the relative evolution of the physiological relation-
ship. Figure 1, taken from Schneider (1897: 932) presents
his phylogenetic schema of the physiological evolution of
symbiotic relationships.
11 Pound’s seems to assume a concept of biological individuality similar to
what Queller and Strassmann have recently called the Bcooperation/conflict
conception^ of the biological individual (2009, 2016). For Pound, as it hap-
pens for the authors, symbiotic assemblages cannot be considered individuals
in the proper sense, as the entities that engage in the symbiosis are in constant
struggle with each other.
12 It must be noted, although in passing, that Schneider does not require that
the two organisms that engage in symbiosis belong to different species: he only
requires that they are morphologically different. That’s why, from his perspec-
tive, the mother and the embryo/foetus, the sexual cells that merge to form a
zygote or even tumours or cysts would count as cases of symbiosis. This is, I
think, different from de Bary’s original purpose –probably that’s why
Schneider says that he uses symbiosis Bin its broader meaning, not in the sense
of De Bary^ (1897: 923, fn. 1)–, who seemed to understand symbiosis requir-
ing different species.
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Schneider acknowledges from the beginning of his paper
the difficulty of determining the starting point of the symbio-
sis. Under the heading of Bincipient accidental symbiosis^ he
includes those cases where the organisms are in close physical
contact for a sufficiently prolonged time, understood ontoge-
netically, and irrespectively of whether or not morpho-
physiological changes (either antagonistic or mutualistic)
occur.13Moreover, he argues that, once an accidental symbio-
sis has been established, then the condition will immediately
be subject to change, since the permanency of this symbiosis
is in direct proportion to the degree of mutualistic specializa-
tion (1897: 934). In this sense, if an accidental symbiosis is not
broken down, it will evolve towards a Bcontingent
symbiosis,^ where the organisms involved, despite not
experiencing anymorpho-physiological change, seem to man-
ifest a sufficient degree of elective affinity. One case of con-
tingent symbiosis, according to Schneider, is the bacterial flo-
ra of humans, which shows a certain degree of elective affinity
but does not seem to show any kind of morpho-physiological
relationship with the host.14
The second symbiotic phenomena considered are the cases
of BAntagonistic Symbiosis.^ According to Schneider, this cat-
egory includes Bmutual parasitism,^ i.e. the situation where
both organisms live together but their relationship is mutually
damaging, Bparasitism,^ a situation where one of the organisms
is damaged whereas the other obtains benefit from the relation,
and, as a limiting non-symbiotic case, Bsaprophytism^. For
Schneider, antagonistic forms of symbiosis can only give rise
to very limited morpho-physiological specializations or
13 Schneider acknowledges the problems of this position, which can be criti-
cized on the same basis as Pound had criticized Frank’s account of mycorrhiza
–B[t]hat every tree has its root system covered with mycelia, proves nothing^
(Pound 1893: 516). However, he justifies his decision by claiming B[f]rom a
priori reasoning one is, however, forced to conclude that the first symbiotic
activities began with the first contact of organisms^ (1897: 933).
14 See part II of the paper for seeing how these sorts of claims are presently
unsustainable.
Fig. 1 Phylogentic development
of symbiosis attending to
physiological criteria. Although
saprophytism is included in the
figure, showing its relation to
other symbiotic forms, it is not
classified as a symbiotic relation,
according to Schneider; rather, he
provides it as a point of
comparison
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adaptation, since the parasitic nature of the relationship causes
it to be Ba destructive association, [such that] [t]he morpholog-
ical and physiological changes tend towards dissolution rather
than evolution^ (1897: 936). Therefore, he has a reason to
believe that, even if antagonistic forms of symbiosis are con-
ceivable (and, in principle, even expectable), a case of antago-
nistic symbiosis either evolves towards a case of mutualistic
symbiosis or it will be driven towards extinction.15
The final kind of symbiotic phenomena, the cases of
Bmutualistic symbiosis,^ can occur when two organisms in-
teract with each other so that the relation is mutually benefi-
cial. The mutual benefit might occur either because one or-
ganism benefi ts another without being damaged
(Bnutricism^), because both organisms Bmutually benefit each
other [while] are still capable of leading an independent
existence^ (Bmutualism^) (1897: 941), or because Bone or
more of the symbionts is absolutely dependent upon the other
for its existence^ (Bindividualism^) (1897: 943). Schneider
remarks, however, that it is very unlikely that something such
as Babsolute nutricism^ really occurs in the biological world.
He acknowledges that in some symbiotic associations one of
the symbionts is clearly benefitted, whereas the material ben-
efits for the other are not so clear. However, he thinks that in
most cases nutricism will tend to evolve towards a relation of
mutual benefit for both partners. This last type of relationships
might happen either in cases where both symbionts can carry
independent existence (he mentions insectivorous plants and
their bacteria, Actinia prehensa and Melia tessellata or some
species of ants and the branches of trees), or in cases where
they are mutually dependent. About this last case he claims
B[i]t (…) represents a higher form of mutualism, fromwhich it
is no doubt phylogenetically derived. (…) [In individualism]
[t]he associations form an individual, a morphological unit,
and the phenomena are frequently not recognized as
symbiosis^ (1897: 943, emphasis added).
It is important to realize, at this point, that Schneider’s work
is conceptually revolutionary. First, he is the first to consider
the possibility of studying the phylogenetic history of symbi-
otic associations (i.e. their evolution): (1) irrespectively of the
evolution of the organisms that form the symbiosis; and (2)
relative to the opportunities that the environment offers for
their evolution (in this sense, symbiotic assemblages would
be something conceptually similar to what we now call Bunits
of selection^). Second, he realizes that symbiotic associations
challenge the individuality of the organisms that interact, to
the point that they might become a new independent emergent
individual. Conceptually speaking, Schneider is the first au-
thor to recognise this last fact, thus opening the possibility of
understanding symbiotic associations as genuine evolutionary
individuals in their own right. Furthermore, he is conscious of
the physiological importance of symbiosis, as well as why it is
occasionally not possible to understand the physiology of the
organisms in isolation from their symbionts.16 This fact has
gained a lot of attention recently, especially after the
hologenome concept of evolution was proposed.
1.4 Constantin Merezhkowsky (1855–1921)
A final and important step in the conceptual development of
the association between symbiosis and biological individuality
is because of the work of Constantin S. Merezhkowsky. In his
BÜber Natur und Ursprung der Chromatophoren im
Pflanzenreiche,^ (BOn the nature and origin of chromato-
phores [plastids/chloroplasts] in the plant kingdom^),
Merezhkowsky proposed, for the f i rs t t ime, the
term Bsymbiogenesis,^ further advancing the conception of
symbiosis as an evolutionary mechanism (Merezhkowsky
1905, 1910) (see also Khakhina 1992; Sapp 1994: 47–59;
Martin and Kowallik 1999; Sapp et al. 2002: 418–423;
Gontier 2016b).
In his paper, Merezhkowsky aimed at discerning the origin of
chloroplasts in plants. During his time, it was commonly believed
that the chloroplasts, contained in the body of plants, appeared de
novo every new generation and, furthermore, that they originated
autogenously, as new organs which differentiated within the bod-
ies of plant cells. Merezhkowsky strongly disagreed with that
conception. Drawing upon Schimper’s discovery that chloro-
plasts do not appear de novo in plant cells, but are always present
within their bodies since the beginning of the life of the plant
(1885, referred in Merezhkowsky 1905), he proposed a revolu-
tionary notion: chloroplasts should not be regarded as autoge-
nous organs of plants, but as symbionts, i.e. as independent
(foreign) organisms that live together with plant cells.
Merezhkowsky offered two different types of arguments to sup-
port his theory. His first two arguments were theoretical. The first
one was based on Schimper’s discovery: if chloroplasts do not
arise de novo, though invaginations of the cytoplasm of the cell,
but Brather, they always arise through division of pre-existing
plastids, and since the latter in turn arise from pre-existing plas-
tids, etc., we necessarily arrive at the logical conclusion that long
ago the first chromatophoremigrated into a colourless organism^
(1905: 596 [Martin and Kowallik 1999: 289]).17 Secondly,
Merezhkowsky argued that chloroplasts can be understood by
analogy to Zooxanthella in the body of Amoeba viridis. In both
15 Of course, extinction of the symbiotic association, but not necessarily of the
partners that interact symbiotically. Remember that Schneider’s paper aims to
study exclusively the phylogenetic evolution of symbiotic associations without
reference to the organisms that interact.
16 Those readers who are not familiar with the different types of biological
individuals (physiological, anatomical, developmental, evolutionary, etc.) can
checkGilbert et al. (2012), Godfrey-Smith (2013), Pradeu (2016a, b), DiFrisco
(2017). In brief, however, it is important that she notes that not all criteria for
classifying biological individuals necessarily led to coincidental classifications
and sometimes different criteria overlap. For the overlapping nature of biolog-
ical classification see Clarke (2010).
17 It is widely acknowledged that chloroplasts are responsible for the green
colour of plants.
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cases, the structures (chloroplasts andZooxanthella, respectively)
can be said survive, divide and behave as independent organisms.
If biologists do not have any issue in understanding Zooxanthella
as independent symbiotic organisms within the bodies of their
hosts, they should not have any prejudice in applying the same
type of reasoning to chloroplasts, providing that the empirical
evidence supported this conception.
The rest of the rationale to his hypothesis were of empiri-
cal observation. First, the discovery that chloroplasts, in con-
trast with other Borgans^ (Borganelles^) in the body of plant
cells, can survive and reproduce even after the nucleus of the
cell has been removed, and also can do so outside the cell’s
cytoplasm, which suggests that they behave like independent
organisms. Second, the similarity between chloroplasts and
free-living bacteria, concretely, with free-living forms of
Cyanophyceae, which has been qualified by Martin &
Kowallik as the Bunquestionably most novel line of reasoning^
(1999: 287). According to Merezhkowsky, chloroplasts and
Cyanophyceae had a very similar physical appearance, both
in form and colour, very similar biochemical (physiological)
properties (with a similar type of nutrition), and analogous
ways of proliferation and reproduction, which Bmakes it ex-
ceedingly likely that chromatophores are Cyanophyceae that
invaded the plasma^ (Merezhkowsky 1905: 600–601 [Martin
and Kowallik 1999: 291]). Finally, he argued that, as it was
empirically proven thatCyanophyceae can also engage in sym-
biotic relationships with other organisms (diatoms, rhizopods,
etc.), even with cells that are protected by a cell wall, it was
possible that at some point in their evolutionary history
Cyanophyceae could have entered in contact with a plant cell
so as to give rise to chloroplasts.
Merezhkowsky’s symbiogenetic hypothesis, as well as his
arguments, gives symbiotic ideas a new meaning.
Authors writing prior to him had discussed the importance
of the symbiotic relationship, the nature of the symbiotic rela-
tionship, how symbiotic relationships could cause several
morpho-physiological changes in biological individuals, etc.
However, no one had considered the possibility that symbiosis
might be a hereditary phenomenon, i.e. that symbiotic associ-
ations might be intergenerationally transmitted (e.g. like gam-
etes passing between germ-line cells). Authors had assumed
that genetically heterogeneous organisms reproduced inde-
pendently, and later would form symbioses. Merezhkowsky,
on the contrary, challenged the necessity of this assumption;
and, by implication, questioned the boundaries of biological
individuals, understood evolutionarily. For instance, it is not
just that different organisms engage symbiotically and later
their morpho-physiological independence is lost; in the case
of plant cells, also their hereditary independence (evolutionary
individuality) is lost, as the two previously independent organ-
isms are now inher i ted exclusively together. In
summary, Merezhkowsky includes the main element that
was lacking in the symbiosis picture, conceiving, for the first
time, the idea of hereditary symbiosis. In one sense, symbiotic
assemblages had already been attributed all the necessary el-
ements for being considered units of selection (variance, in-
heritance, fitness; e.g. Lewontin 1970; Godfrey-Smith 2009).
The question afterwards changed this sense, since it now
asked us to determine the real importance of heritable symbi-
osis. Was this just an isolated case special to a different phe-
nomenon or was it general to symbiosis as such?
The notion of hereditary symbiosis was later supported by
Hermann Reinheimer, Andrei S. Famintsyn and Boris M.
Kozo-Polyansky (1924/2010) (Khakhina 1992; Sapp 1994:
47–59; Carrapiço 2015). Afterwards, Paul J. Portier (1918) and
Ivan E. Wallin (1927) would apply symbiogenetic ideas to the
origin ofmitochondria, extendingMerezhkowsky’s original ap-
plication to another cellular organelle. And even later, Paul
Buchner would explore the importance of hereditary symbiosis
in insects, proposinganewfieldof application for thehypothesis
(Boucher 1965; Sapp 2002). Symbiogenetic theories of the ori-
gin of the eukaryotic cell, however, were frequently rejected.
This trend continued for almost 50 years, until Lynn Margulis
provided new support and the symbiotic origin of the eukaryotic
cell became almost universally accepted (Sagan 1967;Margulis
1970,1991,1993; seeSapp2010).Nonetheless, it is important to
remark that the conceptual basis for understanding the role of
symbiosis in evolution, as well as the possibility of considering
some symbiotic assemblages as what we would call Bunits of
selection^ in contemporary jargon, were already settled by
Merezhkowsky in 1905.By then, all the conceptual connections
between the notions of symbiosis and biological individuality
were already present, as well as the conceptual challenges that
the formerpresentedfor traditionalconceptionsof the later. In the
next part of the paper, I will explore how those conceptual con-
nections have been explored in recent times, especially after the
proposal of the hologenome concept of evolution.
2 Part II. Holobionts and hologenomes –
contemporary philosophical implications
of symbiosis
The previous part of the review has analysed how the concept
of symbiosis appeared in biology and how the connections
between symbiosis and biological individuality changed and
developed. Towards the end of this history, the concept would
express itself, in the form of hereditary symbiosis or
symbiogenesis, and some biologists postulated it as a mecha-
nism of evolution. This part of the review will examine recent
conceptual debates in the symbiosis literature, especially the
notion of the holobiont and the hologonome concept of evo-
lution. In section 1, I discuss Lynn Margulis’ introduction of
the concept, as well as its relation to Merezhkowsky’s notion
of Bsymbiogenesis^. I argue that Margulis’ view of the
holobiont is ambiguous: sometimes the holobiont is
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apparently restricted to cases of hereditary symbiosis and oth-
er times it is not. In section 2, I discuss the hologenome con-
c ep t o f e vo l u t i o n , a s Ro s enb e rg a nd Z i l b e r -
Rosenberg introduced it, and I review the current debates that
it raises in connection to the problems presented by the con-
cept of biological individuality. In section 3, I relate the
hologenome concept of evolution to the historical discussion
presented in Part I, arguing that the conceptual disputes that
the hologenome concept has generated are not new, but only
a progression of the previous disputes that were held in the
nineteenth century. I observe four parallelisms which obtain
between the past disputes on symbiosis and the disputes raised
by hologenomes, as well as three further points of distinction.
2.1 The origin of the concept – the importance
of Lynn Margulis (1938–2011)
Lynn Margulis (born Alexander) was a pioneer in the field of
symbiosis, to which she dedicated almost 50 years. She is espe-
ciallyknownforgivingnewlife to thehypothesisof thesymbiotic
origin of eukaryotic cells, as well as for her enthusiasm about the
importanceof symbiosis for lifeonEarthandevolution (Margulis
1990, 1991, 1998, 2010; Sagan & Margulis 2002; Díaz 2015;
O’Malley 2017). Margulis is acknowledged as the first person
to introduce the term Bholobiont^, which was published in her
paper BWords as battle cries– symbiogenesis and thenewfield of
endocytobiology^ (1990). In this work, she compares cyclical
hereditary symbiosis with meiotic sex. In both of these com-
paredcasesof inheritance, she argues that twoentities arepresent,
which cyclically recognize each other and merge together for
every generation. Moreover, in both of these cases she specu-
lates thepresenceofmechanisms,whichguarantee the integration
of these two entities and, also, their subsequent dissociation,
resulting in the formation of a new individual. An entity formed
of two different gametes is what we call a Bzygote,^whereas the
entity that results from the merger of two symbionts is what
Margulis refers to as Bholobiont^, which she recognises as a
new individual (1990: 676, Fig. 3). Margulis does not, however,
specify which Bbionts^ should be regarded as part of the
holobiont, nor does she explicitly define the term in the paper.
One year later, in BSymbiogenesis and symbioticism^, the
first chapter of a book she edited with René Fester, Margulis
defines the holobiont as a Bsymbiont composed of recognizable
bionts^, and she defines symbiosis as the physical contact be-
tween organisms of different species occurring Bthroughout a
significant proportion of the life history^ (1991: 2, Table 1).
Again, she does not explicitly specify which bionts should be
included in the holobiont. If one follows her definition of life
history strictly –Bevents throughout the development of an in-
dividual organism correlating environment with changes in ex-
ternal morphology, formation of propagules, and other observ-
able aspects^ (1991: 2, Table 1)– it might be argued that the
holobiont would encompass all the bionts that share their
lifetime together, irrespective of whether they are inherited or
not. Clearly, this conception of the holobiont would be incoher-
ent with the concept she had put forward in her previous
(1990), where she seemed to suggest that the holobiont should
exclusively include the cases of hereditary symbiosis, in
her analogy between symbiogenesis and embryogenesis. This
second formulation is reasonable if one takes into account the
purpose of the chapter, namely, to vindicate the proposition of
symbiogenesis as a way in which new species, kingdoms and
taxa could evolve –for instance, she says that Bthe highest level
taxa (…) have evolved by acquisitions of symbionts that have
become hereditary^ (1991: 11, emphasis added)–.
This formulation is also coherent with claims she made in her
later writings (Margulis and Fester 1991; Margulis 1998, 2010;
Margulis & Sagan 2001, Margulis and Sagan 2002; and also
see O’Malley 2017). For instance, in one of her latest paper,
where she justifies the historical role of Kozo-Polyansky in
introducing the idea of symbiogenesis to biology, she argues
for the necessity of genetically distinct bionts reproducing to-
gether in order for symbiogenesis to occur. Analysing the asso-
ciation between eels and a specific species of shrimp (cleaning
symbiosis), she argues:
BIt is symbiosis, but not symbiogenesis. Both partners
grow and reproduce separately. Both shrimp and eel can
live separately. One sees no obvious novelty generated
by this symbiosis; i.e., symbiotic physical association.
The relationship between the shrimp and the eel is still a
behavioral one^ (2010: 1528, emphasis added)
In this vein, one might argue that, as Bholobiont^ was in-
troduced in comparison to meiotic reproduction, andMargulis
discusses it while reflecting the importance of symbiogenesis
as an evolutionary mechanism (and evolution requires inher-
itance), the holobiont is thus the biological individual that
includes all those symbionts that are inherited together (organ-
elles in eukaryotes, obligatory endosymbionts in insects, etc.)
(O’Malley 2017: 36, for a defence of this interpretation).
This interpretation of Margulis’ understanding of holobionts
is not without contestation, though. In the same volume where
Margulis published her paper, Maynard-Smith suggests Ba
Darwinian view of symbiosis^ (Maynard-Smith 1991). There,
he relates the problem of symbiosis to the problem of the units
of selection18 and embeds it in the framework of the theory of
18 Maynard-Smith does not use Bunits of selection^, but Bunits of evolution^,
where a unit of selection is whatever entity exhibit phenotypic variation that
led to multiplication of the entity within the population (thus being selected for
or against), and a unit of evolution is a unit of selection that, furthermore,
exhibits heredity (Maynard-Smith 1987). In contrast with Maynard-Smith, I
will use Bunit of selection^ as it is conventionally used, i.e. requiring heredity,
variance and fitness/multiplication, and thus meaning what Maynard-Smith
means by Bunit of evolution^ (see Lloyd 2017a, c: 293–297; Gontier 2010,
for an analysis of the concept of Bunit of selection^)
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evolutionary transitions in individuality that he was starting to
develop. According to Maynard-Smith, symbiosis can be un-
derstood as an evolutionary mechanism and interpreted in a
Darwinian fashion (i.e. with the entities that interact symbioti-
cally being a unit of selection) only if the entities that interact
symbiotically are transmitted directly, because B[w]ith direct
transmission the genes of the symbionts will leave descendants
only to the extent that the host survives and reproduces^ (1991:
35). Therefore, as far as the two bionts have their fitness inter-
ests aligned, it is expected that those symbionts will tend to
maintain a mutualistic relation that, eventually, might make it
Breasonable to consider the association as a single unit^ (1991:
38). However, in cases of indirect transmission, this possibility
is much less likely, and he suggests that the interacting entities
should be considered as independent units (of selection).
Maynard-Smith’s paper is relevant because he seems to be
discussingMargulis’ liberal views about thepower of symbiosis.
For him, those cases where symbiosis might be considered to
have evolutionary power, in the sense of affecting the role of
natural selection, are very limited, and probably precluded only
tocases suchascellularorganelles, ashe suggests at theendofhis
paper. If this is so, thenMargulis’notionof theholobiontmightbe
interpreted not as constrained exclusively to the cases of the eu-
karyotic cell, but as including the associations of many different
bionts. In fact, this view is endorsed in Guerrero et al. (2013),
published two years after Margulis’ death. In that paper,
holobionts, considered as autopoietic (self-sustaining) units, are
defined as Bintegrated biont organisms, i.e., animals or plants,
with all of their associated microbiota^ (2013: 133, emphasis
added). In thesameplace, theyalsocoinedthetermBholobiome^,
referring to Bthe assembly of genetic information contributed by
the animal or plant and its associated microbiota^ (2013: 134),
and demanding a new look at evolution that would take into
account the importance of the host genome plus the genome of
its microbiota. They argued this to be a new entity, whose basic
interacting elements that would give rise to new species and, in
general, new biological variety. At some point of the paper, the
authors even endorse the theses that: (1) holobionts are subjected
tonatural selection;and(2)holobiomesareentities thathavebeen
selected due to their selective advantages. Even if the authors do
notmention the concept "units of selection", their papermight be
interpreted as endorsing the hologenome concept of evolution,
thus considering the holobiont, with its hologenome
(holobiome), as a possible unit of selection in evolution.
Whether Margulis’ concept of the holobiont has to be
interpreted as encompassing only hereditary symbiosis or,
on the contrary, encompassing the whole collection of symbi-
onts, and whether she was claiming that holobionts are units
of selection or not, it seems clear that her conceptual heritage
in the field of symbiosis is very important. She was one of the
most vigorous defenders of the role of symbiosis for caus-
ing novelty in evolution (Margulis 1998; Margulis and
Sagan 2002). Moreover, she coined the notion of the
Bholobiont^, which is one of the most discussed concepts in
philosophy of biology at present. In the next section, I analyse
the recent usage of the notion of the holobiont, as well as the
criticisms that have been raised against it.
2.2 The hologenome concept of evolution and its
critics: a review of current debates
The hologenome concept of evolution19 was originally pro-
posed by Eugene Rosenberg and collaborators (Rosenberg
et al. 2007), in their review paper: BThe role of microorgan-
isms in coral health, disease, and evolution^, as a generaliza-
tion of the coral probiotic hypothesis (see Reshef et al.
2006).20 Drawing upon their observations on coral disease,
the authors suggested the existence of: Ba dynamic relation-
ship (…) between symbiotic microorganisms and corals at
different environmental conditions that selects for the most
advantageous coral holobiont in the context of the prevailing
conditions. By altering the structure of its resident microbial
community, the holobiont can adapt to changing environmen-
tal conditions more rapidly and with greater versatility than a
process that is dependent on genetic mutation and selection of
the coral host^ (2007: 360).
Moreover, reasoning from the existence of this dynamic
relation between the coral host and its microbiota, as well as
the knowledge that the possibility such a relation offers for the
adaptive evolution of a coral to changing environmental con-
ditions, the authors inferred that the coral holobiont must be a
unit of selection, i.e. that it is subjected to the process of
evolution by natural selection. Drawing upon the observation
that, as it happens in corals, all animals and plants harbour an
19 Originally, they referred to it as the hologenome theory of evolution. Later
on, they started calling it the hologenome concept of evolution (cf. Gissis et al.
2017: 303–384).
20 A clear antecedent to the hologenome concept is found in Sapp (2003: 234-
251, 2004), when he coins the concept of Bsymbiome^. He defines the
symbiome as the entity Bcomprising chromosomal genes, organellar genes,
viral genes, as well as other microbial symbionts, sometimes inside cells and
always outside them, functioning across a continuum from parasitism to mu-
tualism, depending on their nature and context (…). Since every plant and
animal consists of complex ecological communities of microbes, the
symbiome must function as a unit of selection.^ (2004: 1047). Nonetheless,
Sapp first presents the concept in a section dedicated to developmental sym-
biosis (Sapp 2003: 235–236), and there is no reason to believe that a develop-
mental organism should be delineated by the same boundaries than a unit of
selection (e.g. DiFrisco 2017). The concept of Bsymbiome^, however, is not as
frequent in current literature as the concept of Bholobiont^ and it has been
recently used with two different meanings: first, to refer to the whole set of
symbionts that associate with a host, without including the host (e.g. Boucias
et al. 2013; Rosas-Pérez et al. 2017); second, to refer exclusively to Bthe
colocalized and coevolving taxa in a given consortium^ (Tripp et al. 2017:
552). If we define the concept according to the second formulation, then one
might argue either that symbiome = hologenome (if the hologenome is proven
to evolve as a single unit) or that the symbiome corresponds to the part of the
hologenome that actually evolves as a single unit (e.g. the set of vertically
transmitted symbionts). This warrants further discussion, which is, however,
outside the scope of this paper. For my present purposes I will restrict the
discussion to the concept of the holobiont sui generis.
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abundant number of symbiotic microorganisms in their bod-
ies, the authors suggest that we generalise the coral probiotic
hypothesis to include every animal and plant. Thus, Reshef
et al. proposed the hologenome concept of evolution, the no-
tion that Bthe holobiont with its hologenome should be con-
sidered as the unit of natural selection in evolution, and mi-
crobial symbionts have an important role in adaptation and
evolution in higher organisms^ (2007: 360, Box 2).
Nevertheless, in the original paper, the authors do not spec-
ify: the meaning of "holobiont", the meaning of
"hologenome", or how their hypothesis could be applied to
other model organisms. Instead they briefly justify its appeal
on four grounds: first, the universality of symbiosis between
animals/plants and microorganisms; second, the existence of
phenotypic variance between host species and their microbi-
ota, i.e. the fact that hosts of the same species harbour different
microbiotas; third, the different range of effects of the micro-
organisms on their hosts (parasitism, mutualism, commensal-
ism); and fourth, the possible mechanisms of change for the
holobiont (includingmicrobial amplification, microbial acqui-
sition, etc.) (Rosenberg et al. 2007: 360, Box 2). However, the
authors acknowledged that their reasons were insufficient to
support their generalization of the coral probiotic
hypothesis. To overcome this difficulty Zilber-Rosenberg
and Rosenberg (2008) would publish BRole of microorgan-
isms in the evolution of animals and plants: the hologenome
theory of evolution^ one year later. Beginning with the ac-
knowledgment that microorganisms have been discovered to
play a fundamental role in the life of higher organisms (ani-
mals, plants), including humans, the authors introduced their
hypothesis with a rhetorical question:. B[i]f microbial symbi-
onts play such an important role in the lives of their eukaryotic
hosts, why should they not also play a role in the evolution of
these higher organisms?^ (2008: 723, emphasis
added). Zilber-Resenberg and Rosenberg hypothesized that
holobionts (i.e. biological entities composed by a host plus
all its microbial symbionts), with their hologenomes (i.e. the
sum of all the genetic information of the host plus the genetic
information of its symbionts) are units of selection. More spe-
cifically, concerning the notion of the holobiont, they expli-
cated that:
BAlthough much of the important research on symbiosis
has been carried out with a small number of model sys-
tems involving a single major symbiont, the
hologenome theory places importance not only on these
major symbionts but also on the enormously diverse
associated microbiota, which have only been uncovered
in recent years using molecular techniques^ (2008: 724)
This last point is particularly relevant because it frames the
hologenome concept in a very distinctive way. It is not just that
very particular host-microbe associations should be considered
as units of selection (e.g. the eukaryotic cell, aphids and
Buchnera aphidicola, squids and Vibrio fischeri, etc.). This last
proposal would not be so revolutionary, after all. The
hologenome concept suggests that one should consider the host,
with all its microbes (i.e. the holobiont), as a unit of selection in
evolution. Notice that this definition of the holobiont might be
contrasted with Margulis’ understanding, which seemed to be
limited to cases of hereditary symbiosis, at least according to
some interpretaters (e.g. O’Malley 2017). What is the justifica-
tion that Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg believe to have found
for their hypothesis? They claim the existence of four sources of
evidence: the observation that all higher organisms associate
with microorganisms; the fact that symbionts are reliably trans-
mitted intergenerationally; the fact that symbionts affect the fit-
ness of the holobiont; and, finally, the possibility of generating
genotypic variation within the holobiont by changing their mi-
crobial composition.
It must be noted that the way in which Rosenberg and
Zilber-Rosenberg present the hologenome concept is based
on a particular interpretation of the units of selection, accord-
ing to which two types of questions should be distinguished:
first, the question about the interactor, or vehicle, the entity
that interacts with the environment as a cohesive whole, in
such a way that replication is differential21; second, the ques-
tion about the replicator, the entity of which copies are made
(Dawkins 1976; Hull 1980; Okasha 2006; Godfrey-Smith
2009; Lloyd 2017a). For Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg,
the holobiont would be an interactor, a cohesive physiologi-
cal and metabolic entity, whereas the hologenome would be a
replicator (see also Rosenberg et al. 2010; Rosenberg and
Zilber-Rosenberg 2014, 2016; Author 2015; Bordenstein
and Theis 2015; Shropshire and Bordenstein 2016; Theis
et al. 2016).
After Rosenberg and Zilber-Rosenberg proposed their hy-
pothesis, the notion that the holobiont with its hologenome
constitutes a biological individual has been defended in dif-
ferent ways by different authors, some of which have
interpreted it as a unit of selection. Dupré and O’Malley
(2009), and John Dupré (2010, 2012) have defended the no-
tion that the holobiont should be considered as the interactor
in evolution, in so far as it is the entity responsible for the
differential reproduction of the entities that compose it. The
authors do not mention, however, the possibility of conceiving
the hologenome as a replicator. Scott F. Gilbert, Jan Sapp and
Alfred I. Tauber have suggested that we understand the
holobiont as a biological individual anatomically, develop-
mentally, immunologically, physiologically and genetically
21 BSuch that replication is differential^ does not specify which are the entities
whose differential replication might be affected by belonging to an interactor.
It is conceptually possible that the holobiont is an interactor that promotes a
more efficient replication of the different individuals that compose the
holobiont (host, microbes of the microbiome), but not of the hologenome.
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(Gilbert et al. 2012; also Gilbert et al. 2017; Roughgarden
et al. 2017). Lynn Chiu and James Griesemer have separately
proposed a concept of the holobiont as a developmental hy-
brid in which the microbes would act as scaffolds of the indi-
viduality of the host (Gilbert & Chiu 2015; Chiu and Eberl
2016; Griesemer 2016, 2017). Lisa Lloyd has suggested an
understanding of the holobiont as an interactor, as a reproduc-
er, and as a manifestor of adaptation (Lloyd 2017b; see also
Griesemer 2017). Ford Doolittle and Austin Booth have pro-
posed to conceive the hologenome as a functional replicator,
i.e. as a network of genetic interaction patterns that can be
instantiated across different generations of holobionts
(Doolittle and Booth 2017; see also Lemanceau et al. 2017);
Suárez (under review) has defended a group-selection inter-
pretation of the holobiont, suggesting that we conceive
of holobionts as intergenerationally inherited collections of
traits associated to successive generations of a particular host.
In so far as holobionts can be considered collections of traits,
he argues that they can be conceived of as units of selection.
Finally, Ehud Lamm has suggested that holobionts should be
understood as Bstructures of evolution^: Bconstellation[s] of
evolutionary factors and their relations […] [that] provide
scientists with a common framework and terminology and
[allow them] to elicit research questions and hypothesis that
apply to many systems of interest^ (2017: 372).
Furthermore, some evidence has been gathered in support
of the hologenome hypothesis (e.g. Rosenberg and Zilber-
Rosenberg 2014; Bosch & Miller 2016, for general summa-
ries). In a pioneer study onNasoniawasps, Robert M. Brucker
and Seth R. Bordenstein have argued that hybrid lethality
among different Nasonia species is caused by a disruption of
the relation between their species-specific microbiomes and
the host genome, which suggests that the different species
represent a coevolved hologenome (2013; cf. Chandler &
Turelli 2014 for a response; cf. Brucker & Bordenstein
2014).Their study has prompted an immediate interest in the
study of the phenomenon of phylosymbiosis, Bthe eco-
evolutionary pattern, whereby the ecological relatedness of
host-associated microbial communities parallels the phyloge-
ny of related host species^ (Brooks et al. 2016: 1). Convergent
host-microbe phylogenies that support the existence of
phylosymbiosis have been found in hominids (Ochman et al.
2010; Moeller et al. 2016). Julia K. Goodrich and collabora-
tors have found some evidence that suggests that the
microbiome might be heritable and its composition could
be partially determined by the host genome (Goodrich et al.
2014, 2016, 2017; see also Turpin et al . 2016).
Finally, ThomasW. Cullen and collaborators have found some
evidence that might suggest that the host’s immune system
might control microbiota acquisition (Cullen et al. 2015).
However, some evidence has also been found that suggests
that there are no such tight host-microbiome intergenerational
associations. For instance, Eric R. Hester and collaborators
have not found evidence that supports inheritance of the
microbiome among corals. Instead, they found that the micro-
biota that associates with a coral species are selected accord-
ing to functional criteria, and thus there are no intergeneration-
al phylogenetic convergences (Hester et al. 2016). The same
results have been found in ruminal ecosystems: even if
the hosts of the same species might share a functionally sim-
ilar microbiota, the specific microbial taxa that they associate
with are different. The authors explained the occurrence of
this phenomenon with a metaphor: Bthe players might change
but the game remains^ (Taxis et al. 2015; Doolittle and Booth
2017 base their account of the holobiont on these results).
The hologenome concept, however, has also been
contested by many, who propose that: (1) the holobiont is a
sufficiently coherent biological entity for it to be considered
an evolutionary interactor (Booth 2014; Queller and
Strassmann 2016; Skillings 2016); there is no real empirical
evidence supporting the claim that the hologenome can be a
replicator or a reproducer, in so far as the fidelity of its inter-
generational transmission is very low (Moran and Sloan 2015;
Godfrey-Smith 2015; Stencel 2016; Douglas and Werren
2016; Hester et al. 2016; Hurst 2017; Stencel & Wloch-
Salamon under review). Detractors of the holobiont concept
tend to emphasize the lack of shared interests and unifying
mechanisms between the entities that compose holobionts;
and, on this basis, they are reluctant to accept the notion that
holobionts are uni t s of se lec t ion in any of the
aforementioned senses.
The claim that holobionts are interactors has been recently
disputed by Austin Booth who, emphasizing the fact that the
different entities that compose a holobiont can reproduce in-
dependently, has argued that Bthe interactor perspective on
holobionts, as currently endorsed, suffers from imprecision.
More needs to be said about just what kinds of causal interac-
tions among parts serve to bind independently reproducing
populations into interactors^ (2014: 670). This notion has also
been criticized by David C. Queller and Joan E. Strassmann,
who argued that holobiont defenders make an illegitimate in-
ference from physical proximity (symbionts living together)
to functional integration (symbionts constituting an
interactor): BThe holobiont is defined by spatial criteria.
There is no reason to believe that spatial proximity necessarily
leads to functional integration^ (2016: 869). And also Derek J.
Skillings has criticized this notion on the basis that the entities
that compose the microbiome of a holobiont might change
during the host’s lifetime. If this is so, he argues, then there
are no criteria of identity to recognize a holobiont as a biolog-
ical individual (sensu organism or interactor), because the mi-
crobial species that compose it are constantly and fluidly
changing (Skillings 2016).
In relation to the claim that holobionts are replicators,
Angela E. Douglas and John H. Werren have rejected the
possibility on the basis that holobionts lack the proper type
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of intergenerational inheritance (Douglas and Werren 2016).
For them, the holobiont can be considered a unit of selection
if and only if there is sufficient partner fidelity –Bstable asso-
ciation of host and symbiont genotypes across multiple
generations^ (2016: 2) – among the different species that con-
stitute the holobiont. Otherwise, the entities that compose the
holobiont would not have their fitness interests aligned; and
thus, selection at the level of the holobiont would be disrupted
by selection at lower levels. They concede that very specific
and tight host-symbiont associations, under very special cir-
cumstances, may qualify as units of selection. However, they
are sceptical that the same might be said about all the mem-
bers of the microbiota: BWe do not argue that selection cannot
act on the host-microbiome as a unit. We simply argue that the
evidence for this is weak, and the conditions necessary for it to
occur are unlikely^ (Douglas and Werren 2016: 5; see also
Moran and Sloan 2015; Hurst 2017). Suárez (under review)
has offered a specific reply to this criticism, arguing that their
requirement of partner fidelity is unreasonable, since it relies
on some assumptions about biological individuality that are
disputable (the cooperation/conflict concept of biological in-
dividuality). Furthermore, he argues that the same type of
assumptions are not applied to other levels of the biological
hierarchy (e.g. transitions in evolutionary individuality),
which creates a disparity of criteria. Finally, Peter Godfrey-
Smith has also criticized the notion that holobionts are repro-
ducers on the grounds of his concept of Darwinian popula-
tions (2015). He believes that host-microbe associations can
only qualify as units of selection in the situations when the
host is able to Bkidnap^ the reproduction of the microbe, i.e.
when host and microbe can only reproduce together as a unit,
but not independently from each other, since otherwise the
system would be disrupted. He claims this to be true of eu-
karyotic cells generally. Godfrey-Smith also acknowledges
the existence of intermediate reproductive stages (i.-
e. reproduction partially kidnapped, but with a high degree
of independence). In any case, he does not believe that there
is any evidence to qualify the holobiont, conceived as the host
plus all its microbes, as a unit of selection, because the parts
can still reproduce independently of the whole and thus will
not have the same interests.
The debates between defenders of the hologenome concept
of evolution and its detractors reflect diverging conceptions of
biological individuality. Defenders of the hologenome con-
cept tend to emphasize the collaborative nature of life, as well
as the importance of symbiotic associations for maintaining
life as we know it. They seem to share a commitment to a view
of biological individuality according to which the existence of
conflicts amongst the parts of a system does not rule out the
possibility of the system evolving as a unit. Furthermore, they
concentrate on studying symbiosis as an independent phe-
nomenon, and try to understand the evolution of symbiotic
relationships by partially abstracting away from the organisms
that engage in symbiosis. Detractors of the concept, on the
other hand, tend to emphasize the impossibility of having a
biological individual if the parts of the systems are in conflict
with one another, thus rejecting any claim about the individu-
ality of holobionts. They are prone to consider holobionts as
mere ecological communities of independent organisms that
are together due to environmental convenience, not due to
shared evolution. They put more emphasis on the study of
the different species that engage in the symbiosis that in the
study of the evolution of the symbiotic relationship itself.
More research is needed to determine the empirical conse-
quences of the hologenome concept of evolution, as well as
to unravel the empirical consequences of the different concep-
tual assumptions made by defenders and detractors of the
notion. Research on the historical roots on some of the recent
debates will help to determine the origins of some of the pres-
ent assumptions in current debates, as well as help with clar-
ifying different issues raised by the hologenome concept of
evolution, some of which were already present in the debates
of prior literature.
2.3 The historical roots of the hologenome concept
of evolution
Most of the debates about the hologenome concept of evolu-
tion explored in the previous section parallel some of the de-
bates about symbiosis explored in Part I. I will explore four
parallelisms between them, uncovering the similarities be-
tween recent research and the research conducted in the nine-
teenth century. Finally, I will explore the novelties introduced
by the hologenome concept of evolution, exploring its differ-
ences to previous research.
2.3.1 First parallelism. The importance of mutual dependence
among organisms
One of the aspects of life that symbiosis research has empha-
sized since it originally appearedwas themutual dependencies
that exist among organisms. Without being necessarily mutu-
alists, organisms frequently rely and depend on each other in
order to survive and reproduce. De Bary found that some of
those dependencies were not just circumstantial, but were
maintained throughout the entire life cycle of certain individ-
uals of different species. After de Bary, many other scientists
stressed the importance of mutual dependencies among organ-
isms in order to sustain life as we know it. Defenders of the
holobiont concept stress the existence of those mutual depen-
dencies among organisms, putting a special emphasis on the
interactions of animals and plants with their microorganisms.
They frequently insist that the phenotypes of known animals are
not the result of a genetic plan that develops without external
influences, but are the result of a co-construction between the
animal themselves and their symbionts. They stress that
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anatomically, immunologically, developmentally and physio-
logically we have never been individuals, if individuality is
understood as the linear development of a single genetic plan
(Dupré 2010; Sapp et al. 2012).
Like the original proponents of the symbiotic concept, in-
cluding de Bary, Schneider, and Merezhkowsky, contempo-
rary defenders of the holobiont pay special attention to those
processes of co-construction and criticize previous approaches
that have tended to diminish the importance of collaborations
for essential processes. From a conceptual point of view, de-
fenders of the holobiont are not proposing anything new: the
founders of symbiosis research knew already that the long-
term ontogenetic interactions of individuals of different spe-
cies questioned basic ideas about the defining boundaries of
the individual. If a biological individual is a functional whole
that can survive by its own means to a great extent, then
individuals do not necessarily match species, as there could
be individuals that are composed by two or more different
species that interact to form a cohesive bigger whole (see ft.
5). Therefore, defenders of the hologenome share their ideas
with the founders of symbiotic thought; and, in this sense,
their theses are not conceptually new.
2.3.2 Second parallelism. Spatial continuity and biological
individuality
One of the arguments used by the detractors of the
hologenome concept was based on the fact that from the ob-
servation that two entities live together one cannot infer that
these two entities are a biological individual. This criticism
was explicitly expressed by Queller & Strassmann, who de-
nounced the defenders of the holobiont who inferred function-
al integration of the entities that compose the holobiont from
the fact that they live in physical contact (2016: 819). A sim-
ilar view is expressed by Booth, when he demands the pres-
ence of concrete mechanisms that guarantee that the members
of holobionts are genuinely bounded together. It is not enough
to say that they reside within the body of the host. The type of
relationship that those microorganisms maintain with their
host needs to be specified, or otherwise their common bound-
edness would be biologically irrelevant.
Queller & Strassmann’s and Booth’s observations match
closely with the observation made by Pound in 1893.
Criticizing Frank’s assumptions about the symbiotic character
of mycorrhizas, he argued B[t]hat every tree has its root system
covered with mycelia, proves nothing. Every tree has its bark
covered with lichens, its twigs with black fungi, and its leaves
with parasitic fungi of every description.^ (1893: 516). His
criticism, even if it was directed at a different type of associ-
ation, rests on the same kind of assumptions about biological
individuality. To prove that two entities living together are a
biological individual, one needs to prove that there is a shared
functionality. Inferring that two entities are a unique
individual (or that they relate to each other mutualistically)
from the fact that they share the same physical boundaries is
insufficient. Therefore, the criticism raised by Queller &
Strassmann and by Booth cannot be considered as conceptu-
ally novel. It is true that the criticism applies to an entity that,
intuitively (i.e. based on physical appearance), might be con-
sidered more Bindividualistic^ than the association between
mycorrhiza and trees, which Pound discussed. However, this
does not mean that the structure of the arguments used to
criticise the concept are different.
2.3.3 Third parallelism. Studying the symbiotic phenomenon
independently of the organisms that engage in the symbiotic
relation
Defenders of the hologenome concept tend to emphasize the
functional relations that exist between specific hosts and their
microbiota. Different researchers have stressed the importance
of a proper and balanced microbiota for the healthy physiolo-
gy (and development) of organisms. From this observation,
many authors have inferred evolutionary consequences, as
well as a history of shared coevolution among independent
genomes that form a hologenome. In some cases, like in
Doolittle and Booth’s (2017), the hologenome has been de-
fined functionally, as a set of functionally relevant genetic
networks that are reconstructed again and again in every
new realisation of a holobiotic unit. This functional view of
the holobiont and the hologenome abstracts away from the
organisms that interact symbiotically. What matters is that
the same functional relationships reoccur every generation,
as well as the evolution of those relationships, irrespectively
of the organisms that guarantee that this happens.22 This po-
sition contrasts with organism-centred views of symbiosis, in
which what is significant is not so much the evolution of
symbiosis itself, but the evolution of the organisms that en-
gage in the symbiotic relationship.
Schneider might be taken as a key reference for those po-
sitions, in so far as his work emphasized the study of the
evolution of the symbiotic phenomenon in itself,
irrespectively of the organisms that engage in the symbiotic
relationships. As he argued, symbiosis research should study
Bthe phylogenetic relationship of the symbioses without any
reference to the phylogeny of the organisms comprising
them^ (1897: 931). Furthermore, he also emphasized the im-
portance of environmental opportunity for establishing sym-
biosis. The new functional approach towards understanding
symbiosis could be conceptually understood in the terms of
Schneider, and it seems significantly connected to his pre-
scriptions about how to study the phenomenon of symbiosis
and the different symbiotic relations that exist in nature. In this
sense, conceptually speaking, the emphasis on physiology for
22 This position is taken to the extreme in Doolittle (2017).
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understanding the nature and evolution of symbiosis is not
new at all; it was already present in past literature.
2.3.4 Fourth parallelism. From symbiosis to symbiogenesis.
The origin of new individuals through symbiosis
Merezhkowsky famously emphasized the importance of sym-
biosis as an evolutionary agent that can generate evolutionary
novelties (new structures) as well as new biological individ-
uals. In this vein, he was situating symbiosis outside of the
realm of ecology and putting it in the realm of evolution.
Even if the importance of symbiosis for evolution had been
also emphasized for other authors (de Bary, for instance, who
pointed out the possibility of using symbiosis for doing evolu-
tionary experiments and emphasized the importance of symbi-
osis in creating new biological structures), it was
Merezhkowsky who first appreciated the possibility of gener-
ating new biological individuals as a consequence of the sym-
biotic merger of two previously extant ones. Defenders of the
hologenome concept have exploited this last possibility and
applied Merezhkowsky’s ideas generally, not only to eukary-
otic cells. If mitochondria are former symbionts that are now
considered parts of a new biological individual (i.e. the eukary-
otic cell), so too should the microorganisms that compose an
animal’s microbiota be considered parts of a new individual.
Conceptually speaking, there is no big difference between
the hologenome concept and Merezhkowsky’s ideas about
symbiogenesis. In both cases, it is assumed that new individ-
uals can emerge through symbiosis and that these new indi-
viduals will have new biological properties. Furthermore, in
both cases symbiosis qua symbiogenesis is put in the realm of
evolution, and is not considered exclusive to the realm of
ecology. In this sense, the hologenome concept is not concep-
tually revolutionary, as the ideas were already present in early
twentieth century biology. The qualities that differentiate the
hologenome concept from previous developments in symbi-
otic thought, thus, must lie elsewhere.
2.3.5 What is new about the hologenome concept?
Despite the parallelisms between the hologenome concept of
evolution and previous issues treated in symbiosis research, it
cannot be denied that the hologenome concept of evolution has
brought new interestto some debates in biology and philoso-
phy of biology. Furthermore, it has introduced an element of
novelty in those debates; this is the reason why the
hologenome concept of evolution should be explored further,
especially in order to find what precisely makes it unique. I
think that there are three important elements that distinguish
the hologenome approach from its historical antecedents:
– First, the hologenome concept of evolution appeared after
the Bomics^ revolution, a moment when the technological
tools available for scientific research allowed biologists to
discover an important number of microorganisms that
had been previously unnoticed (Rosenberg and Zilber-
Rosenberg 2014). In this sense, and in contrast with pre-
vious research on symbiosis, the hologenome concept is
more universal, as it departs from the empirical evidence
that all animals and plants bear an important number of
microorganisms within their bodies. Previous research on
symbiosis, however, had not been able to detect the uni-
versality of the phenomenon, and only some specific
cases of symbiosis were studied. In addition, in previous
research the emphasis was put on very specific symbi-
onts, those that reappear across different generations of
the same host and play a very specific role during the host
lifetime (normally endosymbionts). The hologenome
concept, however, changes the focus of the research and
extends it to the whole microbiota. In this vein, the foci of
the research are not particular host-symbiont associations,
but the association between a host and all of its microbes.
– Second, a fundamental element that frames contemporary
discussions about symbiosis is the role of microorganisms
for maintaining life as we know it. More concretely, the
hologenome concept appeared as a (alleged) conceptual
consequence of the observations of the conditions under
which healthy corals could grow (i.e. the Bcoral probiotic
hypothesis^). The proponents hypothesized that the best
way of explaining health and disease among corals was to
propose that corals, with their microbiome, constituted a
single unit of selection in evolution. In this sense, the
discovery of the physiological relationships between ani-
mals and plants and their microorganisms is the basis of
the hologenome concept, as well as the basis for under-
standing its philosophical significance. In fact, this is what
distinguishes Schneider’s account of the bacterial flora
and the account put forwards by defenders of the
hologenome concept: while Schneider recognised the ex-
istence of an elective affinity between microorganisms
and their host, he believed this to be of reduced signifi-
cance, and thus situated this as a case of Baccidental
symbiosis^. In recent years however, it has been shown
that the relationship between a host and its microbiota is
not just merely Bcasual^, but that there are very concrete
physiological (and developmental) functions that are par-
tially determined and/or realized as a consequence of its
presence. This is particularly important because it encour-
ages us to think of the phenomenon’s evolutionary possi-
bility. The hologenome concept of evolution is a hypoth-
esis about why this elective affinity, whichis accompanied
by the realization of basic functions could have appeared
and evolved through time.
– Third, the hologenome concept of evolution, in contrast
with previous discoveries made for symbiosis, has caught
the attention of many philosophers of biology that had
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previously not considered the symbiotic Bhabit^ in much
detail. I think there are two reasons for this. The first
reason is that, after the important developments in the
Bomic^ sciences, philosophers of biology started paying
more attention to microorganisms (O'Malley 2014). In
fact, philosophy of biology has been accused of highly
ignoring the importance of microorganisms, which de-
spite constituting about 80% of the total biota had not
played a significant role in many philosophical disputes
(O’Malley and Dupré 2007). This attitude has changed in
recent years, and this change is important if we are to
understand why the conceptual problems raised by sym-
biosis research have become more urgent for the philoso-
phers of biology writing at the present. A second impor-
tant change is the way in which the defenders of the
hologenome concept, especially Rosenberg and Zilber-
Rosenberg, have framed the debate. In contrast to previ-
ous research on symbiosis, which, while acknowledging
the evolutionary importance of symbiosis, still treated the
phenomenon in ecological terms, the defenders have put
emphasis on the evolutionary importance of symbiosis.
Particularly, they have provoked one of the most agitated
debates among philosophers of biology, the debate about
the units of selection. I believe that the emphasis of
their understanding of symbiotic assemblages
(holobionts) in terms of the units of selection debate has
been of special importance for the engagement of philos-
ophers, who have been discussing the issue of units of
selection for about half a century. In this vein, framing the
debate in terms of units of selection is conceptually novel
in relation to previous (nineteenth century) debates.
3 Part III. Concluding remarks
This paper has reviewed some of the current debates about
symbiosis and its relation to the problems of biological indi-
viduality. It has also traced the historical roots of the current
debates, and argued that some of this arise as a consequence of
the hologenome concept of evolution, whichwas were already
present to some extent in the nineteenth century, in the context
of the original problem of explaining the Bliving together^ of
individuals. The review shows how current biological dis-
putes are partially grounded in different philosophical as-
sumptions, but concretely grounded in different conceptions
about biological individuality. I have argued that defenders of
the hologenome concept tend to emphasize the collaborative
aspect of life, and that they showa tendency to focus their stud-
ies on the evolution of the symbiotic relationship, irrespective
of the different organisms that engage in the symbiosis. On the
contrary, detractors of the hologenome concept tend to em-
phasize the conflicting interests of the entities that compose
the holobiont, and, on these grounds, tend to reject any attri-
bution of individuality, conceiving the holobiont as a commu-
nity of relatively independent individuals. The disagreement
among both parties in the dispute is based upon diverging
conceptions about biological individuality, as well as upon
diverging conceptions about the focal unit of analysis.
Finally, the review has also revealed the connection be-
tween the original debates about symbiosis and contemporary
debates. I have drawn four parallelisms between the historical
and contemporary debates, and emphasized three distinctive
issues of the current debates. I have shown how the disagree-
ments amongst both the defenders and the detractors of the
holobiontare similar to some of the disagreements of both the
defenders and the detractors of symbiosis during the concept's
modern inception. In general, the review has shown the exis-
tence of an intimate connection between biology, history and
philosophy, and how different philosophical assumptions
might underlie current debates in biology. Furthermore, I
have suggested the importance of the relationship between
philosophy and current biological thought, especially
concerning the debates on biological individuality, the
holobiont and the units of selection, and I have emphasised
the historical origin of these debates. I suspect that many cur-
rent debates in biology are also affected by diverging philo-
sophical assumptions, which have their specific historical
background also. Studying these assumptions, as well as their
historical sources, is an important and constructive task facil-
itating firther clarity and understanding on some of these con-
temporary debates. In this sense, biology, philosophy of
biology and history of biology, far from being completely
separate disciplines, are totally entangled with one
another.
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Bacterial Persistence in Human Hosts 
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RESUMEN 
Philippe Huneman ha cuestionado recientemente los límites en la aplicación de los 
modelos mecanicistas de la explicación científica en base a la existencia de lo que denomina 
“explicaciones estructurales”, en las que el fenómeno se explica en virtud de las propiedades 
matemáticas del sistema en que el fenómeno ocurre. Las explicaciones estructurales pueden 
darse en formas muy diversas: en virtud de la forma de pajarita (bowtie) de la estructura, de las 
propiedades topológicas del sistema, de los equilibrios alcanzados, etc. El papel que juegan 
las matemáticas en las explicaciones que apelan a la estructura de pajarita o a las propiedades 
topológicas del sistema ha sido recientemente examinado en varios trabajos. Sin embargo, el 
papel exacto que juegan las matemáticas en el caso de las explicaciones en términos de equi-
librio aún no ha sido totalmente clarificado, y diferentes autores defienden interpretaciones 
contradictorias, algunas de las cuales las asemejarían más al modelo defendido por algunos 
filósofos mecanicistas que al modelo estructural de Huneman. En este trabajo, tratamos de 
cubrir ese déficit estudiando el papel que juegan las matemáticas en el modelo de equilibrio 
anidado (nested equilibrium) elaborado por Blaser y Kirchner para explicar la estabilidad de las 
asociaciones ontogenética y filogenéticamente persistentes entre humanos y microorganis-
mos. De nuestro análisis se desprende que su modelo es explicativo porque i) se identifica 
una estructura matemática del sistema que viene dada por un conjunto de ecuaciones dife-
renciales que satisfacen una estrategia evolutivamente estable; ii) la estructura anidada del 
modelo hace que la estrategia evolutivamente estable sea robusta ante posibles perturbacio-
nes; iii) esto es así porque las propiedades del sistema empírico son isomorfas a, pero no 
causalmente responsables de, las propiedades de la estrategia evolutivamente estable. La 
combinación de estas tres tesis hace que las explicaciones en términos de equilibrios se ase-
mejen más al modelo estructural de explicación que al modelo mecanístico.  
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: explicación científica; mecanismos; explicación en términos de equilibrio; explicaciones 
estructurales; explicaciones no causales; estrategia evolutivamente estable. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Philippe Huneman has recently questioned the widespread application of mecha-
nistic models of scientific explanation based on the existence of structural explanations, 
i.e. explanations that account for the phenomenon to be explained in virtue of the math-
ematical properties of the system where the phenomenon obtains, rather than in terms of 
the mechanisms that causally produce the phenomenon. Structural explanations are very di-
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verse, including cases like explanations in terms of bowtie structures, in terms of the topo-
logical properties of the system, or in terms of equilibrium. The role of mathematics in 
bowtie structured systems and in topologically constrained systems has recently been exam-
ined in different papers. However, the specific role that mathematical properties play in 
equilibrium explanations requires further examination, as different authors defend different 
interpretations, some of them closer to the new-mechanistic approach than to the structural 
model advocated by Huneman. In this paper, we cover this gap by investigating the explan-
atory role that mathematics play in Blaser and Kirschner’s nested equilibrium model of the 
stability of persistent long-term human-microbe associations. We argue that their model is 
explanatory because: i) it provides a mathematical structure in the form of a set of differen-
tial equations that together satisfy an ESS; ii) that the nested nature of the ESSs makes the 
explanation of host-microbe persistent associations robust to any perturbation; iii) that this 
is so because the properties of the ESS directly mirror the properties of the biological sys-
tem in a non-causal way. The combination of these three theses make equilibrium explana-
tions look more similar to structural explanations than to causal-mechanistic explanation. 
 
KEYWORDS: Scientific Explanation; Mechanisms; Equilibrium Explanations; Structural Explana-
tions; Non-Causal Explanations; Evolutionarily Stable strategy. 
 
 
In the last few years, a new trend in the debates about scientific expla-
nation has flourished in philosophy of science. This new trend, “new-
mechanism,” emphasizes the role of mechanisms in scientific discourse in 
general, and in scientific explanation in particular [Machamer et al. (2000); 
Glennan & Illari (2017)]. Inspired by the developments in molecular biology, 
new-mechanists redefine causalism and argue that to explain a phenomenon 
consists in providing the mechanism that produces it. In the new-mechanist 
tradition, mechanisms are taken to be a set of entities (parts) and activities (op-
erations) with a particular organization such that their causal interactions bring 
the phenomenon to be explained about [Glennan (2002); Bechtel & Abra-
hamsen (2005); Craver & Darden (2013); Craver (2007); Nicholson (2012); 
Issad & Malaterre (2015); Deulofeu & Suárez (2018)]. Thus, for a scientific 
explanation to be mechanistic, it must fulfill two necessary and sufficient 
conditions. First, it must identify a model of mechanism in which the mecha-
nism is individuated by its parts, operations and organization. Second, it 
must provide a story of how the components of the mechanism are causally 
connected in such a way that they produce the explanandum.  
New-mechanists share a basic commitment to a causal view of the 
world combined with: 1) the rejection of the Hempelian idea that expla-
nations take the form of logical arguments, either inductive or deductive, 
and 2) the notion that mechanisms provide the causal “ingredient” that 
scientific explanations require to be genuinely explanatory1. Furthermore, 
they often assume a hierarchical view of mechanisms, acknowledging the 
existence of a diversity of scientific explanations in every science, thus 
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neither renouncing to the explanatory role of the special sciences, nor to 
the possible existence of mechanistic inter-level (hierarchical) explana-
tions among different sciences [Krickel (2018)].  
The wide scope of the New Mechanism account of scientific expla-
nation in biology has been questioned due to the existence of explanations 
that seem to lack the causal ingredient that new-mechanists demand. One 
of the traditional explanatory types where this happens is in equilibrium 
explanations, where the mathematical properties of the empirical system 
(i.e. the fact that it reaches an equilibrium point) are taken as explanatory, 
irrespectively of the causal-mechanistic details of the system. Starting with 
Sober (1983), equilibrium explanations have been hypothesized to consti-
tute an alternative to purely causal-mechanistic explanations [Batterman & 
Rice (2014); Rice (2015); Huneman (2018b), (2018c)]. However, it has also 
been argued that some equilibrium explanations admit a causal interpreta-
tion, if “causality” is understood in Woodward’s interventionists terms 
[Woodward (2003); Kuorikoski (2007); Potochnik (2015)]. If the later were 
the case, as some new-mechanists are committed to an interventionist 
Woodwardian view of causation [Craver (2007); Kaplan & Craver (2011)], 
it could be argued: first, that the mathematical components that are pre-
sent in equilibrium explanations describe the causal relationships among 
the entities of the system; second, that equilibrium explanations do not 
then constitute a real exception to the new-mechanist trend. The existence 
of these contradictory interpretations of the nature of equilibrium explana-
tions (causal vs. non-causal) creates an important gap to understand how 
they gain their explanatory force, as well as about the specific role of cau-
sality in scientific explanation: is causality — at some level — a necessary 
ingredient in every scientific explanation, or are non-causal explanations al-
so legitimate in certain cases?  
In this paper, we aim to clarify this issue by studying Blaser & 
Kirschner’s (2007) nested equilibrium model (NEM, hereafter) of the 
persistence of bacteria in human hosts. Our choice of this case is moti-
vated by two reasons: on the one hand, Blaser & Kirschner’s NEM ex-
plains the phenomenon in terms of the existence of an evolutionarily 
stable strategy (ESS, hereafter) among the different interacting organ-
isms, a feature that makes it sufficiently analogous to most cases of equi-
librium explanations reviewed in the philosophical literature so that our 
conclusion can shed light on the nature of scientific explanation; on the 
other hand, the explanatory force of their model is also conditional on 
the existence of a nestedness among different biological scales, i.e. on the 
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existence of a hierarchy of interrelated ESSs. As the acknowledgment of 
the existence of a hierarchy of mechanisms is a hallmark of the new-
mechanist account of scientific explanation, and, to our knowledge, cases 
of nested equilibria have never been studied before in the philosophical 
literature, we believe that our case study could bring new light to the 
study of the old phenomenon of equilibrium explanations. Our aim is 
thus to analyse the explanatory role that the appeal to the existence of 
equilibria at different levels plays in the NEM. In that vein, we intend to 
provide a better understanding of the nature of equilibrium explanation, 
and to the role of causality in scientific explanation2. To do so, we frame 
the paper in the context of the debate between Huneman’s structural ac-
count of scientific explanation and the causal-mechanistic account. 
In section I, we introduce the general account of structural explana-
tions presented by Huneman (2018a) and motivate the necessity of dis-
cussing the precise nature of equilibrium explanation to understand 
whether, and if so, to what extent, equilibrium explanations fit Hune-
man’s account, or are rather a special case of causal-mechanistic explana-
tions. In section II, we present our case study. In section III, we present 
our philosophical analysis. We first argue that the explanatory force of 
Blaser & Kirschner’s NEM is mainly provided by the concept of ESS, 
plus the mathematical modelling that defines each strategy at each of the 
levels of the hierarchy, rather than by the causal-mechanistic details of 
the system. Additionally, the nested nature of the different ESSs plays a 
role in making the system robust to every possible intervention at differ-
ent levels. Thirdly, and connected to this last point, we argue that no role 
is left for any causal element in their model, thus suggesting that their 
explanation constitutes a case of structural explanation as Huneman has 
defined it. Finally, in section IV, we present our conclusions. 
 
 
I. EXPLAINING WITH AND WITHOUT CAUSES: THE ROLE OF 
MATHEMATICS IN EQUILIBRIUM EXPLANATIONS 
 
In recent years, the universal application of the "new-mechanist" 
account of scientific explanation in biology has been questioned on the 
basis of the existence of a family of explanations that do not rely on any 
causal features of the system whose properties they explain, but rather on its 
mathematical properties [Huneman (2010), (2018a), (2018b); Woodward 
(2013); Rice (2015); Kostic (2018), (2019); Deulofeu et al. (2019)]. Huneman 
has called these explanations “structural”, and defines them as follows: 
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Family of explanations for which the mathematical tools used in the de-
scription of an explanandum system belong to a mathematical structure 
whose properties are directly explanatory of some aspects of the system 
(such as equilibria, behaviour, limit regime, asymptotic behaviour, etc.) 
(…) They explain by accounting for the explananda through pinpointing 
structural relations that are mathematical relations of some sort. Mathe-
matics here are not representing a dependence between structures in the 
world, but they are constituting the structural dependence itself, (…) and 
in virtue of that they are explanatory [Huneman (2018a), p. 695]. 
 
In contrast with mechanistic explanations, structural explanations do not 
include any mechanism, nor any causal story in their explanans. Further-
more, the inclusion of any of these elements would usually be taken as 
counterproductive to account for the explanandum. Structural explanations 
are abundant in systems biology, where an extensive amount of data has to 
be interpreted by using mathematical and computational tools [Green 
(2016), (2017); Green & Jones (2017); Brigandt et al. (2017)]. Huneman 
explicitly argues that some of the properties of the biological systems 
studied under the label of “systems biology” can only be explained by 
appealing to the formal (mathematical) properties that characterize those 
systems. A well-known example of this, studied by Jones (2014), is the 
vulnerability of the immunological system to attacks to the CD4+ T-
cells. Drawing upon Kitano & Oda’s (2006) case study, Jones argues that 
what explains the vulnerability of the human immune system to attacks 
on this particular component is its bowtie structure: because the human’s 
immune system has a bowtie structure such that CD4+ T-cells are non-
redundant elements in the core of the bowtie, the system is vulnerable to 
attacks on this type of cells (Figure 1). What is more important is that the 
vulnerability to attacks on CD4+ T-cells is not a consequence of the caus-
al-mechanistic processes that produce the vulnerability: it is a consequence 
of the topological properties of the architecture (organization) of the im-
munological system. These topological properties determine its vulnerabil-
ity to attacks on its core, as it is the only non-redundant element of the 
network, which is furthermore a necessary step for every other immuno-
logical process. Huneman summarized this kind of explanation as follows: 
“what is epistemically proper to this network modelling is that the topo-
logical properties found in the networks are such that they explain some of 
the properties one is interested in [vulnerability to attacks on CD4+ T-
cells], (…) the instantiation of these properties is explained by the fact 
that the network is of such topological nature” [Huneman (2018b) p 127]. 
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FIGURE 1. Bowtie structure of the immune system, with the CD4+ T-cells in the core 
of the bowtie. From Jones (2014), p. 1138, Fig. 1. 
 
A second point that is epistemically proper to this kind of explanation is 
that the mechanisms that “sustain” the realization of such topological 
properties are irrelevant for explaining those properties (namely, the vul-
nerability of the network) [Huneman (2018c) pp. 6-8; Deulofeu et al. 
(2019); Moreno & Suárez, (submitted)]3. 
Structural explanations are not restricted to cases of topological ex-
planation, though. In his (2018c), p. 6, Huneman outlines the case of ex-
planations in microeconomics, particularly the “ice cream vendors” 
problem — a direct application of the theory of Nash equilibrium to 
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human behaviour. In this situation, we imagine that there are two ven-
dors standing on a beach and need to decide where to situate their stall in 
order to maximize their sales. Microeconomics, relying on game theory, 
says that the vendors will situate their stall in the middle of the beach, next 
to each other, to attract customers both in the area around them and in 
their extremes. By placing themselves in the middle of the beach, the 
vendors generate a Nash equilibrium, a situation where none of the play-
ers (the vendors) can change their strategy without decreasing their bene-
fits (potential customers). Let us suppose we have to explain a scenario 
where there are two vendors placed in the middle of the beach. What 
explains the fact that both of them place their stalls in the middle? Hun-
eman replies: “the fact that it simultaneously maximizes the share of each 
of them, or in other words, that it instantiates a Nash equilibrium.” And 
adds: “[t]he mechanisms through which vendors move, decide, sell or 
buy, etc. are not explanatory relevant to this precise question” [Huneman 
(2018c), p. 6].  
Nonetheless, Huneman just sketches the elements that make the 
Nash equilibrium explanatory in the case of the “ice cream vendors” but 
does not specify in detail what explaining with equilibria exactly entails, 
nor what is his reason to believe that mechanisms do not play any ex-
planatory role in equilibrium explanations. Previous analyses of the role 
of equilibria in scientific explanations had been presented in Sober 
(1983) and Kuorikoski (2007). However, both authors reach opposing 
conclusions about where equilibrium explanations gain their explanatory 
force from: while the former argues that “equilibrium explanations show 
how the cause of an event can be (statistically) irrelevant to its explana-
tion”, and that their explanatory force comes exclusively from their 
mathematical structure [Sober (1983), p. 201], the latter believes that 
“explanations of singular events are indeed causal, even those supplied 
by equilibrium models” [Kuorikoski (2007), p. 149]. These opposing 
conclusions are interesting because they leave open whether equilibrium 
explanations must be considered a subtype of structural explanation (So-
ber), or a subtype of causal-mechanistic explanation (Kuorikoski), thus 
creating an important gap in how to understand the role of mathematics 
in this type of explanation. In addition to that, they leave open a question 
about the role of causality in scientific explanation in general for, if as 
Kuorikoski argues, even equilibrium explanations are in the end causal, 
then it could be argued that causality is a necessary ingredient in every 
genuine case of scientific explanation.  
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In the next section, we introduce Blaser & Kirschner’s NEM of the 
persistence of bacteria in human hosts as a case study that we will use to 
motivate our response to these two questions. 
 
 
II. A NESTED EQUILIBRIUM EXPLANATION OF THE PERSISTENCE OF 
BACTERIA IN HUMAN HOSTS 
 
Humans harbour an abundant number of microbes in their guts that 
constitute the human microbiome [Huttenhower et al. (2012); Lozupone 
et al. (2012)]4. Among those microorganisms, some persist in our guts 
throughout our entire whole life cycle, whereas others are mainly transient, 
or appear in specific moments of our development, disappearing after-
wards [Chiu & Gilbert (2015)]. Furthermore, some of those are hypothe-
sized to have established long-term associations with humans over millions 
of years, with some people speculating that they might constitute co-
evolved systems or hologenomes [Rosenberg & Zilber-Rosenberg (2014), 
(2016); Díaz (2015); Suárez (2018); Suárez & Triviño (2019); cf. Moran & 
Sloan (2015); Douglas & Werren (2016)]. Irrespectively of the evolutionary 
nature of those associations, the fact that organisms from different species 
engage in persistent long-term associations with each other is paradoxical 
from the perspective of the neo-Darwinian model of life and evolution. 
According to this model, when two individuals of different species associ-
ate, i.e. when they share the same habitat or niche, each one will pursue its 
own fitness interests. In this scenario, it might happen that the two organ-
isms coexist peacefully for a period of time but, normally, peaceful coex-
istence will tend to break down: on the one hand, in the moment in which 
an opportunity for one of the organisms to benefit in detriment of the 
other appears, it will tend to grow to maximize its fitness until the other 
organism is destroyed (appearance of cheaters); on the other hand, it is al-
so not infrequent that in a stable biological population where one out of 
two different survival strategies has been adopted among the members, 
the population becomes invaded by individuals that adopt an alternative 
strategy, until the point where the population collapses (external invasion). 
For these reasons, peaceful associations among organisms of different 
species are rare and will normally be short-term. Then, how is it possible 
that humans and some of their microbes establish persistent infections 
that are not disrupted by cheaters5? And which are the mechanisms that al-
low long-term associations that survive the challenges of sharing a habitat 
and are not perturbed by external invaders? 
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Blaser and Kirschner have recently developed a model “to explain the 
common features of microbial persistence in their human hosts” [(2007), 
p. 847, emphasis added)], i.e. to explain why humans and some specific 
microorganisms have overcome the difficulties of co-habitation6. They 
speculate that those situations represent a successful phenotype that must 
be maintained according to certain eco-evolutionary rules. In their view: 
 
persistence represents the evolved selection for balancing host and micro-
bial interests, resulting in an equilibrium that, by definition, is long-term 
but not necessarily forever stable. We hypothesize that maintenance of 
this equilibrium requires a series of evolved, nested equilibria to achieve 
the overall homeostasis [Blaser & Kirschner (2007), p. 843]. 
 
They argue that such nested equilibria will be observed at different time-
scales: microscopic, at the level of the interactions between the immuno-
logical system of the host and cell-receptors of the microbes; 
mesoscopic, at the level of tissue function; tissue in which the microbe 
population inhabits; macroscopic, where evolutionary changes in the 
host and the microbe will occur to guarantee microbe transmission7. 
Blaser and Kirschner believe that any of these levels conforms to Nash 
equilibria in the form of an ESS that allows the persistence of the rela-
tionship. This is so because both the host and the microorganism will 
have developed a very specific hierarchy of cross-signalling mechanisms 
that generate a set of positive and negative feedback loops with each 
other that guarantee that the overall equilibrium is not disrupted.  
Blaser and Kirschner’s model begins by defining five populations at 
the microlevel whose changes with respect to certain variables are fol-
lowed over time [see also Blaser & Kirschner (1999); Blaser & Atherton 
(2004); Blaser (2006)]. In the case of Helicobacter pylori, the variables in-
clude: M, which represents the population of mucus-living H. pylori (rate 
of change); A, which represents the H. pylori population that adhere to 
epithelial cells; N, which represents the concentration of nutrients avail-
able to bacteria derived from inflammation; E, which represents the 
concentration of effector molecules (molecules that the microbes gener-
ate to achieve some aims, such as suppressing immune response by the 
host); and I, that stands for the host response. Blaser and Kirschner’s 
NEM includes five differential equations that track the changes in the 
variables of their model, as well as how they interact with each other8.  
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For instance, to study how the concentration of mucus-living H. pylori 
varies over time due to the interaction with the other populations, they 
introduce the following differential equation:  
 
dM
dt
= ( ) ( ) ( )( ( )) ( )g N t M t M t K A t A t
m m
   − − − +                      (1) 
where, , ,m mg   and   are parameters, whose value will depend on the sit-
uation; N, M, A (mentioned above) and K (the epithelial carrying capacity) 
are variables that together will determine the rate of change of the mucus-
living population M. In (1), ( ) ( )m N t M tg  represents the potential growth of 
the population in virtue of the nutrient availability; ( )mM t , represents the 
loss of H. pylori due to the process of mucus shedding; and 
( )( ( )) ( )M t K A t A t − +  represents the potential loss/gain of H. pylori due 
to migration between the epithelial and the mucus-living populations. Obvi-
ously, migration from M to A can only happen when A < K, namely, when 
there is still room for more adherence to epithelial cells, and the opposite 
is the case for migration from A to M. Adherent sites are always limited or 
otherwise H. pylori would grow too much, risking the stability of the sym-
biotic association.  
The inflammation induced by the bacteria on the host is captured 
by measuring the change of nutrient concentration over time: 
 
dN
dt
=
( ( ))
b
b I t+
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m
t g N t M t g N AE t t

 − −              (2) 
 
In (2), b, , mg  and g are parameters. ( )N t  is characterized by a gain 
term that is a function of the concentration of effector molecules, E, and 
the host response I. The equation shows the direct proportionality that 
exists between E and N, and the inverse proportionality between I and 
N. In other words, it shows the limiting effect that the host response has 
over the nutrient concentration, as well as the inducing effect of the bac-
teria on the nutrient concentration. (2) also specifies the rate of assimila-
tion of nutrients of the mucus-living bacterial population and of the 
adherent epithelial populations. 
Furthermore, for a microbe-host association to be evolutionarily per-
sistent, the microbe needs to develop strategies for transmission. Ro cap-
tures this concept, quantifying “the transmission potential of a 
microparasite as the average number of secondary infections occurring 
when a single infectious host is introduced into a universally susceptible 
host population” [Blaser & Kirschner (2007) p. 844].  
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oR
( )
BN
x b v+ +
=                                                                            (3)  
 
In (3), BN measures the transmission rate as a function of the population 
size, x measures the rate of host mortality due to the microbe (measure of 
virulence), b is the rate of mortality of the host population independently 
of the microbe (measure of lifespan), and v is the rate at which the host re-
covers from the microbe infection (measure of immunity). Usually, for 
Ro> 1 microbial transmission is sustained whereas for Ro< 1 microbial 
transmission goes extinct.  
Blaser and Kirschner show that in a persistent microbe-host associ-
ation those five differential equations remain constant, and any deviation 
in one of the equations gets immediately counter-balanced by the ad-
justment of the other equations, keeping the equilibrium stable. Thus, 
Blaser and Kirschner claim this can only be possible if the system be-
haves according to a Nash equilibrium, and if the strategies followed by 
microbe and host conform to an ESS. Let us now see how an ESS can 
account explanatorily for observed constancy. 
 
II.1. The Role of the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in Blaser and Kirschner’s Model 
 
Nash equilibrium is a very common situation in game theory. It ob-
tains when two players in a non-cooperative game adopt a strategy such 
that no individual change will render greater benefits to any of them, i.e. 
such that every change in the strategy that one of the players adopts in-
dependently will result in lower individual profit for that player. Nash 
equilibria are not necessarily, however, optimal strategies. It is sometimes 
possible to obtain a better net result if both players change their strategy 
simultaneously and a new equilibrium is reached. Nonetheless, this will 
only occur if both partners modify their strategy co-ordinately, but not if 
they do so independently. Therefore, no player has any incentive to 
modify his strategy individually. The prisoner’s dilemma constitutes a 
typical example of a game whose solution is provided by a Nash equilib-
rium (Table 1). In this situation, two individuals — A and B — are ac-
cused independently of a crime, and each of them is interrogated 
separately and offered a deal: 1) if A betrays B and accuses her of having 
committed the crime, while B stays silent, A will have 4-years reduction 
of sentence and B will have no reduction (and the same, but inverted, 
occurs if B betrays A while A remains silent); 2) if both stay silent, each 
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of them will have a 3-years reduction of sentence; 3) if both betray each 
other, each will have a 1 years reduction of sentence. In this scenario, the 
Nash equilibrium is reached in situation 3), when both players betray each 
other. Of course, the result that they obtain is not optimal (each of them 
will only get 1 year reduction of sentence), but is such that none of them 
has any incentive to change her strategy individually, unless the other also 
does so, as otherwise she will have a bigger individual cost, i.e. she will 
have less years of reduced sentence [Nash (1950a), (1950b); Gintis (2000)]. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. Payoff matrix for the prisoner’s dilemma. The numbers represent the 
amount of years that each subject would have as reduction of sentence. The optimal 
strategy is that where both remain silent (italics). Only the strategy where both betray 
constitutes Nash equilibria (bold). 
 
An ESS is a biological strategy that, when it is adopted in a popula-
tion, natural selection alone will keep the population safe from “intruder 
populations”, in so far as the organisms that adopt an alternative strategy 
will be selected against. All ESSs are cases of Nash equilibria, but the 
opposite is not the case. If a solution to a non-cooperative game repre-
sents Nash equilibrium that is not an ESS, the solution could be disrupt-
ed by an alternative strategy that drives the population towards an 
alternative Nash equilibrium that constitutes an ESS [Smith & Price 
(1973); Smith (1974); Easley & Kleinberg (2010), pp. 209-227]. For in-
stance, take the case of the stag hunt game (Table 2). This is a two play-
ers’ game, where each player has two possible exclusive strategies: hunt-
hares or hunt-stags. In this situation, there are three possible scenarios: 
1) that both individuals are hare-hunters (case where both obtain a fit-
ness benefit of 2); 2) that both individuals are stag-hunters (both obtain a 
fitness benefit of 3); 3) that one of the individuals is a hare-hunter 
whereas the other is a stag-hunter (in which case the hare-hunter obtain 
a fitness benefit of 3, whereas the stag-hunter obtains a fitness benefit of 
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0). In this situation, strategies 1) and 2) constitute a Nash equilibrium, 
for none of the players could get a better payoff by changing strategy. 
However, only 1) constitutes an ESS: while a hare-hunter and a stag-
hunter do equally well when they are paired with a stag-hunter (fitness 
benefit of 3), hare-hunters score better than stag-hunters when they are 
paired with hare-hunters (hare-hunters score 2, while stag-hunters score 
0). That means the stag-hunting strategy is not an ESS because if a hare-
hunter is introduced in a population of stag-hunters, the population will 
evolve towards a population of hare-hunters. On the other hand, a popu-
lation where all the individuals are hare-hunters represents an ESS, be-
cause if a stag-hunter is introduced in the population, it will be eventually 
extinct, for its fitness benefit will be lower than the fitness benefit of 
hare-hunters.  
 
  
Stag-hunter 
 
 
Hare-hunter 
 
Stag-hunter 
 
 
3, 3 
 
0, 3 
 
Hare-hunter 
 
 
3, 0 
 
2, 2 
 
TABLE 2. Payoff matrix for the stag hunt game. The numbers represent the net benefit for 
the individuals in the population that engage in the game. Cases where all the individuals in 
the population hunt exclusively stags or exclusively hares represent Nash equilibria (bold). 
However, only the case where both individuals hunt hares represent an ESS (italics). 
 
Blaser and Kirschner apply this type of reasoning to persistent long-
term host-microbe associations to argue that the situation must be the one 
that is obtained in Nash equilibrium, particularly in ESSs, where both posi-
tive and negative feedback between the host and the microbe occur, so 
that the equilibrium persists over time. The core idea of their model is that 
the equilibrium obtained at the microscopic level immediately affects the 
equilibrium at superior levels (mesoscopic and macroscopic). At the same 
time, the equilibrium at the higher levels affects in a specific way the pos-
sibility of new microbe-host persistent associations. The equilibria are 
nested and the association does not get in principle disrupted. The interac-
tion among levels, partially captured by the equations (1)-(3), is as follows: 
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first, on the microscopic level one would find the microbial population, lo-
calized on an organ or tissue of the host, and the population of immune 
host cells responsible of recognizing the microbe population. The struc-
ture of both populations will depend on the nature of the original founder 
strain, the possibility for generating genetic variants, the selective pressures 
from other microbial cells in the same tissue and, more importantly, from 
the selection that the persistent microbe and the immune cells exert on 
each other [e.g. (Pradeu et. al 2013); Pradeu & Vivier (2016); Eberl (2016)]. 
The nature of the interactions between the organisms in the microscale 
will shape tissue function (or malfunction), and thus will partially deter-
mine the viability of the host, as well as the opportunity for microbial 
transmission (mesoscale). Finally, the effects of the microbe on the viabil-
ity of the host will determine the host population structure (macroscale) 
that in return will affect microbial transmission (mesoscale) (Figure 2). 
Even if the model illustrated in Figure 2 looks like a multilevel mech-
anism, for it appeals to a model of mechanism, it lacks the adequate type 
of causal stories that new-mechanists demand to have a proper explana-
tion. First, because multilevel causation is mysterious, as Craver and 
Bechtel illustrate (2007), since causal relations happen exclusively intra-
level. Second, because the type of inter-level readjustments of the system 
are symmetrical, occurring both top-down (e.g. from the macroscale to the 
mesoscale, or from the latter to the microscale), and bottom-up (e.g. from 
the microscale to the mesoscale, or from the latter to the macroscale), 
while relations between cause and effect are always asymmetrical. Third, 
because even if there could be a way to capture inter- and intra-level causal 
relations, this would be at odds with the information that NEM conveys 
and appeals to. NEM does not specify the causal way in which the entities 
at one level affect the entities at another level. It only specifies that the dis-
ruption of the equilibrium at one level will either prompt the collapse of 
the system (i.e. its death), or it will prompt the re adjustment of the equi-
librium at that level due to the equilibria that exist in the other scales. In 
other words, NEM is not specific about how the equilibrium will be read-
justed, it only predicts that it will be readjusted, provided that the other 
levels keep their equilibrium states. The causal elements (if any) that will 
bring this readjustment are irrelevant for the explanation of this behaviour 
in terms of NEM. What matters is exclusively the nested structure of the 
host-symbiont system (see section 4 for the full details). 
In that vein, the nested structure of the model and the level of 
complex interactions between the different elements at the three scales 
(Nash equilibria, ESS) grant the persistence of the association. As it was 
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said before, one of the reasons why host-microbe associations do not 
normally last long is due to the presence of cheaters, organisms that en-
joy the profits of the associations without paying the cost. Nash equilib-
ria avoid the appearance of cheaters: cheaters are players that change 
their strategy unilaterally; in Nash equilibria, every player that does so is 
condemned to failure, and thus will be removed from the population. Fur-
thermore, as the Nash equilibria that are reached in the population adopt 
the form of an ESS, it is not possible that an external invader adopting an 
alternative strategy disrupts the persistence of the association.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Nested equilibrium model. The dashed box represents those events that 
occur within the host. Adapted from Blaser & Kirschner (2007), p. 845, Fig. 2). 
 
 
III. EQUILIBRIUM EXPLANATIONS AS STRUCTURAL AND NON-
MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS 
 
Blaser and Kirchner’s NEM was developed to account for the persis-
tence and the long-term character of certain human-microbe associations. 
Concretely, the authors seek to explain two paradoxes: first, why the asso-
ciation is not disrupted by the appearance of cheaters, i.e. entities that ben-
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efit from the association without paying the costs; second, why the bacte-
rial population is not entirely substituted by an intruder/external invader 
that deploys a different strategy. Only if those two phenomena are 
avoided, persistent host-bacterial associations can be successful. We will 
now argue that Blaser and Kirchner’s NEM explains how those phe-
nomena are avoided by appealing to mathematical, but not causal, proper-
ties, of host-microbial associations. In other words, we will argue that the 
alleged explanatory force of the NEM lies in the fact that: (i) it provides 
a mathematical structure in the form of a set of differential equations 
that together satisfy an ESS; (ii) that the nested nature of the ESSs makes 
the explanation of host-microbe persistence robust to any perturbation; 
(iii) that this is so because the properties of the ESS directly mirror the 
properties of the biological system in a non-causal way.  
First of all, as shown in section II, Blaser and Kirschner’s NEM 
consists in a series of differential equations that describe how the con-
centration of bacteria in different host tissues, their effector cells, their 
nutrient availability, the immunological response and their rate of trans-
mission will change over time. These equations, as we explained, do not 
contain a priori any information about the persistence of the host mi-
crobe relationship. However, they provide information about how the 
different variables must be related to each other so that persistence ob-
tains. Particularly, the equations measure the impact of host immunologi-
cal response on bacterial colonization and, in doing so, allow determining 
the level at which host’s response will abruptly disrupt colonization, as 
well as the levels at which bacterial inflammation will trigger a decrease 
in nutrient availability that in the end will disrupt colonization. And, in 
addition, they provide information about the way in which the solutions 
to these equations that guarantee the persistence of the symbiotic rela-
tion relate to: a) the rate of transmission of the symbiont (Ro), b) the via-
bility of the host (tissue function and evolutionary advantages).  
The set of equations can be resolved for a concrete host-symbiont 
system, and the evolution of the variables under study, as well as their in-
terrelation, can be analysed. This will provide information about how 
they relate and how they are maintained constant, allowing predictions 
about empirical system9. However, notice that they would still provide 
no information about our explanandum, i.e. about what makes the host-
microbe relationship persistent. To do so, the set of equations must be 
embedded in the framework of ESSs, i.e. it must model the biological 
situation as a non-cooperative game of two players, such that if any of 
the players (host, microbe) follows a unilateral strategy, the consequences 
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will be detrimental for the player that does so. That this is so can be seen 
by studying how changes in the equations that relate the concentration in 
nutrient availability, immune response, microbial concentration, etc. will 
relate to each other to make the system collapse if the change is unilat-
eral. However, as we argued, the explanatory character of the equations 
comes exclusively from the possibility of embedding them in the frame-
work of ESS. In other words, they are explanatory sound because it is pos-
sible to realize that no unilateral change that disrupts the system is possible 
without generating a chain reaction that either reverses the change or de-
stroys the system. The ESS thus explains stability by ruling out two alter-
native scenarios: one where cheaters spread in the population, and another 
when an invader population entirely substitutes the actual one. 
Second, the explanatory force of the ESS is reinforced in Blaser and 
Kirschner’s NEM due to its nested nature. The nested nature of the 
equilibria works as a check and balances system which prevents that a 
disruption of the ESS at one of the levels (microscopic, mesoscopic and 
macroscopic) spreads across the other levels and destroys the host-
microbe association. Let us explain this with an example: take the case of 
a disruption at the mesoscale that substitutes the microbe population for 
an invader. As we are at the mesoscale, the invader will disrupt tissue 
function in its own benefit, e.g. growing more than what the original mi-
crobial population would have grown, while at the same time escaping 
from the barriers of the immunological system. This type of change, to-
tally beneficial for the bacteria at the mesoscale, would trigger two re-
sponses: First, a response at the macroscale that would be immediately 
detrimental for the bacteria. At this level, host viability, which is affected 
by the tissue function, will be reduced and, as a consequence, bacterial 
transmission will substantially decrease in relation to the transmission of 
those bacteria that cause no damage in tissue function. Secondly, at the 
microscale, where the invader population will not have generated immu-
notolerance, the invader population will be systematically blocked by the 
specialized immunological cells, especially the cells of the adaptive im-
mune system. Furthermore, it is expected that the host will reduce nutri-
ent availability, so that it affects in the long-run the intruders’ population 
structure. Remember, as we said in section II, that the key of the ESS is 
that no player that changes its strategy unilaterally will be better. In this 
situation, even if the “player” might be better in one particular scale 
(mesoscale), the same will not be true for the other scales, and thus no 
possibility for invasion exists10. 
112                                                             Javier Suárez and Roger Deulofeu 
teorema XXXVIII/3, 2019, pp. 95-120 
Third, and more concretely about the nature of ESS, we believe 
that Blaser and Kirschner’s NEM, as any explanation that appeals to the 
existence of an ESS, explains the stability of host-microbe persistent as-
sociations in a non-causal way. Let us argue why we believe this to be so.  
1) Blaser and Kirschner’s NEM appeals to general properties of 
ESSs, and they make their model explanatory in virtue of the equivalence 
between the theoretical ESSs framework and the general properties of 
persistence host-symbiont associations. The strategy is the general strate-
gy of Huneman’s structural explanations: first, build a system S’ whose 
properties match the properties of the real system S whose behaviour 
you aim to track. Second, study the behaviour of S’ and attribute its 
properties to S. In Blaser and Kirschner’s NEM, the strategy is applied 
as follows: first, build the ESS model for host-microbe persistent associ-
ations, as a case of a non-cooperative game of two players; second, study 
the behaviour of the ESS model, i.e. why the existence of an ESS, as the 
optimal solution for both players (Nash equilibrium), excludes the possi-
bility of cheaters and invasive populations; third, attribute the properties 
of the ESS model to the empirical phenomenon, i.e. to empirical cases of 
host-microbe persistent associations. Notice that in this schema the ex-
planatory force comes because the mathematical system that is built, in 
this case an equilibrium model, behaves in a certain way that (allegedly) is 
the way in which the empirical system will behave. But, importantly, it is 
irrelevant how the empirical phenomenon causally realizes the properties 
that it is attributed. And this is so in a double sense: on the one hand, 
because the NEM neither mention, nor needs to mention the specific 
species that interact to generate the ESS; on the other, because the causal 
connections between the entities (if any) are epistemologically irrelevant 
for the explanation of the phenomenon.  
2) Despite the highly problematic way of identifying interlevel causal 
relations in a multilevel mechanism, as Craver and Bechtel (2007) explain, 
one could still try to appeal to Woodward’s interventionist strategy to iden-
tify the supposed causes explaining the persistence of host-microbe associ-
ations. However, we believe NEM rules out the possibility of generating or 
even heuristically imagining any intervention à la Woodward, thus contra-
dicting Kuorikoski and Potochnick’s interpretation of equilibrium explana-
tions. Let us explore this via an example. Recall that the explanandum is the 
phenomenon of persistence host-microbe associations. How would an in-
tervention look like in Blaser and Kirchner’s NEM? The only possibility 
would be to generate a situation such that the ESS disappears. However, 
no possible intervention is imaginable without destroying the system. Or, 
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in other words, any imaginable intervention that would make host-microbe 
associations non-persistent would directly change the system we are trying 
to explain, and thus the information it will provide will turn out to be irrel-
evant to account for the phenomenon. Recall the structure of ESS (Table 
2). The only possibility of imagining a significant intervention would be via 
a change in the expected payoffs for the actions of each player. However, 
this intervention would not give any relevant information about why the 
association is stable in certain circumstance, because it would directly shift 
the focus of attention towards a new system, namely, one where there is 
not an ESS. Or, in other words, a causal explanation would consist in say-
ing that the ESS is explanatory because if there were not an ESS the host-
microbe association would not be stable. But this kind of reasoning is un-
informative and, in our view, unexplanatory. The structural interpretation à 
la Huneman, on the contrary, offers a plausible account of how Blaser and 
Kirschner’s NEM gains its explanatory force. 
More importantly, the nested nature of the model, far from moving 
its explanatory force in a causal-mechanistic direction, generates the op-
posite effect. It just makes any possible intervention less imaginable. Be-
cause even if one causal intervention could be imagined for one specific 
level, how would it possibly work, if its effects would be cancelled out 
due to the existence of ESSs in the other levels? Or, in other words, how 
is it possible to imagine an intervention that causally escapes the inter-
level connection? This connection is just a property of any host-microbe 
persistent association, and the explanatory power of the nestedness re-
sides, precisely, in its possibility to cancel out the effect of every possible 
intervention. Therefore, we argue, a causal interpretation of the explanato-
ry power of Blaser and Kirschner’s NEM is not possible, since it would 
simply make the explanatory force of the model completely mysterious.  
Of course, one might agree with what we just said, and still believe 
that our argument does not rule out the fact that the most appropriate in-
terpretation of the explanatory force of Blaser and Kirchner’s NEM is in-
deed causal. For instance, Blaser and Kirschner explicitly argue that 
specific host-microbe associations (human-H. pylori, human-Salmonella 
typhi, etc.) are “not necessarily forever stable” [(2007), p. 843], as obviously 
context (environment) matters, and in a changing context (environment) it 
is possible that concrete associations go selected against, simply because 
the environment selects against that coevolved system [see Díaz (2015); 
Suárez & Triviño (2019)]. In this context, it is possible to investigate the 
causes that made the system collapse, and if this is so, then the same must 
114                                                             Javier Suárez and Roger Deulofeu 
teorema XXXVIII/3, 2019, pp. 95-120 
be true for the cases in which the association is persistent. Nonetheless, we 
disagree, because that will entail changing the explanandum in two senses: 
first, making it specific to particular species; second, explaining the disrup-
tion of the persistence, instead of the persistence itself. And remember 
that our original explanandum was why some host-microbe associations are 
persistent, and the cases to rule out are the cases of cheaters and invasive 
populations. In our view, their model should be interpreted counterfactu-
ally: if a host-microbe association is persistent throughout the host’s life 
cycle and evolutionarily long-term, then it will satisfy the conditions of the 
NEM reached through an ESS. And this situation will be so irrespectively 
of the species that interact, and thus irrespective of the causal-mechanisms 
that host and microbe could have developed to reach that equilibrium. As 
in the case of the ice vendors (section I), where the psychological mecha-
nisms that have driven the vendors to put their stalls in the middle of the 
beach are explanatorily irrelevant to understand why their stalls are there, 
in the case of persistent associations causal-mechanistic details are simply 
superfluous. One can perfectly omit all those details and the explanation 
would still be epistemically sound.  
Alternatively, an enumeration of the causes (if any) that would deter-
mine whether a concrete host-microbe association is stable will be irrelevant 
to explain its persistence if it is not conceived as a consequence of an ESS. 
This is because it would still be possible to imagine the existence of cheaters 
or invasive populations that deploy the same causal-mechanistic “machin-
ery” to escape e.g. immunitary controls, without paying the cost of the sym-
biotic association. However, as we explained, because the host-microbe 
association constitutes a nested ESS, both the cheater and the invader popu-
lation will end up disappearing from the population, just because the host-
microbe persistent system has the structure that appears in the mathematical 
formulation of ESSs. Importantly, we are not here saying that Blaser and 
Kirchner’s NEM rules out the possibility of telling a causal story of why 
concrete host-microbe associations are, sometimes, persistent, although 
some story about how to speak about interlevel causation should be provid-
ed.11 Furthermore, we believe that such causal stories could be told to explain 
specific host-microbe associations, even when these must be complemented 
with the appeal to ESSs. Our point is rather epistemological: causal stories that 
seek to explain the existence of persistent host-microbe associations are nei-
ther required, nor explanatory in themselves. The element that provides the 
explanatory strength in equilibrium explanations is purely structural (in Hun-
eman’s terms), and it is connected with the possibility of accounting for the 
existence of an equilibrium (in Blaser and Kirschner’s NEM, a nested ESS). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have examined the explanatory force of equilibrium 
explanations, and have studied whether the explanatory force of equilibri-
um explanations can be better justified by applying the causal-mechanistic 
model of scientific explanation, or Huneman’s structural model. Concrete-
ly, we have examined the role that mathematical vs. causal properties 
play in the explanation of the stability of persistent long-term host-
microbe associations. Explaining the stability of this type of associations 
is paradoxical, as it requires explaining two facts: first, the absence of 
cheaters; second, the impossibility of the population being substituted by 
an intruder population. We have used Blaser and Kirschner’s NEM to il-
lustrate that the explanation of host-microbe persistent associations does 
not seem to be causal, but structural, relying solely on the non-causal 
mathematical properties of the association to explain its long-term per-
sistence [Huneman (2018a), (2018b)]. We have argued that Blaser and 
Kirschner’s NEM is explanatory of the long-term persistence of host-
microbe associations because (i) it provides a mathematical structure in 
the form of a set of differential equations that together satisfy an ESS; 
(ii) that the nested nature of the ESSs makes the explanation of host-
microbe persistence robust to any perturbation; (iii) that this is so be-
cause the properties of the ESS directly mirror the properties of the bio-
logical system in a non-causal way. In this vein, our case study shows 
how equilibrium explanations, even if nested, gain their explanatory 
force from the mathematical structure that describes the system, instead 
of from the causal interactions among its components. Our analysis sup-
ports two theses: first, that equilibrium explanations, even if nested (in a 
hierarchical setting), are structural rather than causal-mechanistic; sec-
ond, that causality, even if necessary in some explanations, is not a uni-
versally necessary requirement of every scientific explanation. 
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NOTES 
 
1 The commitment to a causal view of the world does not entail either a 
physical reductionism [as in Salmon (1984)] or an “ontic” interpretation of sci-
entific explanation [as in Craver (2014)]. Cf. Glennan (2002), Bechtel & Abra-
hamsen (2005), for a model-based interpretation of mechanisms. 
2 There are other cases where equilibrium models have been used to ex-
plain the stability of biological associations [Baalen & Jansen (2001); Selosse et 
al. (2006)]. We have chosen to analyse Blaser & Kischner’s NEM for its general-
ity, and because it is a case of equilibrium explanation generally accepted among 
biologists. Nonetheless, our conclusions also apply to these cases. Thanks to 
Philippe Huneman for pointing this fact to us. 
3 Following Brigandt (2013), we consider that an element of an explanans is 
explanatory relevant if and only if removing it from the explanation entails that 
the explanandum does not follow, and it’s explanatory irrelevant otherwise 
[(2013), p. 480]. 
4 “Microbiota” refers to “[t]he assemblage of microorganisms present in a 
defined environment”, and “microbiome” is used to denote “the entire habitat, 
including the microorganisms (bacteria, archaea, lower and higher eukaryotes, 
and viruses), their genomes (i.e., genes), and the surrounding environmental 
conditions” in a given environment [Marchesi & Ravel (2015), p. 1]. For the 
purposes of this paper, we will not distinguish the two concepts, and they will 
be used to refer only to the community of microorganisms present in a given 
environment. 
5 In biology, persistent infection refers to lifelong associations between a 
host and some species of microbes that do not necessarily harm the host, alt-
hough they might do it in the long-term. The term should not be confused with 
its medical use, where “infection” is usually employed in reference to pathogens, 
or disease-causative agents. 
6 Their model is in principle developed exclusively for pair associations, 
between one host and one microorganism. 
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7 Those different levels have both a temporal and a scale correlation: the 
macroscale refers to the evolutionary time, the mesoscale refers to organismal de-
velopment and the microscale refers to the interactions among different cell types. 
8 Since our purpose is only to illustrate the main features of the model and 
their relation to Blaser and Kirschner’s explanation, for a matter of simplicity we 
only introduce two of the equations. 
9 Information about the values that the variables must take for a concrete 
(empirically real) host-microbe association, if the association is known to be stable. 
10 It exists, but if and only if the intruder changes the situation in the three 
scales. That is precisely the nature of the nested model. 
11 See Craver & Bechtel (2007) for a proposal. 
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Abstract
Explaining the behaviour of ecosystems is one of the key challenges for the biolog-
ical sciences. Since 2000, new-mechanism has been the main model to account for
the nature of scientific explanation in biology. The universality of the new-mechanist
view in biology has been however put into question due to the existence of expla-
nations that account for some biological phenomena in terms of their mathematical
properties (mathematical explanations). Supporters of mathematical explanation have
argued that the explanation of the behaviour of ecosystems is usually provided in
terms of their mathematical properties, and not in mechanistic terms. They have inten-
sively studied the explanation of the properties of ecosystems that behave following
the rules of a non-random network. However, no attention has been devoted to the
study of the nature of the explanation in those that form a random network. In this
paper, we cover that gap by analysing the explanation of the stability behaviour of the
microbiome recently elaborated by Coyte and colleagues, to determine whether it fits
with the model of explanation suggested by the new-mechanists or by the defenders
of mathematical explanation. Our analysis of this case study supports three theses: (1)
that the explanation is not given solely in terms of mechanisms, as the new-mechanists
understand the concept; (2) that the mathematical properties that describe the system
play an essential explanatory role, but they do not exhaust the explanation; (3) that
a non-previously identified appeal to the type of interactions that the entities in the
network can exhibit, as well as their abundance, is also necessary for Coyte and col-
leagues’ account to be fully explanatory. From the combination of these three theses
we argue for the necessity of an integrative pluralist view of the nature of behaviour
explanation when this is given by appealing to the existence of a random network.
The paper is the result of the discussion among the three authors, who actively collaborated in the
development of all the ideas. JS conceived and structured it. RD and APC wrote Section 3. RD and JS
wrote the philosophical analysis.
B Roger Deulofeu
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1 Introduction
Explaining the behaviour of ecosystems is one of the key challenges for biologists:
why ecosystems have the properties they have, which conditions make them exhibit
a stable behaviour, how they react to perturbations, etc. have been some of the most
debated questions among behavioural ecologists. Almost since the original publication
of the “new-mechanist” manifesto (Machamer et al. 2000), the idea that explana-
tion in biology proceeds by discovering mechanisms has been extensively accepted
among philosophers of science (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Glennan 2002; Bech-
tel and Abrahamsen 2005; Craver and Darden 2005, 2013; Craver 2007). Drawing
upon the findings in neuroscience and molecular biology, new-mechanists reelaborate
causalism (Salmon 1984; Woodward 2003) and argue that to explain a phenomenon
(explanandum) consists in describing its causes by providing a mechanism (explanans)
responsible for the phenomenon coming about. According to the new-mechanist inter-
pretation of explanation, a phenomenon can be considered fully explained only once
a mechanism is provided and the way its components causally interact to produce the
phenomenon is specified.
The universality of mechanistic explanations in biology and neuroscience as orig-
inally formulated in the new-mechanist manifesto has however been questioned on
different grounds. A very popular “non”-mechanist view holds that some explana-
tions in biology are at least partially given by appeal to the mathematical properties
of the systems under investigation. Some of those who defend the necessity of intro-
ducing mathematical modelling in some biological explanations have emphasized
the continuity of these explanation with mechanistic explanations, developing the
concept of dynamic mechanistic explanations (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2010; Bech-
tel 2011; Brigandt 2013a, b, 2015), whereas others have highlighted the differences
between both accounts, arguing that dynamic mechanistic explanation are indeed no-
mechanistic (Issad and Malaterre 2015). A still more radical interpretation of this
“non”-mechanist approach holds that some explanations in biology are given exclu-
sively in mathematical terms, with no reference to any type of causal-mechanistic
information in the explanans (Sober 1983; Huneman 2010; Lange 2013; Jones 2014).
This last kind of explanation might be called mathematical explanation, and it is
usually presented in complete opposition to new-mechanist models of explanation.
One of the most recent topics of attention of defenders of the last approach has been
the study of the explanation of the behaviour of ecosystems. Some of the most salient
behavioural properties of ecosystems (robustness, resilience, stability), they argue, are
explained using the tools provided by network analysis (Xia 2010; Rathkopf 2018).
The use of these mathematical tools to explain how some biological systems behave
in the long-term is very abundant in ecology (e.g. the diversity-stability debate) due
to the complexity of ecological systems. It has recently been argued that explanations
of the behaviour of ecosystems are given exclusively on the basis of the mathematical
properties of the networks that are used to represent them (Huneman 2010, 2018a, b,
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c). The study of behaviour explanations that appeal to network analysis in ecology
has focused exclusively on the study of ecosystems that form non-random networks,
though. However, as far as we know, the explanatory features of behaviour explanations
in ecosystems that organize forming random networks have received no attention
among scholars. A network is said to be non-random when the aggregation of the
elements that interact in the network lead to a concrete topological realization (small
world, scale-free, etc.) with some a priori known properties. A random network, on
the contrary, is characterized for lacking a known topological realization, and thus the
properties of a random network cannot be known a priori, but have to be mathematically
discovered. We suspect that the difference between systems that organise according
to a random network and systems that organise according to a non-random network
get their explanatory force from different sources. In this paper, we aim to test that
intuition by studying the explanatory features of the models that explain the ecological
behaviour of a random network—the human microbiome.
A microbiome is a collection of microorganisms (bacteria, viruses, fungi, etc.) that
reside in a concrete environment (Marchesi and Ravel 2015). In case of humans, our
microbiome is believed to contain hundreds of species (Human Microbiome Project
Consortium 2012). Furthermore, human’s gut microbiome is known for its ecological
stability behaviour: even if it varies quite a lot from one person to another, the gut
microbiome is believed to be very stable for one single individual, who tends to carry
the same species of microbes for a long period (Dethlefsen and Relman 2011; Faith
et al. 2013). Recently, Coyte et al. (2015) and Foster et al. (2017) have elaborated
a model to explain why the human gut microbiome exhibits a stable behaviour over
long periods of time. They found out that, contrary to a usual assumption in evolu-
tionary biology, competition, and not cooperation, is the key factor explaining this
stable behaviour. Here, we analyse how Coyte and colleagues explain the stability
of the microbiome by appealing to linear stability analysis. This case shares several
elements with other cases of behaviour explanation in terms of networks, although
it also differs in some features that led to some differences regarding the nature of
behaviour explanation and that we aim at clarifying.
In Sect. 2 we introduce the notions of mechanistic and mathematical explanation,
and frame the choice of our case study in the context of the mechanistic versus mathe-
matical debate. In Sect. 3 we present Coyte and colleagues’ explanation of the stability
behaviour of the human microbiome. In Sects. 4 and 5 we discuss the consequences
of the case study for the understanding of scientific explanation. In Sect. 4 we argue
that even if the explanation in our case study displays a model of mechanism, it does
not specify a proper causal story to account for the explanandum, thus suggesting that
mechanisms, as understood by new-mechanists, do not play the explanatory role. In
Sect. 5 we argue that the explanatory force in Coyte and colleagues’ account comes
from the display of a mathematical model of the behaviour of the microbiome, as it is
provided by their linear stability analysis of the network that the microbiome instan-
tiates. However, in contrast with some recent analysis of behaviour explanations of
ecosystems in terms of networks, we argue that insofar as an essential component of the
explanatory force of Coyte et al.’s model is their appeal to the different interaction types
within the ecological communities that might exist in the microbiome (cooperative,
exploitative, competitive), and thus to the establishment of a range of topologies—and
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not exclusively to a concrete topology—their explanations differs from purely math-
ematical explanations. We further argue that the appeal to this element is exclusive
of random networks. In Sect. 6 we explore the pluralistic consequences of our case
study for the analysis of behaviour explanation, suggesting that it supports the general
appeal to integrative pluralism. Finally, we present our concluding remarks.
2 Twomodels of explanation in biology: mechanistic
versus mathematical
In its most basic meaning, to explain a phenomenon consists in giving the reasons
why the phenomenon obtains in a concrete system due to its behaviour. Those reasons
may be specified by appealing to laws of nature—deductive-nomological theories of
explanation—or by appealing to the causes that are responsible for the phenomenon.
In the first case, it is usually assumed that to explain a phenomenon is to provide an
argument so that the phenomenon (explanandum) logically follows from the laws of
nature that regulate the behaviour of the system where it obtains, given a concrete set
of initial conditions (explanans) (Díez 2014; Alleva et al. 2017). In the second case,
the phenomenon is embedded in a causal network in the world, in a way such that the
phenomenon (explanandum) is a causal consequence of the behaviour of the system
(explanans) (Woodward 2017).
New-mechanist theories of scientific explanation are of this last kind. They assume
that to explain a phenomenon consist in citing its causes by providing a mechanism that
specifies how those causes produce the phenomenon. The definition of “mechanism” is
different in differing accounts (Nicholson 2012; Deulofeu and Suárez 2018), although
most new-mechanists share a similar conception: a mechanism consists in a set of
entities with a concrete spatial organization plus a set of activities governing the
behaviour of those entities (model of the mechanism). The phenomenon to explain,
new-mechanists argue, causally obtains as a consequence of the activities of the entities
(causal story) (e.g. Machamer et al. 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Craver and
Darden 2005 2013; Craver 2007; etc.). For new-mechanists, the presence of a model of
the mechanism and of a causal story is necessary and sufficient for having a mechanistic
explanation (Issad and Malaterre 2015: p. 270).
New-mechanists generally accept a hierarchical view of mechanisms, thus not con-
fining themselves to the narrow approaches of previous causalists (Salmon 1984).
Furthermore, they usually neglect the capacity of mathematical models alone to explain
any phenomenon. In a well-known paper, Kaplan and Craver argued that “the [mathe-
matical] generalizations are explanatory because they describe the causal relationships
that produce, underlie, or maintain the explanandum phenomenon” (2011: p. 612) and
insisted that:
In successful explanatory models in cognitive and systems neuroscience (a)
the variables in the model correspond to components, activities, properties, and
organizational features of the target mechanism that produces, maintains, or
underlies the phenomenon, and (b) the (perhaps mathematical) dependencies
posited among these variables in the model correspond to the (perhaps quantifi-
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able) causal relations among the components of the target mechanism. (2011:
p. 611).
Mathematics, thus, can play an explanatory role for new-mechanists only if it cap-
tures a causal relationship among the entities that are posited in the mechanism.
Otherwise, they are merely “phenomenological models”, which represent the reality
and allow predictions without really explaining why those predictions obtain (e.g.
Kepler’s laws, Snell’s laws, etc.) (Díez 2014).
Radically contrasting with this last view, some people have vindicated a more sub-
stantial role for mathematics in biological explanations by highlighting the importance
of mathematical properties for explaining the features of some biological systems. The
explanations that rely on the mathematical properties of the system to explain a phe-
nomenon have been called “mathematical explanations” (Baker 2015), or “structural
explanations” (Huneman 2018a).1 They have been defined as follows:
Family of explanations for which the mathematical tools used in the descrip-
tion of an explanandum system belong to a mathematical structure whose
properties are directly explanatory of some aspects of the system (such as equi-
libria, behaviour, limit regime, asymptotic behaviour, etc.) (…) They explain by
accounting for the explananda through pinpointing structural relations that are
mathematical relations of some sort. (Huneman 2018a: p. 695)
The mathematical properties that appear in a mathematical explanation might be of
different types, and they could be used to explain different kinds biological questions.
They might consist in: the application of an arithmetic theorem to explain the life cycle
of some species (Baker 2005, 2009, 2015); the establishment of one or more points
of equilibrium to explain a tendency in a population (Sober 1983; Kuorikoski 2007;
Rice 2012, 2015; Suárez and Deulofeu, unpublished manuscript); the application of
statistics to explain certain evolutionary patterns in a population (Walsh 2015); the
discovery of a concrete topology that explains the behaviour of a complex system
(Huneman 2010; Jones 2014); the use of matrix calculus to explain the processes that
regulate some physiological states (Issad and Malaterre 2015); etc.2
Not every substantial use of mathematics in biological explanations needs to be
in principle completely opposed to every element of the new-mechanistic account
of explanation, though. The explanation of some cyclical biological processes such
as the circadian rhythms has been argued to constitute an extension of mechanistic
explanation, namely a dynamic mechanistic explanation (Bechtel and Abrahamsen
2010, 2011; Brigandt 2013a, b, 2015). In general, an explanation is considered a
dynamic mechanistic explanation in virtue of making use of some mathematical model
in its explanans that: (1) is essential to account for the explanandum, (2) replaces the
role that new-mechanists attribute to the causal story, without being itself a causal
1 To refer to mathematical explanations as “structural explanations” might be confusing, since the later
could be interpreted as special cases of the former, as one reviewer has correctly suggested. However, the
way in which Huneman (2018a) describes them, as well as the family of explanations that he includes under
the umbrella of “structural explanations” makes clear that the two are synonymous. For purposes of clarity,
however, we will refer to this family of explanations as “mathematical explanations”.
2 We take all the aforementioned properties to be different types of mathematical properties.
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story stricto sensu, (3) is combined with a model of mechanism, i.e. a set of entities
and activities plus their organization. Nonetheless, it is precisely because of the lack
of a causal story that some of these explanations entail that they have been argued to
be “anti”-mechanistic, or at least far away from the core elements that new-mechanists
consider necessary and sufficient to formulate an adequate scientific explanation (Issad
and Malaterre 2015).
In still more extreme cases, however, some explanations in biology have been argued
to be even more substantially mathematical, abstracting away also from the model
of the mechanism, and being explanatory of the biological phenomenon exclusively
in virtue of the mathematical properties of the explanans, whatever their type (Sober
1983; Baker 2005; Huneman 2010; Jones 2014; cf. Kuorikoski 2007; Potochnik 2015).
The analysis of behaviour explanations in biological systems that present a network
structure (e.g. ecosystems, immunological systems, etc.) has been argued to follow this
pattern of mathematical explanation. The behaviour of this type of systems is usually
explained in two steps: (1) the system is attributed a concrete network topology, which
provides the mathematical properties of the system; (2) the properties of this topology
are studied and then its behaviour is attributed to the biological system, explaining
why the system behaves how it does. Because of the reliance of the last type of
mathematical explanation on the topological properties of the networks, it has been
called topological explanation (Huneman 2010, 2018b; Jones 2014; Brigandt et al.
2017).
Those who have studied topological explanation more attentively have made two
points: First, that the appeal to the topological properties of the mathematical struc-
ture alone (its graph structure, or its network motifs, for instance) is sufficient to
explain some of the properties of the biological system that the structure is believed
to represent, irrespectively of the entities and the activities of the entities that realize
those systems (see also Huneman 2018c); second, that the addition of any mechanistic
details, instead of making the explanation of the properties more precise, obfuscates
the question and turns out to be deeply irrelevant for the embedding of the explanan-
dum. This second point might be explicated as follows: in sharp contrast with dynamic
mechanistic explanations, in topological explanations, neither the model of mechanism
(nature of the entities, nature of the activities), nor the causal story are explanatory
relevant. All that matters in the explanation is that the topology is provided and that it
gives information about the organization of the system.
One of the fields where the appeal to topological properties to explain biological
phenomena has proven more fruitful is in the diversity-stability debate in ecology
(McCann 2000; Nikisianis and Stamou 2016). In that context, the aim of ecologists is
to elaborate network models that represent the relationships among the biotic members
of an ecological community with the aim of inferring some general features about its
behavioural patterns. To do so, once the network model is elaborated and linked to
behavioural properties of the ecological community which is being studied, ecologists
analyse the global properties of the network—e.g. how it will respond to a perturbation,
to an increasing/decreasing number of nodes, to an increase in the number of connec-
tions, etc., and then attribute the exact same properties to the ecological community
that the network is believed to capture. The driving question in the diversity-stability
debate is whether increasing the number of species in the community would make the
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Fig. 1 This figure exemplifies different types of networks. The one on the left is a random network. The one
in the middle is a small world network. The one of the right is a scale free network. (From Sporns et al.
2004: p. 419)
community ecologically stable3 and, if so, under which conditions. Some recent dis-
cussion surrounding the diversity-stability hypothesis have tried to unravel how some
ecological communities will react to the loss of some species for communities where
the connections between the nodes are non-random (Solé and Montoya 2001). In the
context of network theory, a network is non-random if it instantiates a particular topol-
ogy, e.g. scale-free networks, small worlds (Fig. 1). Because the topological properties
of theses types of networks are known, and both small worlds and scale-free networks
are known to be highly stable to the elimination of some of their nodes (Montoya and
Solé 2002), it is enough for ecologists to prove that a concrete ecosystem instantiates
one of these networks to explain why the ecosystem exhibits a stable behaviour. The
explanation in these cases would work as follows:
Ecosystem E instantiates a network N which, in virtue of being of type X has the
topological property P. Therefore, E also has P (adapted from Huneman 2010).
Interestingly, these types of explanations: (1) do not mention either the entities or
the activities that might be going on in the ecosystem, insofar as network analysis only
represents relations in terms of the number of nodes and the strength of their interac-
tions—thus being applicable to multiple kinds of systems, just replacing “node” for
the objects that are studied in the field (Internet, metabolic networks, social networks,
etc.); (2) do not elaborate any kind of causal story that is responsible of producing
the phenomenon under investigation. The explanandum (E having P) is accounted for
simply because the network is of type X, and thus necessarily must instantiate P. Thus,
topological properties alone would explain P obtaining, and there is no role left for
mechanisms (Huneman 2010).
The study of behaviour explanations provided in terms of networks analysis has
been centred in the study of explanatory patterns in systems that instantiate non-
random networks (e.g. scale-free networks, or small worlds). However, no attention
has been devoted to study the explanatory patterns that underlie behaviour explana-
3 The exact definition of stability is an agitated topic in ecology, and different diversity-stability hypotheses
are formulated accordingly (McCann 2000: p. 230, Table 1; Nikisianis and Stamou 2016: pp. 35–36; Gonze
et al. 2018: p. 42, Box 1). In most cases, though, a system is qualified as stable if and only if it is able
to return to its initial state after a perturbation (resilience), or also the capacity of a population to resist
invasions by external species. We will specify later what “stability” means in our case study.
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tions for systems that instantiate purely random networks. We suspect that because
random networks neither have a particular topology associated, nor an exclusive type
of network motifs, the type of explanatory patterns that underlie behaviour explana-
tions of the systems that instantiate them might be slightly different from the types of
explanatory patterns provided in terms of non-random networks. The rest of the paper
is thus devoted to analyse the explanatory features of a behaviour explanation given
for a system that instantiates a random network.
3 Case study: the stability of the humanmicrobiome
The human gut is an ecosystem consisting in a large community of microbes (≈1000
species), whose stability behaviour is crucial to maintain human’s health.4 Recent
empirical research suggests that the human microbiome exhibits a stable behaviour:
even if different individuals might bear different microorganisms in their microbiome,
the species that compose the microbiome of an individual, and their relative densities,
tend to remain largely stable during her lifetime (Dethlefsen and Relman 2011; Faith
et al. 2013). The reasons that make such essential community to behave stably despite
the existence of constant perturbations are yet unknown, though. One possible way
to explain why the microbiome behaves stably would be to argue that it does so as
a consequence of the great number of species that compose it. The explanation in
this case would work as follows: insofar as the microbiome is an ecosystem which
is composed by a great number of species, and ecosystem biodiversity is believed to
foster ecological stability under certain circumstances, then it will be expected that
the human microbiome exhibits a stable behaviour (McCann 2000; Ives and Carpen-
ter 2007). This way of accounting for the explanandum poses a serious challenge,
though: the positive correlation between diversity and stability only works for non-
random ecological communities; however, the opposite has been demonstrated to be
true for random communities, in which an increase in biodiversity fosters instability
(May 1972). Because the microbiome is a random ecological community that due
to its biological nature is expected to be suffering constant perturbations, then it will
tend to be unstable. Therefore, what ecological theory predicts (instability) and what is
empirically observed (stability) are at odds. The question that arises is then the follow-
ing: what type of dynamics are instantiated in the microbiome so that its interactions
result in a stable behaviour?
Fairly recently, Mougi and Kondoh (2012) have elaborated a model that overcomes
the difficulty that May’s results pose to explain the stability behaviour of random
communities. In their view, the problem with May’s model is that he only analysed
communities with one interaction behavioural type (i.e. where all the members were
4 In ecology, the concept of “stability” can be used to mean both that the number of species of the microbiome
remains constant (i.e. that no species gets extinguished, also called persistence), and that the species density
in the community recovers quickly after the community has been perturbed (i.e. once the density of one
of the species in the community has slightly changed, also called resilience). A community whose species
density remains constant is said to be in equilibrium. Obviously, if a community is stable in the second
sense, it will also be stable in the first sense, but the opposite is not necessarily the case. In the case study
that we present here, “stability” refers to the ability of the microbiome to recover its initial species density
after a perturbation, i.e. it is a model to study resilience.
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either mutualistic, or antagonistic, etc.), and they thought that different results might
be obtained if the communities were studied taking into account the fact that there
might be different behavioural types interacting simultaneously. They observed that,
in fact, the existence of different combinations of interaction types in a community
might be a solution to May’s results, and thus allows showing that an increase in bio-
diversity alone (i.e. irrespectively of the interacting types) does not trigger instability.
Mougi and Kondoh applied their reasoning to macroscopic communities, showing
that in communities with different interaction types, an increase in biodiversity does
not necessarily foster instability, if the proportion of cooperative types is high, thus
explaining stability in terms of cooperation.
Coyte et. al’s explanation of the stability of the microbiome follows the same logic as
Mougi and Kondoh’s research. They agree with them that a key element to explain the
stability behaviour of the microbiome is the appeal to the existence of different inter-
acting types. However, contrary to the claim by Mougi and Kondoh that cooperation
fosters stability in macroscopic communities, Coyte et al. argue that it is competition,
not cooperation, what explains the stability behaviour of microscopic communities.
To prove their claim Coyte et al. develop a mathematical model and a series of com-
putational simulations of the behaviour of the microbiome, and showed that the same
result (i.e. that competition stabilizes and cooperation destabilizes communities) was
observed irrespectively of the size of the community. Based on their analysis, they
hypothesize that the destabilizing effect of cooperation is due to the strong dependen-
cies among species that it generates, which would lead to the appearance of feedback
loops in the community, whose destruction would lead the community to collapse.
These feedback loops, on the contrary, would not appear when the species in the
microbiome compete, thus making the community behaviour more stable. In this sec-
tion, we analyse the mathematical model that Coyte et al. use to explain the stability
of the microbiome.
Coyte et al. model the microbiome as a network of interconnected species to
abstractly study its dynamics by applying a combination of linear stability analy-
sis with computational simulations.5 Their model describes the dynamics of density
change of one species Xi given the interaction with another species X j , and it is written
as a modification of the Holling type 1 functional response:
d Xi
dt
 Xi
⎛
⎝ri − si Xi +
S∑
j1, j i
ai j X j
⎞
⎠ i  1, . . . , S (1)
System of Eq. (1) expresses how the density of species i (Xi ) will change over
time given its own intrinsic growth rate (ri ) its interaction with other members of the
same species, i.e. its self-interaction rate (si ), which it is assumed to be the same for
all species (i.e. si  s), and its interactions with the members of every other species,
5 Their research consists in three different mathematical methods. In method 1 (linear stability analysis),
they only consider communities that are close to equilibrium, while in methods 2 and 3 (permanence analysis,
individual-based model) they investigate the behaviour of communities that are far from their equilibrium.
Those two later methods yield the same results as the former (cooperation destabilizes communities). For
reasons of space, we only consider method 1 for our analysis of the nature of explanation.
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Fig. 2 Species-density variation due to a perturbation. Those communities that return to its equilibrium
point are considered stable, and those that return to their previous equilibrium faster after a perturbation are
considered more stable. Those that do not return to their equilibrium are deemed unstable. In this image there
are two communities represented, stable and unstable. (From Coyte et al. (2015: Supplementary Figure 1C)
or interaction strength (ai j , such that j  i). Finally, S expresses the total number of
interacting species of a given community.
In Coyte et al.’s model, the interaction of a given species within the network will be
determined by two parameters: first, the connectivity of i in the network, C  [0, 1],
defined as “the fraction of all S species that a single species i interacts with” (Coyte
et al. 2015: Supplementary 4). Second, the nature of the interaction types between
microbial species. They can take up to five possible forms, based on the signs of
aij/ aji: Pm (cooperation +/+), Pc(competition −/−), Pe (exploitation +/−), P− (com-
mensalism −/0) and P+ (amensalism +/0). Accordingly, the proportion of interaction
types between species must be established for a given community, being the total
proportion of interaction types equal to one:
Pm + Pc + Pe + P− + P+  1 (2)
Given this, Coyte et al. elaborate a phase portrait of their model to study its dynami-
cal behaviour. To do so, they start by determining its equilibrium points, i.e. the points
for which the variables of the system remain constant over time. Second, they deter-
mine the stability of each equilibrium point. An equilibrium point will be stable if after
a small perturbation in the system the variables return to the same values that they had
before the perturbation, and it will be unstable otherwise (Fig. 2). To determine the
stability of each equilibrium point they perform a linear stability analysis. The linear
stability analysis for an equilibrium point y is performed in three steps: (i) constructing
the Jacobian matrix M of the system. The Jacobian matrix of a N dimensional system
is a N × N square matrix whose elements mi j will be given by the partial derivatives
of the system. (ii) evaluating M at the equilibrium point M |y (iii) computing the eigen-
values of M |y . Once the eigenvalues are computed, the stability of such equilibrium
is determined by the following criterion: the equilibrium point y will be stable if and
only if the real part of all the N eigenvalues of M |y is negative.6
When working with large dimensional systems the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix M tend to follow a concrete distribution. In the case of Coyte et al.’s model,
6 We will use “stable points” to refer to what mathematically are defined as “asymptotically stable points”.
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Fig. 3 Distribution of eigenvalues of a microbe community. The largest real part of the eigenvalues deter-
mines whether and how quickly the community will return to equilibrium after a perturbation. If this quantity
is negative, the community is deemed stable. More negative implies more stability. The imaginary compo-
nents determine the frequency of the oscillations in population densities after a perturbation. The different
colors represent different simulations. (From Coyte et al. 2015: Supplementary Figure 1D)
the eigenvalues that they compute for each equilibrium fall into an ellipse of hor-
izontal radius re in the complex plane and centre at (−s, 0), being s the “average
self-interaction”, except for a single eigenvalue rs which can lie outside (Fig. 3).
Therefore, because an equilibrium requires all its eigenvalues to have a real negative
part to be stable, an equilibrium in Coyte et al.’s model will be stable if and only if
max(re, rs) − s < 0 (3)
Once we have briefly introduced a basis to study the stability of a given large
dynamical system we can focus on analyse our case study. If we denote by y a given
equilibria for Coyte’s model, the Jacobian Matrix evaluated at that equilibria has the
following entries (Coyte et al. 2015: Supplementary 3),
mii  −s i  1, . . . , S (4)
mi j  ai j i, j  1, . . . , S
so that its eigenvalues—and therefore its stability—depend on the values of the self-
interactions s and the ai j terms, i.e. on the type of interactions between the species
(cooperation, competition, etc.). Moreover, the connectivity also plays a role in the
entries of the Jacobian matrix, so that the lower the connectivity of the network, the
more ai j terms will be equal to zero.
Coyte et al. are interested in computing the eigenvalues for each equilibrium point
because the ecological stability behaviour of the system is characterized in terms
of magnitudes directly related to the eigenvalues distribution of such equilibrium.
First, if the equilibrium point is mathematically stable, then it will be ecologically
stable too, i.e. the species density before the perturbation took place will eventually be
recovered afterwards. In their context, a perturbation is produced when the densities
of the species of community changes. Second, the behaviour of the community will be
classified as more or less stable depending on how quickly it recovers its initial density
distribution after the perturbation. Mathematically, this can be studied by analysing
the eigenvalue distribution, such that the more negative the values of the distribution,
the more attracting the equilibrium point will be, i.e. the faster the densities will go
back to their initial states, and thus the system will be classified as more stable.
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Fig. 4 Numerical confirmation of the analytical model for increasing cooperation in an exploitative commu-
nity. The image shows how the distribution of the eigenvalues of a given exploitative community changes
with respect to the increase in cooperative interactions. According to the linear stability analysis, a system
will be more stable if the distribution of the eigenvalues lies further into the negative real part. Here, the
single eigenvalue rs shows how increasing the proportion of cooperative interactions destabilizes the system.
(From Coyte et al. 2015: SM. Figure S3)
To study how the degree of ecological stability of each equilibrium point depends
on the parameters ri , s, ai j , in system of Eq. (1), Coyte et al. run a series of simulations
with different community types (exploitative, random and competitive). To do so, they
define a measure of stability U, such that:
U  −max(re − s, rs) (5)
Equation (5) gives the rightmost eigenvalue, i.e. the eigenvalue that represents the
lower level of ecological stability. Right after, they study the behaviour of the fol-
lowing derivative dUd Pm , that measures how U varies with respect to the proportion of
cooperative interactions Pm . The sign of this derivative describes whether the com-
munity behaviour becomes more stable (if it is positive) or less stable (in case it is
negative) in function of the proportion of interaction types of the species in the commu-
nity. With this method, they show that for a given value of C and any given community
type, gradually increasing cooperative interactions nearly always increases the overall
return rate (the time it takes for the community to recover its initial densities after
the perturbation), and the likelihood of the community being unstable (Fig. 4). This
method also serves to prove the key role that C plays in the community behaviour: for
a constant value of Pm , gradually increasing the value of C always has a destabilizing
effect on the community. The overall result of their different simulations is that the
higher the values of Pm and the higher the values of C, the less stable the community
will be (Fig. 5).
A final step in Coyte et al.’s analysis is the ecological interpretation of their results,
i.e. the explanation of what happens in the ecological community when the values of
Pm and C increase so as to make the community less stable. In their view, communities
with high values of C and Pm might generate strong dependencies among some of
its members, which could be transformed into the existence of feedback loops in
the community. The existence of feedback loops makes the community sensitive to
small perturbations, insofar as a small change in the density of one of the species
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Fig. 5 Effect of increasing cooperation on stability in exploitative communities. This heat map shows how
stability varies with respect to connectivity and the proportion of cooperation interactions in an exploitative
community. The darker areas show higher stability, whereas the lighters show lower stability. It can be
appreciated how stability is higher for the community with almost non-cooperative interactions. High
connectivity makes the system unstable when cooperative interactions appear, for the combinations of both
makes the system more vulnerable. The combination of low connectivity and high cooperation makes the
system stable because of redundancy. (From Coyte et al. 2015: Supplementary Figure S4)
might trigger a cascade effect in the community that will in the end move it towards a
different equilibrium point than the one it had before the perturbation. A low value of
C and Pm avoids the creation of feedback loops and, therefore, has a stabilizing effect.
Coyte et al. rely on the empirical work done by Stein et al. (2013) to claim that
their model is supported by empirical data. After the linear stability analysis and
the different simulations they run, Coyte et al. make the following prediction: the
proportion of destabilizing cooperative interactions in a stable microbiome has to be
low in comparison with competitive and exploitative links, which will be predominant.
The data presented by Stein et al. provides empirical validation for such hypothesis,
thus suggesting that their model captures the right explanation of the stability of the
microbiome.
4 Coyte’s explanation as non-mechanist: explaining
without providing a causal story
The case study presented above illustrates a type of explanation that we argue does not
strictly follow the standard conception of scientific explanation as presented by the
new-mechanists. To recapitulate, new-mechanists argue that to explain a phenomenon
consist in: first, identifying a model of mechanism (individualized by its entities, its
activities and their organization); second, identifying a causal story by means of which
the model of mechanism produces the phenomenon to be explained. The question is
now to determine in which sense (and to which extent) Coyte et al.’s explanation of the
behaviour of the microbiome does not fulfil these two requirements. Particularly, we
argue that even if a model of mechanism can be identified in Coyte et al.’s explanation,
it is not the case that the explanatory force of the explanation they provide comes from
a causal story being told.
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Let us start by considering whether Coyte et al. individuate a model of mechanism.
As we explained above, Coyte et al. model the microbiome as a network of interact-
ing microbial species that behaves following the dynamics dictated by the system of
Eq. (1). In their model, the entities are the different S microbial species that are part
of the network, i.e. that compose the microbiome, and whose densities Xi are being
studied. The activities of each of the entities are determined by the type of interactions
they engage in (competition, cooperation, etc.), and would be given by the sign of
ai j . Finally, the organization of the community is given by the random network that
describes the interactions among the species, including its number of nodes and its
connectivity. Because the elements of the model of mechanism seem to be present in
the case of the explanation given by Coyte et al., it seems that the first requirement to
have a mechanistic explanation is satisfied by their model.
Once the model of mechanism has been specified it becomes necessary to show
how the interactions among the different parts that compose it can produce the
explanandum. In the case of Coyte et al. the explanandum is the stability behaviour
of the microbiome, that is, how the species densities remain constant over time
despite the existence of perturbations (i.e. some species that vary their densities).
The explanans says that the key element that makes the microbiome stable is the exis-
tence of a high degree of competitive interactions among the species that compose
it (so that competition explains stability). To get the appropriate connection between
the explanans and the explanandum Coyte et al. proceed as follows: (i) they stipulate
a community type (e.g. exploitative community); (ii) they determine its equilibrium
points; (iii) they analyse the behaviour of the rightmost eigenvalue in function of the
variation of the value of two key parameters of the topology [the connectivity C, and
the proportion of interacting behaviours, as defined in (2)] in order to determine the
degree of stability of each equilibrium point. In their analysis they observe that, for
a fixed value of C, proportionally increasing Pm tends to make the system less stable
(ecologically: less resilient). In other words, the time that the system will take to return
to its initial equilibrium state after a perturbation will be larger, until a critical value
of Pm is reached, such that the return time is equal to ∞, that is, the system becomes
unstable.7
Now, the question for the new-mechanist is: does Coyte et al.’s mathematical model
for the explanation of the stability behaviour of the microbiome actually captures a
causal story of what happens in the microbiome so that it is ecologically stable?
We suspect that the answer to this question is negative. First of all, because the way
how Coyte et al. determine its stability behaviour is by means of a linear stability
analysis of the system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) specified in (1). And
second, because even once the linear stability analysis is performed, what needs to
be modelled to produce the explanandum is how the variations in Pm will affect the
stability behaviour of the system.
Concerning the first point, the new-mechanist might argue that once the system is
modelled, each ODE tells us a different causal story, so that the system as a whole
is just an abstraction of the sum of all the individual causal stories modelled by each
7 In their model, Coyte et al. do not exactly determine at which point the system will become unstable. It is
enough for their explanation to show the general tendency of the community to an increasing value of Pm.
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differential equation. But, even when all these causal stories are put together, they do
not lead to the production of the phenomenon. At most, the ODEs give us information
about how the variations in the densities of some species will respond to the variations
in the densities of others. They do not give any information about how these variations
are produced, nor how the variation of the densities of one species will affect the
variation of the density of the rest of the species that compose the microbiome. By
themselves, they say nothing about how the dependencies among the entities that
compose the microbiome produce its stability. The only way in which the ODEs
might say something about it is by numerically computing its evolution with respect
to time (i.e. the trajectories of the system) when a minimal perturbation occurs.
However, for their explanation, Coyte et al. do not even consider the particular
trajectories of the system. Their explanation only requires to study the stability of
the equilibria by performing the mathematical steps described before (creating the
Jacobian matrix, evaluating it, studying its eigenvalues, etc.), a procedure which does
not require to specify the intermediate values of any of the variables Xi of the system.
It is enough to study its long term behaviour, no matter which intermediate processes
generate it. For this reason, it is difficult (if not impossible) to see how any of the steps
followed by Coyte et al. describe a causal story that relates the specific interactions of
the entity with the phenomenon to be produced.8
In relation to our second point, it seems to us that the explanation by Coyte et al.
includes an additional step that makes it even harder to see how the causes can produce
the stability behaviour. Concretely, once the ODEs generated by the system of Eq. (1)
are solved, Coyte et al. still need to run simulations to determine how the variations
in the proportions of the interacting species will affect the stability of the community.
This step is crucial, because their explanans is precisely that a community will be
stable if and only if it has the right proportion of interacting types. This step, as
we said, is performed by analysing the variations of the rightmost eigenvalue to an
increase in the proportion of Pm . But it is not specified which of the concrete species
interactions will become cooperative, nor is that necessary to highlight the negative
impact of cooperation on stability. The knowledge of the proportion of species that
interact cooperatively is enough to establish their claim. Thus, again, the rehearsal of
a causal story seems unnecessary to produce the phenomenon that Coyte et al. are
explaining and therefore their explanation is not mechanistic.
5 Explaining withmathematics: combining topology with interaction
types to explain stability behaviour
Coyte et al.’s model explains the stability behaviour of the microbiome but it does so
in non-mechanistic terms. The question now is to determine how their model gains
its explanatory force. In this section, we argue that what makes Coyte et al.’s model
explanatory is the combination of the topological properties of the network instanti-
8 Our argument in this section is inspired by a similar argument presented in Issad and Malaterre (2015:
p. 284).
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Fig. 6 Schematic representation of the microbiome network. Figure A represents the topology of the network
by exclusively pinpointing the interactions among the species (the dashed line between X3 and X2 indicating
that a32  0). Figure B represents the effect that considering not only the topology, but also the interaction
types, might have on stability: for two communities with the same topology, only the one where competition
is high (right) would be stable
ated by the microbiome with the knowledge about the dynamics that each of these
topologies acquires in virtue of the combination of interacting types in the community.
Let us start by discussing the role of the topology in their explanans. In Coyte
et al.’s model, the knowledge of the parameters si and ai j allows determining the
value of C and thus provides the topology of the system. Notice that if our network
were non-random, i.e. if it realized a concrete topology, at this point we would have all
the necessary information to decide whether the network is stable or unstable. Take the
example of a scale-free network: were the microbiome a scale-free network, we could
already identify its hubs (these nodes whose alteration would destabilize the network),
as well as how it will behave if we increase the number of nodes, if we destroy some of
the edges between nodes, etc. If this were the case, Coyte et al.’s explanation would be
much simpler: the microbiome behaves stably because it realizes a scale-free network.
This type of explanation would have the same nature as other topological explanations,
gaining its explanatory force simply from the nature of the network that the system
instantiates (Huneman 2010, 2018b; Jones 2014).
However, contrary to what happens in non-random networks, the microbiome
instantiates a random network, which means that none of its topological properties
will be known a priori. For that reason, Coyte et al. need to study the dynamics that
the topology instantiates in order to determine which are the conditions that will make
it stable. Furthermore, in their case, what ultimately explains whether the dynamics
instantiated will be stable is the proportion of interacting types in the microbiome.
That is, not every community with the same topology will be equally stable. Their
explanation, therefore, needs to combine the determination of the topology of the sys-
tem with the study of the dynamics that the variables that instantiate that topology will
have under different conditions, i.e. for different interaction types (Fig. 6).
Therefore, Coyte et al.’s explanation of the stability behaviour of the microbiome
would consists in something like:
Ecosystem E instantiates a network N such that: (i) N corresponds to one of a
set of topologies ϕ, and (ii) ϕ has the right proportion of interaction types. Thus,
N has property P. Therefore, E also has P
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Let us now develop what this model of explanation consists in. First, concerning (i),
it is possible to mathematically compute which networks will make the microbiome
stable, but this knowledge alone will render the explanandum unexplained, because
there is still an element missing: which is the property in virtue of which N’s topology
is stable? Or, in other words, why N has a dynamics such that the system will tend
to keep its stability? Appealing to its topology, by itself, will undermine the answer,
because the system is purely random and there are multiple states that will make it
stable, as well as multiple states that will make it unstable. But this option is not
possible in the case of purely random networks, and therefore the explanatory force
of Coyte et al.’s model, even if requiring the appeal to the topological structure of the
microbiome, needs to be acquired from somewhere else.
Second, about (ii), our proposal is that the key additional element that makes Coyte
et al.’s model fully explanatory of the stability behaviour of the microbiome is their
appeal to the different interaction types that might appear in the network. The reason
is that for the microbiome to be stable it is necessary that the dynamics instantiated
by the topology are conducive to a stable equilibrium state. The only way of showing
what are the conditions under which the dynamics instantiated by a random topology
are conducive to a stable state is by studying their response to slight modifications
in the parameters that define the system, namely ai j . The way of computationally
studying this is by evaluating the response(s) of the rightmost eigenvalue to changes
in the values of ai j in relation to changes in the proportions of interacting types in the
community. In other words, it is necessary to study how the changes in the proportions
of cooperative, competitive, exploitative, etc. interactions will affect the stability of the
microbiome. Only once this response is studied, and the results are analysed, will the
model be fully explanatory of the stability behaviour of the microbiome. In this sense,
even if knowing the topology is necessary, since the dynamics of the system directly
depends on the topology it instantiates, its knowledge is not sufficient to explain its
behaviour. It is necessary to additionally understand how the community will respond
to different proportions of interaction types. Only after this is done will the model gain
its explanatory force, and Coyte et al. can assert that competition explains the stability
behaviour of the microbiome.
Even if the points we have made here are relative to the case study we have analysed,
we suspect that our conclusions about the nature of explanation can be extended to all
the cases of behaviour explanations when they are given in terms of random networks.
One key feature that distinguishes random from non-random networks is that the latter,
but not the former, have specific properties derived from their network motifs and that
can be unequivocally ascribed to every system that instantiates them. This does not
mean however that random networks do not have network motifs: it means that their
network motifs will highly depend on the way in which the network is constructed, and
it will not be constant among all the systems that instantiate a random network. Because
of this, we suspect that explanations of the behaviour of systems that instantiate a
random network can only be given by studying an alternative mathematical property
of the network (e.g. in Coyte et al.’s, the dynamics of the network), because: first,
their network motifs will only be known once its mathematical properties have been
studied; second, they will be highly variable depending on the mathematical properties
that the network instantiates. This sharp contrast between random and non-random
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networks is thus fundamental to understand why explanations in terms of the latter
can be exclusively topological, whereas in the case of the former the topology has to
be complemented with an appeal to dynamics.
6 A case for integrative pluralism in behaviour explanation
Until now we have argued that Coyte et al.’s explanation of the stability behaviour of
the microbiome is neither purely mechanistic, since it lacks a causal story, nor exclu-
sively topological, since the topology needs to be combined with a dynamics to be
fully explanatory. We now argue that our case study supports an integrative pluralistic
picture of behaviour explanation in biology. Following Mitchell (2003) and Brigandt
(2010, 2013b; Brigandt et al. 2017), we take an explanation to be integrative when
it requires the combination of concepts from different fields and of different types
in order to gain its explanatory force. Such integration is normally driven by prag-
matic considerations about the question asked: that is, as some scientific questions are
about very complex phenomena, their responses usually require the integration of the
knowledge of different fields to be fully satisfactory (Brigandt 2013a). In this sense,
integrative pluralism is both beyond simple pluralism and against reductionism. Like
simple pluralism, integrative pluralism accepts that some phenomena in ecology might
be explained by simply telling a causal story (i.e. describing a mechanism), whereas
others might be exclusively given in mathematical terms. However, integrative plural-
ism tries to go beyond this simple idea by showing how some complex phenomena are
explained by integrating knowledge from different fields (ecology, population genetics,
molecular biology, etc.), using both, causal mechanistic strategies and mathematical
modelling. Against reductionism, integrative pluralism embraces the idea that even
if the explanation of a complex phenomenon requires the appeal to knowledge from
different fields, all of them are indispensable for the explanans to account for the
explanandum. In other words, that the explanation of the phenomenon is only possible
by integrating all the knowledge provided by the different fields, which would not be
obtained if the knowledge of one of the fields were reduced to the knowledge of some
of the others.
Following the tenets of integrative pluralism, we will make the point that the
explanatory model of the stability behaviour of the microbiome presented by Coyte
et al. exemplifies an integrative explanation. Concretely, their explanation combines
a model of a mechanism with a mathematical model plus a series of computational
simulations, integrating mathematical knowledge (network modelling, linear stability
analysis), with knowledge about the patterns of interactions in ecological communi-
ties. We further argue that the necessity to integrate knowledge about the model of
the mechanism with knowledge about the mathematical properties of the community
(including its topology) is common for every scientific explanation that accounts for
the phenomenon in terms of random networks.
As we argued in Sect. 4, Coyte et al.’s explanans, despite not telling any causal story
of what happens in the microbiome, describes a model of the mechanisms enumerating
which are the interacting entities, what type of activities they engage in, and the type of
organization that the microbiome has. Also, as we argued in Sect. 5, their explanatory
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model relies on the dynamics of the microbiome, which is acquired in virtue of the
topology that it instantiates. The study of the behaviour of this dynamics determines
a set of possible topologies, any of which will be stable, and thus one of the possible
states the microbiome could be at. Importantly, both the model of the mechanism and
the mathematical model are necessary and none of them is by itself sufficient without
the other for Coyte et al.’s explanans to account for the explanandum in terms of
“competition”, as the authors say it does.
First of all, the model mechanism without the dynamics is completely unspecific
about the stabilizing role of competition in the microbiome. Since they are explaining a
behaviour (stability behaviour), and the behaviour is the result of the set of interactions
between the entities (the species that compose the microbiome), it is necessary to study
the way in which the interactions result in the behaviour that is observed. Or, in other
words, detailing the entities that interact and the activities they engage in is insufficient
to explain the stability behaviour if the way how these interactions make the system
change is not studied adequately. For sure, the model of the mechanisms specifies that
competition is one of the activities that the entities of the microbiome engage in and
that can affect its stability. However, because the model of the mechanism in itself
does not describe how the system changes in time, its specification is insufficient to
make competition explanatory.
Secondly, the topology of the system, without the knowledge of the model of
the mechanism, is also insufficient to explain why the microbiome exhibits a stable
behaviour. As the community instantiates a random network, its network motifs have
to be studied by analysing its dynamics. In the case of Coyte et al. they perform a linear
stability analysis to study the reaction of the community to small perturbations. This
analysis, however, does not make competition explanatory of the stability behaviour
of the microbiome. As we explained extensively in Sect. 5, once Coyte et al. have
determined the distribution of ai j that make the microbiome stable, they have to study
how the variations in the proportions of interaction types will affect the stability of
the community. In other words, what makes competition explanatory in Coyte et al.’s
model is not the strength of the interactions between the members of the microbiome,
but the character (competitive, cooperative, exploitative, etc.) that those interactions
have.
The previous observation entails that it is possible to have two communities with the
same topology (i.e. with the same nodes, edges), but where only one of them is stable,
whereas the other is not, due to the role that the interaction types have on the stability
behaviour of the microbiome. Importantly, the knowledge of the influence of the
interaction types on the dynamics that the topology instantiates is only possible once
the model of the mechanism has been specified. Before this happens, and cooperation,
competition, exploitation, etc. have been defined as possible activities of the entities,
it is impossible to know whether the interaction types will have any influence on the
dynamics of the network, since the latter is not the case for many other networks
that might instantiate a random topology (e.g. the internet). Therefore, the knowledge
of the dynamics is, by itself, insufficient to make competition explanatory, since the
knowledge that competition will influence stability derives from the knowledge of the
model of the mechanism of the microbiome.
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From the two previous observations we derive that the explanation of the stability
behaviour of the microbiome is a case of integrative pluralism, where a model of
the mechanism needs to be combined with a mathematical analysis in order to be
explanatory. As we argued in Sect. 5, the stability behaviour of the microbiome cannot
be explained exclusively in terms of the topological properties of the network. Since
it is a random network, it needs to be complemented with the study of the dynamics
that the topology instantiates. As we argued there, this is a consequence of the fact
that the network motifs of a random network can only be discovered a posteriori, by
determining the effects that the interaction types have on the stability of the network.
However, this claim about the study of the dynamics cannot be extended to every
random network, since the reasons that make each random network stable will be
different depending on their nature, and thus on the type of mathematical analysis
that has to be done to determine its properties. The type of mathematical analysis
will nevertheless depend on the model of the mechanism that is instantiated in each
case, which will determine the nature of the entities that interact, as well as how
their activities will be produced. The point we are making is thus that every scientific
explanation that relies on the realization of a topology will be a case of integrative
pluralism if the network that is realized is random.
7 Conclusion
The case study analysed in this paper fits well with the recent tendency in philosophy
of science to emphasize the important role that mathematics play in some scientific
explanations. Particularly, our case study, even if focused on behaviour explanations,
shares many similarities with some of the cases of topological explanation analysed by
Huneman (2010, 2018a, b). As in the cases he studies, the stability of the microbiome
cannot be explained purely in mechanistic terms, due to the impossibility of telling
a causal story that explains how the system behaves. Additionally, the explanation
we analyse in this paper also gains its explanatory force from the specification of
the topological properties of the system. However, and in contrast with the cases
of explanations of the behaviour of non-random networks, in the case presented by
Coyte et al. (which analyses the behaviour of a random network) the specification of
the topology of the community is not enough to account for the explanandum (the
stability behaviour of the microbiome). The authors are also required to study the
dynamics that the topology instantiates, as well as to discover which set of topologies
will make the system stable in virtue of its dynamics. Such set of topologies can
only be discovered by studying the response of the rightmost eigenvalue to different
proportions of Pm . Because the knowledge that the interaction types will influence
the stability behaviour of the microbiome is only acquired after the model of the
mechanism for the phenomenon is expelled out, Coyte et al.’s explanation constitutes
a case of integrative pluralism. In other words, the explanatory force of their model is
only gained from the combination of mathematical and mechanistic knowledge.
As a consequence, the analysis of our case study proves two main points: (a) the
explanation of the behaviour of non-random ecological networks is different form the
explanation of the behaviour of random networks. That is to say, because the network
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is random, there is not any network type whose specification would automatically
explain the behaviour of the system, and thus the network motifs have to be discovered;
(b) behaviour explanations of random ecological networks are cases of integrative
pluralism, in which knowledge from mathematics and from ecology are integrated to
solve a complex problem. Concretely, the model of the mechanisms determines how
to construct and study the mathematical model so that the explanans that accounts for
the explanandum can be provided.
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